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This study develops a conceptual model that explains vertical integration as a synthesis of
transaction costs economics and the competence perspective. It is proposed that variables
derived from these two perspectives are complementary and interact in the vertical integration
decision. The underlying behavioral assumptions in the two perspectives are examined and
discussed. The assumptions of opportunism and bounded rationality as used in the TCE-
framework are respecified and based on a synthesis of transaction cost economics,
evolutionary economics and the resource-based perspective.
The model developed was empirically tested on a sample of Norwegian hydroelectric power
stations industry. The results from the test show that the concepts derived from the two
perspectives have substantial impact on the vertical integration decision. Consequently, the
synthesis provides a much more powerful framework for explaining vertical integration, than
the two perspectives may contribute in isolation. Accordingly, the two perspectives should be
integrated into a unified framework sharing the same set of assumptions. Transaction cost
economics and the competence perspective are not, as previously argued, in conflict, but are
complementary. In the last part of the dissertation theoretical and managerial implications are
presented and discussed, and suggestions for future research are provided.
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PART I: INTRODUCTION
This part of the dissertation consists of the introduction chapter, which presents the




Vertical integration - internalization into the firm oftasks carried out by suppliers or customers
- is a major strategic option. The literature on vertical integration is discussed in many
contexts, and can roughly be divided into studies that are concerned about the effects of
vertical integration, and the studies that focus on the determinants of vertical integration. The
purpose ofthis dissertation is to focus on the latter aspect, and to examine factors expected to
affect vertical integration. The objective is to synthesize two perspectives, the competence
perspective (Wernerfelt, 1984; Conner, 1991; Kogut & Zander, 1992; 1993; Prahaled &
Hamel, 1990; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Winter, 1988) and transaction cost economics
(Williamson, 1975; 1979; 1981; 1985; 1991), seemingly viewed as contradictory perspectives,
into a unified framework for analyzing the vertical integration decision.
The use of the two perspectives raises several important questions, which are not, yet,
answered in the literature: Does a firm's existing competence matter in the choice of economic
organization? If so, why is this aspect not included in the existing dominating framework
explaining governance forms? Do all economic actors involved in exchange processes act
opportunistically? Is there any kind of connection between opportunism, transaction costs and
competence? Is the potential of opportunistic behavior only a problem in exchange processes
involving autonomous parts? Does the firm in all circumstances have a superior ability to
hamper opportunistic behavior, or are there some organizational mechanisms that may
decrease or increase the degree of opportunistic behavior inside firm boundaries? Transaction
cost economics and the recently developed perspective of what may be called the competence
perspective have to date offered seemingly contradictory answers to these questions. While the
former theory is well established as a part of the new institutional economics, the latter
perspective is not yet fully developed as a theory. While both perspectives rest on efficiency
considerations, the solutions they describe rest on different behavioral assumptions, as well as
different interpretations offactors that determine the fum's efficient boundaries. This study will
show that to date these two approaches have asked complementary questions and provide
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complementary answers. Accordingly, we will in this study argue that in isolation, transaction
cost economics and the competence perspective leave critical issues unaddressed.
Is it, however, possible to develop a consistent synthesis ofthese two perspectives by utilizing
the same set of underlying assumptions? As Simon (1991) states, the choice of assumptions is
the foundation of a theory, as it influences the selection of variables included in a model.
Accordingly, there will be a trade-off between the clarity and precision in a theory's
assumptions, and the realism in the predictions or explanations derived from the theory.
Consequently, is it logically possible, realistic or even «right» to incorporate the same
assumptions into both perspectives without losing the predictive power of one or both of the
perspectives? We address this issue by developing a synthesis, and examine the paradigmatic
choice of market versus hierarchical governance. Accordingly, utilizing the synthesis, attention
is directed toward the determinants ofvertical integration.
Theoretical and empirical work devoted to explaining vertical integration has taken a number
of different approaches. The most applicable and dominating rationale to the neo-classical cost
efficiency explanations, has so far been transaction costs economics (Perry, 1989). Transaction
cost economics focuses on market failure and how to reduce opportunistic potential as
explanations why tirms integrate activities. However, in recent years the competence
perspective (Conner, 1991; Kogut & Zander, 1992; 1993; 1996; Conner & Prahaled, 1996;
Grant, 1996) has proposed competing theoretical explanations for the vertical integration
decision. The competence perspective emphasizes that the performance gains from assessing
internal capabilities and competence drive boundary decisions. The perspective focuses on the
limits of internal organization, and views organizational failure as a condition when a new
activity does not tit the firm's existing operations and competence.
Thus, while transaction cost economics mainly is concerned about transaction cost efficiency,
the competence perspective more explicitly directs attention to production cost efficiency. The
latter perspective argues that because firms have different resources, they often carry out the
same activity with different production costs, and contrary to transaction cost economics, this
perspective does not address performance losses from opportunism. However, very little
attention has been given to explaining vertical integration within the latter framework (Poppo
& Zenger, 1995; Argyres, 1996), compared with the extensive attention, empirically as well as
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theoretically, the former has received (cf. Shelanski & Klein, 1995; Rindfleisch & Heide,
1997).
When studying vertical integration there is a need for theories that can explain limits to firm
size, beyond the market failure argument (Wiggins, 1991). A competence perspective is argued
to be well suited for this issue (Kogut & Zander, 1992; 1993). However, a theory of
organizational failure must put the "study ofinternal organization more nearly on a parity with
the theory of markets and market failure" (Williamson, 1994: 19). Accordingly, the possibility
of incorporating transaction cost economics and the competence framework into the same
model should be examined (Conner, 1991; Mahoney & Pandian, 1992; Williamson, 1994). The
competence perspective, however, is inadequate in that no consensus exists regarding
definition and operationalization of core concepts. Consequently, clear criteria have not yet
been developed for identifying, characterizing and isolating firm competencies (Williamson,
1994; Nordhaug, 1993; Bogaert, Martens & Van Cauwenbergh, 1994; Argyres, 1996; Teece,
Pisano & Shuen, 1997). Because of this lack of core concepts to test the predictions from the
competence perspective, there is a need to define and isolate different competence concepts
grounded in the perspective. Accordingly, this study directs attention to developing and
defining a concept that is qualified for testing the predictions from the competence perspective.
This study directs attention to one, and probably the most focused issue addressed in the
competence perspective. We focus on the issue in which familiarity or closeness in competence
to an activity will be one important concept for testing predictions from this perspective.
Theoretical rationale for the need of such a concept is found in the closely associated
approaches of evolutionary economics (Nelson & Winter, 1982), the resource-based theory
(Penrose, 1959; Wernerfelt, 1984), and the core competence approach (Prahaled & Hamel,
1990). In this study these three approaches will together be labeled as the competence
perspective. Evolutionary economics, the resource-based perspective and the core competence
approach are closely related as they all focus on dynamic as well as evolutionary contexts
(Mahoney & Pandian, 1992), share the same assumptions regarding human actors and focus on
the limits of internal organization (Collis, 1991).
In sum, this study seeks to identity to what degree a synthesis of the two perspectives is
possible. To offer an answer to this we follow a deductive theorizing approach (Lakatos,
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1978; Camerer, 1985; Chiles & McMackin, 1996), and the behavioral assumptions that
underlie the predictions in the perspectives will be examined and synthesized. Based on this,
we argue that a theory of vertical integration can be developed as a synthesis of transaction
cost economics and the competence perspective. We develop a conceptual model that
incorporates main concepts and predictions from both perspectives. The study addresses this
issue by examining buyers' incentives to integrate in industrial buyer-vendor dyads.
Consequently, the main purpose of the present study is to extend the two addressed
perspectives by developing a synthesis and to test that synthesis empirically.
1.2 Research questions
The study seeks to build up arguments for an integration of two approaches that previously
have been argued to be competing rather than complementary theories of vertical integration
(Conner, 1991; Poppo & Zenger, 1995; Argyres, 1996). In order to achieve this objective, one
has to identify and clarify the explanatory mechanisms as well as examine the underlying
assumptions that drive the predictions in the theories (Lakatos, 1978). Empirical testing cannot
solve this issue. It must rather be based on purely theoretical reasoning to decide if the two
perspectives are rival or complementary explanations of vertical integration. Accordingly, the
following research question has to be answered:
Research question 1:
To what degree are the competence perspective and transaction costs
economics complementary theories of vertical integration, and to what
degree is it possible to develop a consistent synthesis of these perspectives?
If a synthesis can be logically outlined, the next issue is to decide how major concepts derived
from the two perspectives will affect the vertical integration decision. To my knowledge, there
exist no concepts, neither theoretically nor operationally defined in the literature, to test
predictions from the competence perspective, that closeness in competence to activities will
affect vertical integration. Implicit in the following research question is therefore an attention
directed to defining a concept from the competence perspective, which can be empirically
tested. Accordingly, the second research question is:
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Research question 2:
How do major concepts derived from the competence perspective and
transaction cost economics affect vertical integration?
1.3 Significance of the topic
There are several reasons for studying vertical integration by examining the complementarity
between transaction cost theory and the competence perspective. First, such a study may
provide a broader and more complete understanding of the phenomenon than each perspective
may provide in isolation. Thus, the study seeks to explain vertical integration both from a
market failure perspective as well as from an organizational failure perspective. In the
literature, this problem has received limited theoretical and empirical attention. Secondly, the
realism of the behavioral assumptions of transaction cost economics has been strongly
attacked. Thus, the study seeks to give a theoretical rationale for a synthesis through relaxing
the behavioral assumptions of transaction cost economics. Third, the competence perspective
lacks rigorously developed concepts for testing its predictions. Development of concepts
derived from the competence perspective is therefore both necessary and useful for further
theoretical development. Thus, the study outlines, defines and operationalizes a concept for
testing the prediction from the competence perspective, and also conceptually distinguishes this
concept from previous "competence" concepts used in economics.
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1.4 Organization of the dissertation
The dissertation is divided into four main parts. In a addition to the introduction part, Part II
provides the foundation for the overall theoretical perspective of this study, and the discussion
will be guided by research question l. Part II closes by answering this research question. Part
III consists of two chapters. First the conceptual model of the relationships to be studied
empirically is presented. Next, the research hypotheses are outlined and formulated. The last
Chapter in Part III presents the research design, and provides a description of the choices
connected to an empirical test of the hypotheses. Part IV includes the last two chapters. First,
the results of the empirical analysis are presented. The model is empirically tested on a sample
of Norwegian hydroelectric power stations industry. The industry consists of 600 business
units, in which 411 of these were identified and asked to respond to a questionnaire. The last
chapter contains a discussion of the results of the study. The chapter includes suggestions for
future research and implications for theory and practice.
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PART II: LITERATURE REVIEW AND MAJOR
CONCEPTS
This part of the dissertation consists of 4 chapters. In Chapter 2 the theoretical position of this
study is outlined and the two focused perspectives on vertical integration are reviewed.
Moreover, major concepts derived from the two perspectives are outlined and defined. Chapter
3 discusses and defines the behavioral assumptions, which underlie the predictions in the
dissertation. This is done by confronting the assumptions from transaction costs economics
with the behavioral assumption that implicitly can be found in the competence perspective.
Chapter 4 discusses and defines the concept of interfirm trust. In Chapter 5, we summarize the
discussion. Chapter 5 concludes with the answering ofresearch question l.
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2. THEORETICAL PERSPECTIVES ON VERTICAL
INTEGRATION
Section 2.1 argues for the relevance of using transaction cost economics and the competence
perspective as the overall theoretical framework for explaining the phenomenon studied. In
Section 2.2 the transaction cost framework is reviewed and analyzed. In section 2.3
evolutionary economics, the resource-based theory, and the core competence perspective are
reviewed and analyzed. These latter perspectives are together argued to represent a
competence perspective on vertical integration. Each perspective or theory is discussed
according to its underlying assumptions, unit of analysis, strength and limitations. A definition
and an outline of the concept of closeness to primary competence are the main objective of
Section 2.4. The distinction between the concept of primary competence and earlier
"competence" concepts used in economics, is the issue of Section 2.5. A summary and a
discussion of implications are presented in Section 2.6. We argue that TeE and the
competence perspective focus on different explanatory mechanisms when predicting vertical
integration, and that an examination of the underlying assumptions in the two perspectives are
necessary in order to analyze to which extent the competence perspective and TeE are
complementary rather than competing theories ofvertical integration.
2.1 Theoretical position
Vertical integration has been studied in great depth in economics. The three broad
determinants focused on have been market imperfections, technological economies, and
contractual economies (Perry, 1989). The first two represent neo-classical rationale for
vertical integration. The models have primarily used arguments due to increasing return to
scale and attention has been directed to exploring the consequences of modifying the standard
assumptions of competition, e.g. to restrain trade and create entry barriers. However, the
fundamental paradox of orthodox theory is that the firm need not exist. Orthodox theory fails
to provide an understanding of firm behavior, as it assumes away or does not regard
phenomena such as transaction costs (Coase, 1937), limits on rationality (Simon, 1959; Nelson
& Winter, 1982), opportunism (Williamson, 1975), learning processes (Rumelt, 1994) and
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information asymmetry (Alchian & Demsetz, 1972). Accordingly, neoclassical economics has
largely ignored the concept of the firm by viewing it strictly as a production function
(Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Consequently, orthodox theory can neither answer why markets
are not able to co-ordinate as firms do, nor why one big finn cannot work as well as markets
(Winter, 1988).
When we build the conceptual model in this study, we follow the above critique and do not
further address the neo-classical approach'. Accordingly, we are interested in going beyond the
orthodoxy view of the firm as a "black box", and examine the efficient boundaries of firms in
an organizational as well as in a market failure context. As the contractual approach is the
candidate framework to evaluate the market failure argument, so far theories for explaining
vertical integration from an organizational failure framework are nearly absent. Traditional
scope considerations on firms are not sufficient in this respect. Chandler's treatment of
economies of scope lacks systematic comparison of contractual considerations as well as how
to grapple the concept of dynamic capabilities, and therefore offers no formal theory of the
firm (Teece, 1993). According to Teece, further progress in the scope considerations of the
firm should emphasize the finn as a unique bundle of resources. Further, he recognizes that bits
and pieces of such a theory can be found in the contributions from e.g. Penrose (1959) and
Nelson & Winter (1982).
Leaving aside market imperfection and technological economics, the theoretical framework for
this study is anchored in transaction cost economics (Williamson, 1975; 1979; 1981; 1985;
1991), the resource-based perspective (Penrose, 1959; Wemerfelt, 1984; Conner, 1991;
Prahaled & Hamel, 1990) and evolutionary economics (Nelson & Winter, 1982; Winter, 1988;
Kogut & Zander, 1992; 1993). In addition we use arguments from Arrow (1974) on
information and search costs, and the knowledge transmission theory from Hennart (1982),
when the behavioral assumptions of the study are outlined.
JHowever. previous studies have established that various economic. strategic and power-dependency forces may influence
vertical integration. We recognize the legitimacy oj alternative perspectives and return to these motives when introducing
control variables supplementing our conceptual model (Section 7.5).
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2.2 Contractual Economies and Transaction Cost Economics
The background
Coase (1937) was the first scholar to pose the question which activities are mediated through
markets and which within formal organizations from a contractual point of view. Coase
challenged the orthodox economic assumption that market transactions between economic
actors could be handled without cost, and thereby added the concept of transaction cost to the
price-theoretical apparatus. The main problem introduced was to economize on transaction
cost, because the transaction costs differ according to the nature of the transaction and the way
it is organized. According to Coase, under certain conditions the cost of conducting economic
exchange in a market may exceed the cost of organizing the exchange within the firm.
Accordingly, in order to address the question of a firm's efficient boundaries, the focus was
directed to contractual constraints and the understanding of the exchange relation rather than
production constraints.
The analysis by Coase was not given any further attention before the contributions by Alchian
& Demsetz (1972) and Williamson (1975)2. According to Alchian & Demsetz, the existence of
the firm was explainable in terms of the incentive problems that arise when team production is
combined with asymmetrical information and shirking tendencies. Firms then arise because a
manager can subjectively evaluate the performance of individual workers and discipline
individual team workers. The theory then centers on the incentive problems of joint
production. In such situations actors will not bear the full social cost of their action, and
extensive shirking is the result. The problem is therefore to structure effective systems in a
manner that minimizes their costs. In this perspective the firms are viewed as an entity of
"nexus of contracts" (Jensen & Meckling, 1976; Farna, 1980).
While the "measuring" branch has mainly been centered on the cost of metering productivity
and rewards, Williamson (1979; 1981; 1985) has focused on asset specificity as the main
2rCE (Williamson, 1975: 1985) is often described as the asset specificity branch oj the new institutional economics, as
opposed to the work oj Alchian and Demsetz, which is labeled the measurement or metering approach (Shelanski & Klein,
1995).
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determinant regarding make/buy decisions. Such specific assets give rise to what Klein,
Crawford and Alchian (1978) call"appropriable quasi-rents", which are the difference between
the value of the asset in its best use and the value in its next best use. The tussle for rent in
bilateral situations characterized by asset specificity is, given the assumptions of opportunism
and bounded rationality, the driving forces behind firms' integration of activities. A
fundamental assumption in transaction cost economics (TCE) is that the predicted governance
forms serve efficiency purposes and economize on transaction costs (i.e. the costs of
negotiating, writing, monitoring, and enforcing contracts between trading partners).
Although the two approaches surely have addressed the same questions from the Coasian
analysis', they have given rather different answers'. The metering branch views the firm as a
complex set of market contracts. This makes it difficult to give the firm an analytical meaning.
The main problem is that the manager (as well as the workers) can come from an employee of
a separate firm with a contract that specifies his reward as the residual output, and thus
offering no explanation of firms boundaries (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1989; Mahoney, 1992). The
pr~blem of organizatiQ!l.E:L'anQ!l~ is not shared by TCE, where organizational setting
characteristics are important determinants for efficient governance structures. This difference
might best be traced back to the behavioral assumptions ofhuman actors in the two branches.
The metering approach has clearly a "stronger" rationality assumption than TCE, which in
some respects is close to orthodox theory. The owner is fully aware of the hazard the agent
poses, and, therefore, the problem is a matter of incorporating all relevant action into ex ante
incentive alignments. The nexus of contracts approach therefore treats human actors as capable
of processing all relevant information ex ante. The boundaries of the firm are therefore not an
interesting issue, because the parties can agree today about a contract that needs no change in
the future. The metering approach therefore theorizes about the contract between co-operating
parties, regardless of boundaries (Eisenhardt, 1989). Hence, "it does not matter what
affiliations the parties have and hence where the contract is embedded organizationally"
(Holmstrom & Tirole, 1989:68). Therefore, TCE comes forth as the most suitable theory from
3And what they share. of course. is thefocus on exchange processes and its relevance in economic analysis.
4For a more detailed discussion of the difference between the approaches. see Williamson (1985. chapter J & 2).
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the contractual perspective concerned about the issue of firm boundaries, and is further
regarded below.
Transaction Cost Economics (TCE)
After presenting an overview of the theory, the major empirical TCE-studies on vertical
integration are summarized. A discussion of implications is then provided. Particularly, we
discuss critical issues not addressed by the TCE-framework.
The theory. TCE identifies different modes of governance for transactions. The theory
explicitly addresses firm versus market questions and gives an explanation why the firm exists
and what determines its boundaries'. The ways of organizing transactions differ in costs
depending on the characteristics of the transaction in question (Williamson, 1979). These
characteristics or dimensions are uncertainty, the frequency of the particular transaction, and
the degree to which durable, transaction specific investments are required to realize least cost
supply (Williamson, 1985). Williamson proposes that where transactions have highly uncertain
outcomes, recur frequently, and require transaction specific investments, they can be
performed most efficiently within hierarchies.
According to Williamson, the governance choice is determined by firms' economizing on
transaction costs. Williamson (1985) classifies transaction costs into three main groups;
bargaining costs, control and monitoring costs and maladaption costs. Bargaining costs refer to
the costs induced through negotiations ofambiguous terms of trade. Control costs include time
and resources spent on monitoring and evaluating various dimensions of the transactions taking
place between transacting parties. Maladaption costs occur when dependent parties are unable
to respond quickly and easily to changing circumstances because of self-interest bargaining and
disagreements. These transaction costs come into being because of actors' opportunistic
potential and bounded rationality, combined with high asset specificity situations.
5Moreover, TeE as a framework has been applied in studying a variety of economic relationships (e.g. long-term
contracting, franchising, and the organization of m:>rk,joint venture and other contractual relationships). However, as
Williamson (1985: 13) states: "Vertical integration is not only an important condition in its own right but equally because
the transaction cost treatment of the decision to integrate is paradigmatic ",
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As briefly mentioned, TCE operates with two behavioral assumptions. Williamson's concept of
bounded rationality is derived from Simon and defined as: "... a condition in which human
agents are intendedly rational, but limitedly so" (Williamson, 1985:45). The cognitive
limitations of human actors are acknowledged, as they are not capable of writing
comprehensive contracts accounting for all possible contingencies. However, Williamson uses
only one strand of Simon's original concept, namely the cognitive limits to rationality leaving
aside the 'satisficing' part of the concept (Martin, 1993). Therefore, actors are viewed as
rational in their capacity to handle their own cognitive limitations as they are supposed to
calculate the efficiency of different governance modes (Williamson, 1991). Opportunism is by
Williamson (1985) defined as "self interest seeking with guile" (p. 47). It is a rather strong
assumption of the selfish motives of actors resulting in shirking and dishonesty. The problem
with opportunism in the TCE-framework is connected to the assumption of bounded
rationality. Accordingly, both the assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunism have to
be present in order to outline the transaction costs issues raised by Williamson. If either one of
the behavioral assumptions should be absent, answering the question of efficient governance
would be different: ",. contracting would nevertheless be feasible if human agents were not
given to opportunism Thus, if agents, though boundedly rational, were fully trustworthy,
comprehensive contracting would still be feasible" (Williamson, 1981:554). However, the fact
that economic agents are "simultaneously subject to bounded rationality and .. are given to
opportunism does not itself .. vitiate autonomous trading" (Williamson, 1981:554). It is the
presence of a high degree of investments in asset specificity that creates the situation where the
consequences of opportunistic behavior are critical. Asset specificity or transaction specific
investments is by Williamson defined, as investments required to realize least cost supply.
When asset specificity is high, hierarchical solutions are assumed more efficient than market
solutions, since internal opportunism is, in this framework, easily handled by the organizational
mechanism of fiat. When asset specificity is low, however, it would always, according to
Williamson, be efficient to use market solutions due to the weaker incentives and the higher
transaction costs, which exist internally.
Empirical studies. Even though all the three dimensions mentioned above are expected to
affect the choice of governance form, asset specificity is the critical one: "Asset specificity is
both the most important dimension for describing transactions and the most neglected attnbute
in prior studies of organization" (Williamson, 1981:555). Thus, asset specificity is the
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dimension that is most utilized in empirical works. Regarding the to other two dimensions,
very few empirical studies have examined transaction frequency (Mahoney, 1992; Shelanski &
Klein, 1995; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). However, the few studies examining the
hypothesized effect of frequency have been largely unsuccessful in that they "have failed to find
any positive association between transaction frequency and hierarchical governance"
(Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997:31). Uncertainty has been commonly employed in the empirical
literature on vertical integration. However, the effect of uncertainty has showed mixed results.
For example Harrigan (1986) finds that uncertainty reduces the probability ofintegration, while
Walker & Weber (1987) find that uncertainty increases the probability of integration. Asset
specificity has been extensively employed in empirical work on transaction costs explanations
for vertical integration. Evidence in support of asset specificity's impact on vertical integration
has been obtained in numerous studies. Reviews of TeE (cf. Joskow, 1988; Mahoney, 1992;
Shelanski & Klein, 1995; Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997) show that asset specificity has significant
effects on vertical integration. Thus, from TeE asset specificity is both theoretically and
empirically the most important determinant ofvertical integration.
According to TeE, the governance decision will involve a trade-off between transaction and
production costs. Thus, some TCfi-studies have given support to the argument that
heterogeneous firm resources and production costs influence the make-buy decision.
Monteverde & Teece (1982) find that the heterogeneous and unobserved firm effects had most
significant influence on the make or buy decision. The study, however, also supported the
transaction cost argument. Walker & Weber (1984; 1987) found production costs to be more
statistically important predictors of the make or buy decision than were transaction costs. Even
though the most important indicator of vertical integration was found to be differential firm
capabilities, the Walker and Weber studies also, like the Monteverde & Teece study, find
support for the transaction cost argument. According to Walker & Weber (1984): "... the
effect of transaction costs on make-or-buy decisions was substantially overshadowed by
comparative production costs" (p. 387). These three studies state that while boundaries of the
firm indisputably are influenced by transactional dilemmas, they also propose the issue that
firms' differential production costs matter. However, other studies (Anderson, 1985; John &
Weitz, 1988) find the opposite. Because of the mixed findings and the fact that very few
studies have examined the role of production costs, further research is needed to clarify the
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role of production costs vs. transaction costs in determining appropriate governance structures
(Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997).
To what degree can we question some of the empirical research done in the TCli-program?
Shelanski & Klein (1995) give some guidelines to why the measuring of asset specificity in
some cases can be questioned. They assert that asset specificity sometimes has been confused
with other factors, and that imperfect measures on asset specificity in some empirical works are
not able "to capture whether the investment has alternative value outside the transaction for
which is was initially made" (p. 344). This leads us to questioning the construct validity.
Additionally, the studies that measure vertical integration as a dichotomous variable (e.g.
Monteverde & Teece, 1982; Masten, 1984; Walker & Weber, 1984: 1987) give no exact
measure on the predictions from TeE and the focus on exchange relations. This means that it
offers no exact attention to the standard TeE paradigm in which "partners are locked into a
relationships ex post because of investments that have substantially higher value than outside
it" (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1989:69). As Wiggins (1991) states, empirical studies in a TCE
framework are subject to multiple interpretations. In fact, one could alternatively interpret
some of the results in the way that firms continue to do things that are close to or identical to
what they have done earlier, and not that it is the properties of the transaction per se that
matter. However, relatedness in resources and competence has not been conceptualized as an
alternative explanation in empirical work on TeE, which may be a matter of internal validity
problems.
Critical remarks. Even though asset specificity has shown to be an important determinant of
vertical integration, there is a need for other theories to be developed (Mahoney & Pandian,
1992; Minkler, 1993; Kogut, 1991; Whyte, 1994). TeE has little to offer in low asset
specificity situations other than an exclusive advantage for market allocations (Wiggins, 1991).
Following TCE, there are no limits of firm size, if and when the market fails. As Gibbons
(96:4-5) states: "TeE has emphasized inefficiencies o •• of the market in conducting certain
transactions ..., rather than the inefficiencies of the firm in its internal organization and
operation". Hence, there is a need for a supplementary theory of organizational failure
(Williamson, 1994).
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TCE gives no attention to what extent the integration of an activity will fit a firm's existing
competence or resource base, and, thus, no attention is directed to firms' uniqueness in
resources or competence. TCE "assumes that the same productive activity can be carried out
either within the firm or by a collection of autonomous contractors; that is except for the
problem of opportunism, the same inputs can be used equally productively in a firm or in a
market context" (Conner, 1991:142). Accordingly, there is no focus on firms' potential
production constraints. Moreover, TCE assumes opportunistic actors, and is not able to "give
refutable prediction about the implications of a deviance from opportunism" (Heide & John,
92:32). Accordingly, TCE does not specify the mechanisms through which opportunistic
behavior is created or is reduced (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). Although trust appears to be an
essential element in efforts to explain the nature of economic organization (Ring, 1997), it is
not incorporated into the mainstream model of TeE. Accordingly, trust as a governance
mechanism (Bradach & Eccles, 1989) is generally ignored (Ring & Van de Ven, 92).
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2.3 The competence approach
Below, evolutionary economics (Nelson & Winter, 1982), the resource based perspective
(Wemerfelt, 1984) and the core competence perspective (Prahaled & Hamel, 1990) are
discussed and analyzed. These perspectives are argued to represent a unified competence
perspective on firms. Moreover, we review the few theoretical and empirical studies that
address how competence affects the choice of economic organization.
2.3.1 Evolutionary Economics (EE)
Evolutionary economics (Nelson & Winter, 1982) focuses on firm dynamics. Nelson &
Winter's contribution can be divided into a macro- and a micro part. In the macro part markets
are viewed as dynamic and would never reach the equilibrium stadium as postulated by
orthodox economic theory. Instead organizations will continually be confronted with ways of
reproducing themselves. They do so by selecting successfully standard operating routines from
the environment over time, and store those as a part of the organization's memory. The
environment will select the firms that use relatively efficient routines. The micro part
concentrates on how firms follow rules and routines, which give stability in operational
activities. The primary concept to signify organizational functioning is routines. The
organizational routines (using an analogy to biological genes) are the main reasons why
organizations are resistant to change. The evolutionary dynamic explanation stresses that some
antecedent conditions existed and "that the state of affairs now observed reflects -the
cumulative effect of the laws of change operating on that antecedent condition" (Winter,
1988: 172). EE holds that actors have limited capacity to perform new tasks and regards actors'
production constraints or what we refer to as bounded production rationality. The fundamental
view in EE that organizations 'know how to do things', means that they know how to do things
they are familiar with and not how to do things they are not familiar with. As Winter
(1988: 176) states; ".. when a firm grows by vertical integration, it is not just a question of
'more of the same'. But it is [also] more ofsomething closely related, something about which
the firm already has some degree of relevant knowledge. The evolutionary view suggests that
this 'degree' is probably an important determinant ofwhere integration takes place and where it
does not." (p. 176).
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2.3.2 Resource-based theory and the core competence approach
The resource-based view (Wernerfelt, 1984) emerged as a counterpoint to market structure
analyses of competitive strategy, where competitive advantage is primarily seen as a function
of inherent industry attractiveness and the market positioning of individual firms. As Teece,
Pisano & Shuen (1997:513) state:
This approach [i.e., the resource-based perspective] focuses on the rents accruing to the owners of
scarce firm-specific resources rather than the economic profits from product market positioning.
Competitive advantage lies 'upstream' of product markets and rests on the firm's idiosyncratic and
difficult-to-imitate resources.
Even though the 1984-article by Wernerfelt gave the start of a new renaissance in strategy, the
basic ideas from the resource-based perspective (that connects performance to a firm's unique
competencies and resources) has for a long time been of concern. Drawing on insight from
economics (Penrose, 1959; Schumpeter; 1934; Nelson & Winter, 1982), administrative science
(Selznik, 1957) and strategy (Andrews, 1971) scholars identified a view of corporate strategy
that placed unique difficult-to-imitate skills, knowledge and other resources (tangible as well
intangible) ahead of focusing exclusively on the competitive environment. The underlying
theoretical approach is to see the firm as a unique bundle of intangible and tangible resources,
and not through its activities in the product market (Wernerfelt, 1984). The emerging central
theme addressed seems to be that privately held knowledge or competence is the basic source
ofadvantage in competition (Conner & Prahaled, 1996). Conner & Prahaled (1996:477) state:
As the literature makes increasingly clear, a knowledge-based view is the essence of the resource-based
perspective ... The resource-based view generally addresses performance differences between firms
using asymmetries in knowledge (and in associated competencies or capabilities ... ). A resource-based
theory of the firm thus entails a knowledge-based perspective.
So far, however, little attention has been given to explaining economic organization and
vertical integration in the resource-based literature (Poppo & Zenger, 1995). However,
resource-based theory (RBT) generally points out that limits of integration can come from a
lack of relatedness, not only from the opportunism problem (Conner, 1991; Conner &
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Prahaled, 1996; Kogut & Zander, 1992; Kogut & Zander, 1996}. RBT emphasizes that firms
lack the capability to develop new competencies quickly (Dierickx & Cool, 1989), which
implies that the choices of domains of competence are influenced by past choices (Teece,
Pisano & Shuen, 1997). Teece, Pisano and Shuen (1997:515) further state:
At any given point in time, firms must follow a certain trajectory or path of competence development.
This path not only defines what choices are open to the firm today, but it also puts bounds around what
its internal repertoire is likely to be in the future.
Thus, according to RBT (and in accordance with EE), a finn will fail on vertical integration if a
new activity does not fit the finn's existing competence base. Therefore, RBT represents,
according to Conner (1991:143), an "alternative rationale for existence of the finn and its
scope".
The roots of the core competence approach (Prahaled & Hamel, 1990) can be traced back to
the resource-based view of the finn, and is based on the same assumption that the uniqueness
offirms is the foundations for competitive advantages (Rurnelt, 1994). However, in contrast to
the resource-based approach, where rent-earning factors were identified as the whole 'bundle
of resources', the core competence approach almost exclusively focuses on competence as the
most important factor, considering other resources as less important. In a way the approach is
not unlike an activity chain, because a core competence is tied to competitive advantage
through core products, which again is the basis for the final products. This implies that
competence is viewed as the foundation of the value-creating process (De Leo, 1994; Bogner
& Thomas, 1994), and that the unit of analysis is the underlying competence, and not a
particular product or service (Hamel, 1994). Therefore, focusing on core competence means
that some kind of competencies underlie the activities or transactions in question, which comes
earlier in the causal chain, and that some competencies must be reflected in the performance of
the activity. In this study the core competence approach is viewed as a category classified
under the RBT -frameworks,
6 Moreover, since this study brings attention to competence issues, the concept of core competence is used as a theoretical
departure when defining the concept of closeness to primary competence (cf section 2.4).
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2.3.3 A unified approach
EE is closely aligned with the resource-based perspective. EE and RBT share with orthodox
theory the ignorance of exchange processes in their analysis. Firms are further viewed as
repositories of productive knowledge, making no difference between production and
transaction costs, and is embedded in the same knowledge or competence class (Blackler,
1995). Both perspectives focus on dynamic as well as evolutionary contexts (Mahoney &
Pandian, 1992). EE follows the Schumpeterian dynamic competition model, which involves
carrying out "new combinations» including new methods of production. This model may be
translated into the RBT framework (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992) by considering the firrn's "new
combinations ofresources" (Penrose, 1959:85), as means ofdeploying existing resources into
new business activities. In an evolutionary context, both approaches emphasize that firms' past
decisions and decision rules are the basic genetics that firms possess (Mahoney & Pandian,
1992). Accordingly, firms are viewed as repositories of competence, and it is emphasized that
this competence base involves idiosyncratic features that distinguish them from other firms in
the same business. Both pay attention to the internal resources of the firm, and how these are
acquired and developed (Collis, 1991). Moreover, neither of the perspectives consider
transaction costs (Winter, 1988; Collis, 1991), and ignores the issue that some human agents
are given to opportunism(Foss, 1996a; 1996b).
Even though RBT and EE are closely aligned, EE is better suited to understand the kind of
bounded rationality found in the competence perspective, while RBT (together with the core
competence perspective) provides a better understanding of the importance of a firm's unique
resources and competencies. EE is mostly concerned about explaining firms' routine behavior
in a descriptive way, while RBT and the core competence perspective are concerned with the
more normative strategic aspect of identifying inputs likely to generate rents. EE, in contrast to
TCE, relies more on the "behavioralist" position (Cyert & March, 1963) when arguing that
organizations will resist change, because they will follow procedures that have given earlier
success. EE focuses explicitly on the limitations firms' routines, as firms are supposed to
reproduce themselves instead of adapting to perfectly competitive environment. According to
Nelson & Winter (1982), firms are "much better changing in direction of 'more of the same',
than they are at any other kind of change" (pp. 9-10). Accordingly, EE moves attention to
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firms' limited capability to perform new and different tasks (Winter, 1988). The latter view on
rationality is by Williamson (1985) classified as organic rationality, and is, even though
different from the 'semistrong rationality' assumption of TCE, "nevertheless complementary;
each can expect to benefit from the insights of the other" (p. 47).
Implicit in RBT is the same view ofactors' 'bounded production rationality' as developed in EE
(Barney, 1991). It is stressed that firms would have performance advantages for related
diversification over unrelated diversification (Mahoney & Pandian, 1992). Additionally, RBT
stresses that firms should select product markets where existing resources can be deployed
even though other markets objectively may give better performance (Penrose, 1959;
Wernerfelt, 1984). Finally, firms grow in the direction set by their capabilities and these
capabilities will slowly expand and change (Penrose, 1959).
2.3.3 Review of competence-based perspectives on economic organization
Recently, a number of contributions within the framework of evolutionary economics and the
resource-based perspective have tried to theorize on the economic organization of the firm.
What these theories have in common is that they all try to rationalize the existence or the
growth of the firm based on a competence perspective on firms, and that this issue may be
solved without regarding or by rejecting the new institutional economics assumption of
opportunism (Foss, 1996b). Accordingly, the studies view firms as heterogeneous, knowledge
bearing entities, and agree that the assumption of opportunism is an unnecessary premise for
explaining economic organization. After reviewing the theoretical studies, we consider the few
studies that explicitly address how competence or knowledge affects the transfer of goods
across technological interfaces. A discussion ofimplications is then provided.
The studies
According to Conner (1991), firms exist because some co-specialized assets make 'a better fit'
with some firms than with other firms. According to Conner, firms have different
organizational routines and cultures and are heterogeneous entities, which makes the
information transmission between firms costlyand time consuming. She further posits that the
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degree to which new undertakings are successful depend on the degree to which they are
related to the firm's existing asset base. Such relatedness provides an opportunity for gains to
generate new redeployable resources as well as to economize on intra-knowledge and intra-
information transmission. Thus, firms economize if internalizing when this fit is present because
the firm's sharing of some kind of codes, languages etc. implies that co-operation in only one
direction is needed. In contrast, under market exchange two autonomous parties "must try to
orient in two different directions" (p. 142).
Kogut & Zander (1992) argue that firms exist because they have some higher-order organizing
principles that markets cannot supply. It is not clear what these higher-order organizing
principles are (Foss, 1996b), but according to Kogut & Zander (1992:474) they include
"shared coding schemes", "values", "a shared language", and "mechanisms by which to codify
technologies into a language accessible to a wider circle of individuals". Thus, by utilizing
these higher-order organizing principles what firms "do better than markets is the sharing of
and transfer of the knowledge of individuals and groups within an organization" (p. 383).
According to the authors, the decision to make or buy is dependent upon three elements: "how
good a firm is currently at doing something, how good it is at learning specific capabilities, and
the value of these capabilities as platforms into new markets" (p. 395). The only reason why
firms purchase goods from suppliers is because suppliers in some situations may have superior
knowledge. Otherwise firm organization or some kind of complex contracting will be
preferred. Thus, the vertical integration decision is independent of potential opportunism
problems: "In contrast to the contract approach to understanding organizations, the
assumptions of the selfish motives of individuals resulting in shirking and dishonesty is not a
necessary premise of our argument" (p. 384).
Conner & Prahaled (1996) extend the arguments from Conner (1991) and are mainly
concerned about knowledge-based transaction costs that are independent of opportunistic
considerations. Conner & Prahaled assume, as Williamson, bounded rationality, and argue that
"cognitive limitations prohibit individuals from possessing identical stock of knowledge" (p.
478). They assume away opportunism, and assume instead that individuals are taken to behave
truthfully: "We disagree with the proposition that honest behavior necessarily results in market
contracting" (p. 483). However, a very important argument oftheir study is that honesty "does
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not rule out intense disagreements or haggling", because, ''truthful individuals honestly may
disagree about the best present and future action for their business activities" (p. 483).
Their main arguments are connected to what they call the knowledge-substitution and
flexibility effects on organizational mode. The knowledge-substitution effect implies that within
the firm the manager's wisdom may replace the employees'. Thus, it is not necessary that the
employee may absorb the manager's wisdom before he can apply it. Under market contracting,
however, each autonomous party in an exchange uses his own judgment, and, "retains the right
or power of self-government" (p. 478). According to the authors, bounded rationality implies
that the knowledge-based transaction costs will increase as the differences in the stock of
knowledge between parties increase. Thus, by having the 'power to give direction' a firm will
economize on knowledge transaction costs, and hence economize on knowledge substitution
grounds if the degree of perspectives or knowledge between exchange partners is high. Thus,
they propose that firm organization is more likely to be preferred, the greater is the initial
differences in knowledge between two parties. The flexibility effect concerns the relative cost
under the two organizational modes, of altering the parties' duties and responsibilities on an
ongoing basis, in order to respond to new learning or other developments arising during the
course ofwork. In uncertain situations, theyargue, market contracting requires costly contract
renegotiations in order to implement flexibility, while firm organization does not. Thus, they
propose that firm organization is more likely to be preferred on knowledge flexibility grounds,
the more dynamic and uncertain is the competitive environment, and that this proposition is
independent of opportunistic potential.
Kogut & Zander (1996) argue that firms exist because coordination, communication, and
learning "are situated not only physically in locality, but also mentally in an identity" (p. 502).
Their discussion implies that the existence of the firm may be explained in terms of some deep
preferences for firm organization and that people wish to belong to a community. Thus, the
development of shared identities may lower the costs of communication, coordination, and
learning.
Kogut & Zander (1993) study the decision to transfer technology within the firm or in the
market with focus on the attributes of knowledge. They propose that the more tacit the
knowledge that underlies the technology, the more likely the technology will be transferred
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within the firm. This hypothesis was found to be statistically significant. Drawing on Winter's
(1987) work, they develop scales to measure the latent construct oftacit knowledge (Polanyi,
1966). Kogut & Zander's work shows that the characteristics of the knowledge involved in
transactions seems to matter in the make/buy decision: "Our findings suggesting that firms
specialize in the transfer of relatively tacit and idiosyncratic knowledge are consistent with the
broader evolutionary perspective" (Kogut & Zander, 1993:640). Moreover, their results
indicate that: "... as the knowledge becomes more codified and more easily taught [low degree
of tacitness], the more likely it will be transferred to a third party." (Kogut & Zander,
1993:635).
Borman (1994) examines common knowledge between companies and argues that the
presence of common knowledge reduces co-ordination costs and thereby facilitates market
exchange. This is due to common knowledge between the parties that reduces the degree of
uncertainty. However, the empirical results of the study are very difficult to interpret. The
overall problem is the descriptive approach. Besides, the operationalization of the construct
seems to be questionable. Its seems to be impossible to assess to what degree it really
represents the theoretical constructs. However, the theoretical implications outlined are




Important critics and shortcomings of the theoretical studies are excellently discussed in Foss
(1996a) and Foss (1996b). Regarding Conner (1991) and Kogut & Zander's (1992; 1996)
studies, Foss states that in absence of opportunism why could not co-specialization or higher
order organizing principles develop in markets as well as in firms. None of the studies are able
to explain why there should be more organizing principles, co-specialization or common codes
in the firm than in the market. Accordingly, what the studies do not address is that without
opportunism why should there be more co-operation in firms than in markets. From a
contractual point of view, however, firms are constructed to hamper opportunism The TCE
explanation is simply that the reason why there is more of co-specialization (Conner, 1991) or
higher order organizing principles (Kogut & Zander, 1992) in the firm than in the market is
because "firm-organization is the transaction cost-minimizing mode of organizing for this type
ofasset" (Foss, 1996a:474).
Moreover, the Conner & Prahaled (1996) study addresses the issue that transaction costs may
arise even from truthfully behavior. Clearly, disagreements on future actions may depend on
different initial knowledge structures and perspectives, as well as on opportunistic behavior. If
opportunism is absent, however, why could not two autonomous parties ex-ante simply agree
that e.g. the buyer's perception of the unforeseen situations should be followed. However, a
long-lasting relationship may imply that the parties develop high levels of relational norms
(Macneil, 1980). Opportunism absent, these norms may secure that exchange partners develop
common expectations about how to behave when responding to 'dynamic and uncertain
competitive environments'. Accordingly, what the no opportunism-based transaction costs
Conner & Prahaled (1996) are concerned about, is more a complementary than competing
perspective to TCE.
As Foss (1996a:747) states, and strongly emphasized in this study, a competence perspective
may complement transaction cost economics in the analysis of various agency-problems in
internal organization: "... so that - for example - the organizational knowledge residing in
business culture is also seen as influencing the organization's agency cost", and " ... as the ...
firm moves increasingly away from its core competencies ..., it may confront increasing agency
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costs, as increasingly unfamiliar activities produce more severe moral hazard and adverse
selection problems." Thus, one should try to incorporate " ... some of the insights from
knowledge-perspectives in the contractual approach" but ''we cannot do without concepts such
as opportunism ifwe wish to explain the existence of the firm" (Foss, 1996a:747). None of the
issues Foss addresses are, however, theorized in the studies above reviewed. However, these
issues are the ones we try to solve in the analyses provided in the forthcoming chapters.
While there has been done extensive empirical works on vertical integration within the TCE-
framework, very limited effort has been made within a competence framework. Consequently,
empirical studies focusing on closeness to existing competence as a determinant for vertical
integration have not been found in the literature. However, the studies by Kogut & Zander
(1993) and Zander & Kogut (1995), have given important insight in pointing out that the
degree of tacit knowledge involved in the transferring of goods between interfaces seems to
affect the governance oftransactions. Accordingly, the concept is outlined and defined below.
2.3.4 The concept of tacit knowledge
The concept oftacit knowledge was introduced by Polanyi, who started out with the fact that
individuals "... can know more than we can tell" (Polanyi, 1966:4). Polanyi emphasized
individual problems and low ability to give useful explanations of (or articulate) the rules
involved in a skilful performance. Nelson & Winter (1982) further explored the significance of
the concept in organizational analysis, when emphasizing the tacit dimension involved in firms'
routine activities. Winter (1987) elaborated this issue by introducing five dimensions meant to
represent the degree of tacit knowledge". According to Winter (1987) the dimensions of
codifiability and teachability are the dimensions that best represent tacitness. This proposition
is supported by the empirical study of Zander & Kogut (1995): "These two [dimensions]
provides the most direct insights to the degree to which capabilities are tacit and difficult to
communicate" (p. 85). Thus, the dimensions of codifiability and teachability are selected to
7These five dimensions are viewed as continua representing degrees of tacitness, and are: not teachable - teachable; not
articulated - articulated; Not observable in use - observable in use; Complex - Simple, An element of a system -
Independent. The left-hand ends of the continua are expected to represent high degrees of tacitness. Moreover, Kogut &
Zander (1993) and Zander & Kogut (1995) developed continuous scales ofthese dimensions.
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represent the construct of tacitness. Additionally, system dependence is included as a
dimension representing tacitness (Winter, 1987)8.
In this study, the tacit knowledge involved in the transaction is built on research by Winter
(1987) and Zander & Kogut (1992). However, we limit the focus to the buyer's perception
about the vendor's tacit knowledge 9. Accordingly, the concept of tacitness is defined as the
buyer's perceived degree of the tacit knowledge underlying the vendor's performance of the
activity purchased. A high degree of tacit knowledge will imply that the group is to a limited
degree able to explain, articulate, write down, teach and so on the knowledge or the 'theory'
which lies behind the performance of the activity. Thus, system dependency, lack of
teachabilityand lack of codifiability represent high degrees oftacitness.
Codifiability is defined as the extent to which the vendor's knowledge is articulated in
documents available for the buyer. Teachability refers to the ease by which the vendor's skills
can be learned by the buyer. System dependency is the extent to which the transfer of
knowledge from the vendor to the buyer is impaired due to dependence of many different
(groups of) experienced people for its production. The above definitions are somewhat
different from Winter's and Kogut & Zander's. Our definitions imply that the vendor's
knowledge actually may be e.g. codified, but that this codified knowledge (e.g. the recipes,
formal record and documents) is not available for the buyer. Hence, it is possible that the buyer
can perceive the knowledge as tacit, even though the vendor will not. Accordingly, we are not
able distinguish between knowledge which is in fact tacit, and knowledge that is not tacit for
the vendor but perceived as tacit for the buyer. However, this will not cause any problems with
regard to the explanatory logic underlying the predictions involving this construct. If the buyer
perceives the knowledge as tacit, this knowledge will, regardless be unfavorable to knowledge
transfer.
8 This implies that the dimensions of complexity and product observability is excluded from Winter's (1987) originally
taxonomy. This choice is based on Kogut & Zander's (1995) empirical study, which concludes that these dimensions to a
lesser degree represent tacit knowledge, which also is consistent with Winter (1987). According to Winter, observability in
use is more related to the costs of observation, while complexity is related to "the amount of information required to
characterize the item of knowledge in question" (p. 172).
9Kogut & Zander, however, are concerned about the efficiency for afirm to establish a wholly owned subsidiary compared
with the efficiency of using an agent. They do not address the issue that the competence base of the other side of a dyad
matters.
28
Following Winter (1987), the concept of tacitness is proposed to be caused by the three
dimensions of codifiability, teachability and system dependency. As outlined by Bollen &
Lennox (1991), with cause dimensions one cannot expect that an increase in value of one
dimension simultaneously requires an increase or decrease in the other dimensions that cause
the concept. For example, if codifiability increases then it is not expected that system
dependency and teachability necessarily will decrease and increase simultaneously. If
knowledge is not codified this does not imply that one automatically will expect that system
dependency is absent and that the activity is easy to teach. Teaching a task may often involve
learning-by-doing, without manuals or records to guide the learning process (Nelson & Winter,
1982). Likewise, even though knowledge is not codified this does not imply that performing
the activity is less dependent on other parts of a system Thus, tacitness is proposed to be
formative concept.
2.3.5 Summary
Within the TCE-framework, without positive transaction costs there will be no incentives for
hierarchical governance. Within the competence framework, however, the reviewed studies
argue that hierarchical governance may be efficient even if transaction costs is absent. In a
TCE-framework hierarchical governance will always contribute to higher production costs, and,
the potential savings are in transaction costs. By contrast, in a competence perspective, lower
production costs may exist because of economies of relatedness and avoidance of good
intention transaction costs. However, the competence approach neither evaluates or rules out
integration decisions based on reducing opportunistic potential. Accordingly, there is no focus .
on exchange costs, and therefore no theorizing about how to avoid opportunistic potential.
Even though some kind of closeness in competence to an activity will reduce the production
costs internally, ceteris paribus, the high power incentives of the markets (Williamson, 1985)
may further reduce the production costs. Besides, the cost of exchange has to be regarded
when deciding either to make or buy. For example, ifthe cost ofrunning the exchange relation
is at a minimum (near perfect market conditions), some governance costs, in contrast, will
always be present in the hierarchy (Williamson, 1975; 1985). Accordingly, while the
perspective gives plausible explanations of when a firm will fail in integrating an activity, it is;
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however, not able to analyze when favorable internal conditions will outperform market
exchange.
Furthermore, the literature lacks rigorously conceptualized concepts (Williamson, 1994;
Nordhaug, 1993; Bogaert, Martens & Van Cauwenbergh, 1994; Argyres, 1996; Teece, Pisano
& Shuen, 1997), and a competence framework applied in empirical works on the make or buy
decision, is, except for the work of Kogut & Zander (1993)10, to my knowledge, absent. There
exists in the literature no concepts, neither theoretically nor operationally defined, to test the
loosely formulated prediction from the competence perspective that closeness in competence
to activities will affect vertical integration. Accordingly, in the next section, such a concept is
developed and discussed in the context of buyer-vendor relationships, and regards the buyers
competencies.
2.4 The concept of closeness to primary competence
When firms grow by vertical integration, they will most likely grow in the direction of
something closely related to current competencies. This premise, adopted from the competence
perspective (evolutionary economics as well as from resource-based perspective), is the
foundation for the development of the competence construct of the study.
A firm surely possesses many different kinds of competencies (Nordhaug, 1993). Some
competencies, however, are likely to be more important than other competencies. The other
major departure when developing the competence construct of the study is grounded in the
resource-based perspective and the core competence approach. As discussed in Section 2.3,
according to resource-based theory the competencies that contribute best to the success and
survival for a firm will be the foundation behind a firm's integration activities. The most
manifest perspective emphasizing such issues in the literature is the c~re competence approach.
Accordingly, we start the discussion of the competence concept used in this study, by drawing
on the guidelines identified in this approach.
IOKogut & Zander, however, are concerned about the efficiency for a firm to establish a wholly owned subsidiary
compared with the efficiency of using an agent. They do not address the issue that the competence base of the other side of
a dyad matters.
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In Paragraph 2.4.1, organizational competence is outlined and defined. In Paragraph 2.4.2 the
concept of primary competence is defined. Finally, the concept of buyer's closeness to primary
competence (CPC) is defined in paragraph 2.4.3.
2.4.1 Defining organizational competence
The term competence has been used in psychology (White, 1959), in strategy (Andrews,
1971), in economics (Penrose, 1959) and in administrative sciences (Selznik, 1957). Due to the
fact that the concept has been used in many different disciplines and because the treatment of
the concept has neither been analytically well treated nor empirically measured and validated,
there exists great terminological confusion. Consequently, in economic approaches to
competence there is a lack of basic concepts that theory development can be built on
(Nordhaug, 1993; Bogaert, Martens & Van Cauwenbergh, 1994). Concepts such as
competencies, core competence, capabilities, invisible and visible assets, strategic assets,
resources and skills partly overlap and partly represent different concepts in the literature. In
short, the different definitions are fragmentary and no conceptual agreement is identifiable.
Taking all ofthese concepts together, almost everything in the firm becomes competencies. An
avoidance ofthis is important to prevent the competence and resource-based perspectives from
becoming tautological (Conner, 1991).
The often used dimensions of organizational genetics (Nordhaug, 1993), collective attitudes
(Hall, 92), organizational culture (Defillippi & Arthur, 1994), shared value systems (Bognar &
Thomas, 1994) as parts of the competence concept are good examples of how competence
seems to cover almost everything of a firm's internal and external resources. As shown by
population ecologists (cf. Hannan & Freeman, 1971) and scholars in organizational culture (cf.
Schein, 1985), it seems like cultural factors affect the organization's ability to survive. Culture
may, in a sense, have effects on organization's survival and income, but incorporate culture, as
a dimension of the competence concept will make the competence concept tautological. We
are following Nordhaug (1993) in that an economic view on competence should exclude
psychological variables like motivation and attitudes. In addition we will also exclude the
cultural aspect. We view the cognitive aspects of competence as the most important in
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economic analyses, and exclude the value-oriented perspective as emphasized for example by
scholars in the old institutionalism in sociology (e.g. Selznik, 1957).
The distinctions between assets and resources have been discussed in the competence literature
and some scholars regard assets as the overall concept (e.g. Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1990) and
some see resources as the general concept (e.g. Wernerfelt, 1984; Barney, 1991). However,
the most frequent distinction is the one between "having" and "doing" (Bogaert, Martens &
van Cauwenbergh, 94), where having is related to tangible assets and competence to doing,
and where both assets and competencies are regarded as resources (Hall, 1992; Bogaert et al.,
1994; Nordhaug, 1995). Another argument for this distinction is that firms do not have
property right over competence in the same manner as other resources!', and that competence
to a great degree represents intangible resources for the finn. Beside, a competence is not an
inanimate thing, it is reflected in an activity (Hamel, 1994). So competence is seen as
underlying both the exploitation of assets and the performance of activities.
Drawing on the insight that competence is not an asset, in the accounting sense of the word,
leaves out many of the dimensions used earlier. Tangible resources will be regarded as assets,
and are the "sort ofthing ... reflected on the asset side of a balance sheet" (Winter, 1987: 163),
and should be distinguished from competencies (Hall, 1992). Organizational competencies are
those information-based resourcest? that are mainly invisible, and will consist of both
organizational knowledge and organizational skills. Organizational knowledge is defined as
specific information about a subject or a field, and organizational skills as a special ability to
perform work-related tasks (Nordhaug, 1993). Our definition of competence is closely aligned
with organizational competence categorized as information and know-how (Kogut & Zander,
1992). A central premise in both definitions is that some organizational competencies is held by
individuals, but that it is also "expressed in regularities by which members co-operate in the
firm" (Kogut & Zander, 1992:383). As Kogut & Zander (1992) emphasize, if competencies
11The distinction can, however, be more problematic than this. Firms may have ownership of the competence that is
embedded in the standard procedures and routines. The distinction between Polanyi's (1966) tacit and explicit knowledge
(cf Paragraph 2.3.4) seems to be important in this respect. The knowledge that is explicit and embedded in the firm
routines and SOP is to a larger degree owned by the firm than tacit knowledge, which largely is owned by the employees
that possess it.
12Leaving aside intangible resources as a firm 's loyalty and reputation, which is not information based (Løwendahl,
1993).
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only were represented by individuals, "then firms could change simply by employee turnover"
(p.383).
2.4.2 The concept of primary competence
The discussion in this paragraph will be related to the difference between primary and core
competence (Prahaled & Hamel, 1990), analyzed in accordance with Rumelt's (1994)
components presented below.
Core competence versus primary competence
The concept of core competence has four key components (Rumelt, 1994):
1. Corporate span (the core competence supports several products)
2. Temporal dominance (products are the momentary expression of a firm's underlying
core competencies)
3. Learning-by-doing (competencies are gained and enhanced by work.)
4. Competitive locus (product-market competition is merely the superficial expression of
a deeper competition over competencies)
Corporate span. The requirement of being unique, as emphasized in the core competence
perspective is often related to being one of the world leaders in the field13. Accordingly, if the
underlying competence gives rise to several, unrelated product markets, it will be easy to give
up one segment and concentrate on others. However, that kind of ongoing learning processes
has its costs, and for most firms there is no need to be the world's best, or even specially to let
the business go around. In situations when there is no need or even any possibility of having a
broad competence base, the basic need is to sustain and gradually develop the firm's primary
competence. However, a firm will evaluate the trade-off between investments in the
development of new competence and the replications of current competence (March, 1991;
13As shown by several scholars in the approach when world leading corporations are referred to, as for example Sharps
core competence in flat-screen displays that gives access to diverse product markets such as computers, video projection
screens, pocket television etc. (Hamel, 1994); or Honda's engine competencies that allow them to compete in distinctive
markets such as automobiles, motorcycles, lawnmowers and electric generators (Prahaled & Hamel, 1990). Other
frequently used examples include Sony's miniaturization competence, Apples user-friendly interface, and Canons
competence in laser printers.
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Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Accordingly, we expect that a further development of the
competence resources of the firm is based on efficiency considerations. That is, we expect a
firm to identify competence inputs likely to generate rents (Conner, 1991), and that the primary
competence of the firm is the most likely candidate to generate such rents.
Temporal dominance. The argument that products are but the momentary expression of a
firms underlying core competencies, is as important here as in the original approach. The focus
that what is expressed in the product is a result of the underlying competence, is a central
argument when defining and analyzing primary competence.
Learning-by-doing. The earlier contributions from Selznik and Andrews, on distinctive
competence, were both essentially static (Rumelt, 1994). However, the experience curve
brought some dynamics into thinking, and experience has so far empirically proved to have a
better effect on a firm's performance, than other focused parts in the organizational learning
literature (Huber, 1991). Accordingly, the contributions from Dierickx & Cool (1989) and
Teece, Pisano & Shuen (1990) have both united the classic distinctive competence view with
the learning-by-doing dynamism of the experience curve. This approach has been further
developed by Prahaled & Hamel (1990) and recently by Teece, Pisano & Shuen (1997).
Prahaled & Hamel (1990) argue that organizations should collectively learn, especially about
co-ordination ofproduction skills and integration oftechnologies.
Most of the scholars in the competence approach have therefore recently recognized learning
processes as fundamental in the process of building core or new competence, but they are
inadequate in giving a more comprehensive view of the problem (Bognar & Thomas, 1994).
While learning is still in an analytical vacuum (as well as empirical) in the competence
perspective, a few theoretical studies have been concerned with combining a static competence
approach with the more dynamic theories on organizationallearning (e.g. Nordhaug, 1993;
Kogut & Zander, 1992; Helloid & Simonin, 1994). A theory of organizational learning must
include a static component (Nordhaug, 1993; Kogut & Zander, 1992), that is a present analysis
of the skills (Nelson & Winter, 1982), knowledge (Kogut & Zander, 1992) or competence
(Nordhaug, 1993) that will influence the question how and what kind of learning processes can
be implemented. In the same way, a competence perspective must include a dynamic
component (Nordhaug, 1993).
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In order to analyze the dynamic argument embedded in the core competence perspective, it is
important to note that firms do best in tasks closely related to present activities (Cyert &
March, 1963; Nelson & Winter, 1982). In fact the approach is based on the assumption that
"the core competencies which will retain competitive advantage in the future are built on the
core competencies of today" (Bogner & Thomas, 1994). Therefore a firm must carefully
consider the balance between exploitation of existing competencies and the development of
new ones (Wernerfelt, 1984; Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). The efficiency of performing new
activities in terms of both costs and time will therefore be dependent on to what degree the
competencies necessary to perform the new activities are close to the existing ones. This is
maybe the most important issue when focusing on primary competence.
Competitive locus. Hamel (1994) distinguishes among three broad types of core
competencies; market-access competencies, integrity-related competencies and functionality-
related competencies. The latter focuses on the kind of competence of concern in this study,
that is, competencies which contribute to better performance and more effective, cost-reducing
activities in the operational day-to-day work's. It is the kind of competencies that are necessary
to perform the activities directly related to the core products of the firm.
Describing and defining primary competence
In regard to the four components above, the component of corporate span is of lesser
importance when focusing on primary instead of core competence. This component is linked to
the uniqueness that is embedded in the argument offered by Prahaled & Hamel'S, and may be
seen as the component that distinguishes primary competence from core competence. This
conceptualization is very similar to the way Teece, Pisano & Shuen (1997) recently
distinguished between core and distinctive competencies. According to Teece, et al. (1997),
core competencies "are those competencies that define a firm's fundamental business as core"
(p. 516). Additionally, they state that ''the degree to which a core competence is distinctive
14This, however, does not imply that afirm s primary competence could not be one of the other ow competencies.
15The uniqueness can be traced to Prahaled & Hamel's arguments that a core competence must be competitively unique
and be a gateway to new markets. Or as Hamel (1994: 14) put it: A competence should not be considered core unless "the
company's level of competence is substantially superior to all others".
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depends on how well endowed the firm is relative to its competitors, and on how difficult it is
for competitors to replicate its competencies" (p. 516). Thus, compared with Teece, Pisano &
Shuen, a primary competence approximates a core competence, while unique competence
approximates distinctive competence. Consistent with Teece, Pisano & Shuen (1997)16, a
primary competence is defined, as one of those competencies that define a firm 'sfundamental
business as core.
Moreover, it is important to note that primary competence is but one category of the
competencies a firm possesses. A firm will surely possess other competencies that must be
present in order to perform well (see e.g. Nordhaug, 1993: Chapters 3 & 4, for an overview of
different competencies a firm possesses). However, the primary competence would be what
further competence development must be based on. Without primary competence, the firm
would not have any basis for staying in business.
2.4.3 Defining and outlining closeness to primary competence (CPC)
A definition
For a buyer, the competence that is close to the present competence base would be the target
for "borrowing" from the vendor. A buyer may find out that he actually has many of the
necessary competence elements himself, and thereby try to imitate the remaining parts in order
to perform the transaction "in-house". Or he may, because of a relatively long lasting
relationship, have incorporated many parts of the elements in his own routines or competence
base through intemalleaming processes. However, it is the closeness in competence that is the
main argument for the buyer to incorporate the knowledge in the routine "pool". Thus, the
existing underlying competence is used as a catalyst (Verdin & Williamson, 1994) in the
further process of accumulating those competencies that without the existing competence base
would be much slower and costly to build and incorporate in the routine pool.
16 We prefer the distinction between primary and core competence because this seems more consistent with the core
competence literature in general. As discussed above. in the literature core competence is often viewed as a competence
that contributes to be one o/the world leaders in afield.
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Following the discussion in this section, the definition of closeness to primary competence is
the degree to which the finn 's existing primary competencies can be used as a catalyst in the
internal learning processes and in the process of imitating environment-specific
competencies.
This concept can be used when analyzing expansion of firms' competence bases in general. The
phenomenon examined in this dissertation, however, is restricted to buyer-vendor dyads, and
transactions as the basic unit of analysis. The operationalization of environment-specific
competence is therefore restricted to the competencies represented by the vendor in the
transaction in question.
The argument from EE, that when firms grow by vertical integration they grow in a direction
of something closely related, and the resource-based perspective's attention to the identification
of competence inputs likely to generate rents, form the content of the concept of CPC. While
EE gives the basic foundation for the understanding of economic actors' limited capacity to
perform new and different tasks, RBT gives a comprehension of those competencies most
likely to generate rent. The construct of CPC will capture both those aspects as its definition
includes both the issue of being related to existing competence in the firm, and that this
relatedness is based on the most important and value creating competencies in present business
activities.
Competence imitation, learning processes and closeness to primary
competence
The definition above stated that a buyer's CPC would be favorable to internal learning
processes and imitation of the vendor's competence. Below, we address the specific imitation
problems that exist in buyer-vendor relations, and show why the buyer's CPC will act as a
guide and be helpful to overcoming some of these problems. Imitating refers to a successful
effort to achieve a level of performance by resting the manufacturing process on imitation of
another firm in an imperfectly, but economically acceptable way (Zander, 1991). Thus,
imitation occurs when a buyer discovers and simply copies a vendor's organizational routines
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and procedures (Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). The buyer's difficulties in imitating the
vendor's competence can be divided into three parts.
First, the coding problem implies that encoded knowledge available to the buyer, must be
decoded in order to be adjusted to the buyer's routines and recipes. Even though the
competence will be closely related, there will always be other possible means to the same end.
As mentioned by scholars in new institutional organization theory (Powell & DiMaggio, 1991),
organizations will decouple their operational activities from the institutionalized myths and
structures, while at the same time being isomorphistic with the institutional norms. Therefore,
the operational routines will be developed differently among organizations even though their
end product and superior structure can be the same or similar. According to Nelson & Winter
(1982), a firm's former investments and its repertoire ofroutines, restrict its future behavior.
This follows because learning tends to be local (Cyert & March, 1963; Nelson & Winter,
1982), and opportunities for learning will be close to previous activities and thus production
specific (Teece, 1988). As Teece et al. (1997) emphasize, learning is often a process of trial,
feedback, and evaluation. If too many parameters are changed simultaneously ''the ability to
ascertain cause-effect relationships is confounded because cognitive structures will not be
formed and rates of learning diminish as a result" (p. 523). Thus, since productive knowledge
is embedded (Nelson & Winter, 1982), replication cannot be accomplished by simply
transmitting information between parties with different routines (Kogut & Zander, 1992). Only
in those instances where all relevant knowledge is fully codified and understood by the buyer
can replication be collapsed into a simple problem of information transfer (Teece, et al., 1997).
In other instances, the vendor's coded knowledge must first be recoded before it correspond to
the buyer's own routines.
Second, the availability problem implies that not all of the vendor's coded knowledge will
usually be available for the buyer. One of the greatest dangers for a vendor is that the buyer
may learn enough about the vendor's operations to duplicate its routines and special
competencies and become an effective competitor (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992). Accordingly,
the vendor will normally not be willing to share all of his coded knowledge with the buyer,
partly because the vendor apprehends losing a customer (the buyer could integrate), partly
because the buyer by integration could be a future competitor in the market.
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Third, the tacitness problem indicates that expressing know-how or skills in printed words and
blueprints can be an insufficient way of transferring knowledge (Hennart, 1982), mainly
because there is tacit knowledge involved. Knowledge, which is embedded in the vendor's
routines and not coded and articulated, will represent the vendor's tacit knowledge. Such tacit
knowledge is very difficult to replicate by the firm itself (Zander & Kogut, 1995). Thus, if self-
replication is difficult, imitation is likely to be harder (Kogut & Zander, 1992). Indeed,
imitation of such knowledge is often impossible absent the transfer away groups of key
individuals (Teece, et al., 1997).
Because of the availability problem and the tacit problem, only a part of the relevant
knowledge from the vendor can actually be coded. Further, due to the coding problem,
available coded knowledge will be difficult to decode. If the buyer has a considerable amount
of relevant manufacturing skills, it will be easier to overcome the coding problem Knowledge
from external sources will always be difficult to incorporate into a tangible product and hence
extremely costly, if a firm does not have existing competence that can guide them in the
imitation process. As emphasized by Cohen & Levinthal (1990), the buyer's capability to
absorb, exploit and "borrow" new knowledge from the environment will depend on their
existing competence base: "Absorptive capacity is more likely to be developed and maintained
as a by-product of routine activity when the knowledge domain that the firm wishes to exploit
is closely related to its current knowledge base" (p. 149). The coding of new information is
therefore only successful if the search for new coding schemes do not require a comprehensive
change in the firm's existing common codes or organizing principles (Kogut & Zander, 1992).
The availability problem and the tacit problem represent knowledge that the buyer will not
have access to. The availability problem relates to articulated knowledge that the vendor
refuses to share with the buyer, while the tacit problem is connected to knowledge that the
vendor is not able to articulate inside their own boundaries. These problems, however, will
partly be solved ifthe buyer has CPC. A firm's previous investments and repertoire ofroutines
constrains its future behavior (Nelson & Winter, 1982). However, when having CPC, the buyer
does not need to build completely new competencies if integrating the activity. The firm can
instead, to a large degree, rely on their existing competence. However, relying on existing
competence does not mean that they already have all the resources necessary to perform the
activity. What it means, is that by deploying existing competence the firm can improve the
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efficiency in terms of both cost and time (Verdin & Williamson, 1994) by making some
adjustments in their existing routines as a result of internal learning processes in order to
perform the 'new' activity. As widely recognized (e.g. Cyert & March, 1963; Nelson & Winter,
1982; Levitt & March, 1988), firms are able to make minor adjustments in their existing
routines and learn in areas closely related to their existing practice as a product of localized
search guided by the existing set of capabilities. Accordingly, having CPC will assist the buyer
to successfully integrate the activity, without having accessibility to all the vendor's coded and
tacit knowledge.
A firm can extend its competence base by internal learning processes and/or by imitating
competence from sources outside the firm's boundaries. We have proposed that having CPC to
an activity will contribute to both these processes in buyer-vendor dyads. The buyer can solve
the coding problem by imitating the vendor and decode the knowledge adjusted to his own
routines. The availability problem and the tacit problem, however, must mainly be solved as a
result of internallearning processes.
2.5 The distinction between Firm-specific competence, Transaction-
specific competence and Primary competence
The study of properties of competence is to a limited degree theoretically and empirically
treated in economics. Empirically measured concepts are mainly restricted to firm-specificity
(Becker, 1962; 1975; Williamson, 1981; 1985) and human asset specificity (Williamson, 1979;
1981; 1985). In this section the goal is therefore to establish a link as well as to make a
distinction between the concept of primary competence and the earlier concepts frequently
used in economic analysis. Even though the concept of firm-specificity is not incorporated in
the model developed in this study, a discussion of the concept is considered necessary for the
logic established.
Firm-specific competence and transaction-specific competence - a distinction
The main proposition in Human Capital (Becker, 1975) is that the acquisition of valued skills
leads to greater compensation. With simple theoretical arguments, Becker is able to explain
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relations between education and productivity, age and earnings, unemployment and level of
skills and between age and on-the-job-training. Becker (1962) makes a distinction between
specific and general training. He argues that firm-specific training is valuable to the
organization and that firms will benefit from investments in on-the-job training. Human capital
theory, however, has neither treated how human capital should be governed (Williamson,
1981) nor analyzed the substance of the human capital itself (Nordhaug, 1993). Accordingly,
human capital theory, like neo-classical economics in general, views the firm as a black box.
The TCE-framework has been applied at three levels ofanalysis (Williamson, 1981; 1985). The
first is focusing on the overall structure of the enterprise, the second on the makelbuy decision,
and the third is concerned about the internal organization of work. In the first level the concept
of asset specificity is absent, while in the latter two asset specificity is present in the analysis.
The 'organization of work lever regards the manner in which human assets are internally
organized. Internal human assets is by Williamson (1981; 1985) descnbed in terms of(l) the
degree to which they are firm specific (Becker, 1962) and (2) the ease with which productivity
can be measured (Alchian & Dernsetz, 1972). The object is to "match internal governance
structures with the attributes of the work groups in a discriminating way" (Williamson,
1981:549). This kind of organizational consideration is absent in human capital theory!".
Accordingly, what TCE adds to human capital theory is that firm-specific skills need to be
embedded in a protective governance structure (Williamson, 1981).
In contrast, Williamson (1981), when describing the dimension of asset specificity (or what
may be labeled transaction-specific competence) in the makelbuy level of analysis, states the
following:
The reason asset specificity is critical is that, once an investment has been made, buyer and seller [seen
as autonomous parts] are effectively operating in a bilateral .... exchange relation for a considerable
period thereafter. Inasmuch as the value ofspecific capital in other uses is, by definition, much smaller
than the specialized use for which it has been intended, the supplier is effectively 'locked into' the
transaction to a significant degree. (p. 555).




Accordingly, in the make/buy level of Williamson's analysis, the important issue is to what
extent autonomous parts are locked into relationships ex post because of investments that have
substantially higher value inside the relation than outside it (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1989).
However, when analyzing the organization of work, Williamson assumes a priori that the
transaction in question involves asset specificity, and for that reason already brought inside the
boundaries of the firm. Accordingly, there is a difference in level of analysis. The make/buy
decision has the dyad as the level of analysis, while internal governance of competence has the
firm or the group as the level of analysis.
Both firm-specific and transaction-specific competence can be classified under the umbrella of
human asset specificity. However, firm-specific competence is about specific competence that
is not transferred across a firm's boundaries, and defined as competence that can be used in one
firm only, and has no value in the external market (Nordhaug, 1993). Transaction-specific
competence, on the other hand, is exclusively used as a dimension for descnbing
characterizations oftransactions between autonomous exchange partners.
Primary competence, transaction-specific competence and firms-specific
competence - a distinction
A transaction-specific investment in competence arises when e.g. the buyer invests in the
vendor's employees, in order to give them training in his own routines and procedures. Another
kind of investment might be the buyer's investments in his own employees regarding
competence in the vendor's procedures and routines (or vice versa). Accordingly, the
investments are specialized with respect to one particular transaction partner. The rationale
behind such investments will initially be to ensure that the interface between the buyer and the
vendor functions well and reduces the degree of delays, breakdowns or other malfunctions.
Such investments will, however, imply a loss of value if a buyer internalizes the activity,
because transaction-specific competence has higher value in the bilateral relationship than
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outside it (Holmstrom & Tirole, 1989; Perry, 1989) and the appropriable quasi-rents'! (Klein,
Crawford & Alchian, 1978) will be lost.
However, as Winter (1988) states, further progress of the concept of human asset specificity
".. must be redefined and linked to the broader context in which quasi rents to various sorts of
productive knowledge are determined" (p. 179). Such a progress can be made by incorporating
the competence argument in the analysis: In the decision either to make or buy, we expect a
firm to evaluate to what degree the firm is capable ofperforming the activity itselfby drawing
on their existing competence, or in more formal terms, in which situations the appropriable
quasi-rents loss, for the integrating party, will be least. Accordingly, there exist some situations
where the appropriate quasi-rents are lower than in other situations, while holding transaction
specific investments constant. In order to examine when the value loss will be least, a buyer
has to identify when the formerly invested competence can be used directly or as a foundation
for performing the new activity. Accordingly, the quasi-rents loss will be lower ifthe buyer has
CPC to the activity compared with a situation when the buyer does not have CPC.
Primary competence should therefore be clearly distinguished from transaction specific
competence. In the same line as the difference in level of analysis between transaction-specific
and firm-specific competence, the level of analysis of primary competence is connected to the
firm level, not the dyad. However, primary competence is to a higher degree than finn-specific
competence, connected to the relationship to the environment. As shown in section 2.4,
primary competence is connected both to efficient internal performance as well as to
functioning as a catalyst in the process of imitating relevant competencies from the
environment. Additionally, in a TCE-framework, the incentive to integrate is based on the
argument that contractual difficulties make it costly to continue the relation with an exchange
partner, because ofinvestments in e.g. transaction specific competence. Contractual difficulties
have, however, nothing to do with the degree to which there is sufficient competence to
perform the activity in-house. What it means it that is would be less expensive to perform the
activity in-house because of contractual difficulties. This argument comes clearly from
18As previously mentioned, the appropriable quasi-rents refer (in this situation) to the difference between the value of the
competence in the exchange and the value of the competence when internalizing the activity and illustrate the value loss
between best and second best use.
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Williamson's work. The main advantages of firms over markets in high asset specificity
conditions are, according to Williamson (1981):
First, common ownership reduces incentives to suboptimize. Second. and related, internal
organization is able to invoke flat to resolve differences, whereas costly adjudication is needed when
an impasse develops between autonomous traders. Third, internal organization has easier and more
complete access to the relevant information when dispute settling is needed. (p. 559)
All of these advantages have to do with how internal organizing solves contractual problems
that autonomous exchange is not able to solve as easily. Accordingly, all ofthese problems are
connected to the difficulties of solving contractual problems because of a condition of high
asset specificity. None ofthese advantages regards the nature of the competence involved, that
is, the potential competence difficulties in performing the activity in question. In this respect,
transaction specific and primary competence can be seen as complementary concepts. As
investments in transaction specific competence would give implications for administrative
governance structures, the pool of productive competence resources will also act as a
determinant for how a firm should govern transactions.
The concept of primary competence is also conceptually distinct from firm-specific
competence. While firm-specific competence is defined as competence that is of value in one
firm only, primary competence is defined as the competence that is most important for the
firms profitability and survival. Hence, while primary competence is restricted to the firm's
most important competence, firm-specific competence can, in principle, be all the competence
in the firm that is not ofvalue in other firms. Accordingly, there would exist different classes of
finn-specific competencies in firms (Nordhaug, 1993), some more important than others.
Summary
In this section the primary goal has been to conceptually distinguish the concept of primary
competence from the earlier competence concepts used in economics. The concept of firm-
specific competence was argued to be different from transaction-specific competence and
primary competence was conceptually distinguished from both those concepts. Both firm-
specific competence and transaction-specific competence were classified as special kinds of
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human assets. However, firm-specific competence is the kind of competence that is only of
value inside the boundaries of the firm, while transaction-specific competence is a dimension
for descnbing characterizations of transactions in bilateral exchange relations.
While firm-specific competence includes all the competencies that are of value in the firm only,
primary competence is restricted to one of the most important competencies a firm possesses.
Primary competence is further seen as the competence that further development must be based
on, and will thereby focus attention on a dynamic component. One difference between
transaction-specific competence and primary competence is connected to the differences in
level of analysis. Additionally, transaction specific competence creates problems for bilateral
exchange and the substance of the competence is not itselfinteresting. The concept ofprimary
competence, on the other hand, implies a focus on the potential in the existing competence and
an evaluation of the potential advantage of using the existing competence when integrating an
activity, and thereby minimizing the appropriable quasi-rents lost. Accordingly, these concepts
are seen as complementary.
2.6 Summaryand implications
As shown, the competence approach and TeE focus on different factors that determines a
firm's integration activities. TeE posits that asset specificity is the main determinant of vertical
integration. The explanation for this is that when asset specificity is high, the incentive for
opportunistic behavior is present and the transaction costs in bilateral exchange will increase.
There have been extensive empirical works done within the TeE-framework, and the most
important factor affecting vertical integration has been asset specificity. The competence
approach, on the other hand, states that different firm capabilities and production costs play an
independent role in make or buy decisions. However, no empirical studies focusing on
closeness to existing competence as a determinant of vertical integration have been found in
the literature. Accordingly, we developed such a concept. This concept was distinguished from
the TeE-derived concept of asset specificity, and was built on theory that takes into account a
firm's ability to create and develop competence as a product of learning processes. This ability
moves attention to the kind of individual firm behavior that will contnbute to a successful
integration decision and we emphasized why a strategic integration decision has to be based on
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a firm's existing competence. Additionally, drawing on Winter's (1987) and Zander & Kogut's
(1995) studies, we introduced and defined the concept oftacitness.
According to Williamson, if the market fails, organizational solutions are assumed a priori to
be efficient. A competence perspective will disagree with this, and will instead assert that
organizations may still fail. Viewed from the competence perspective, a firm would refuse
integration because of organizational failure. This means that even if the characteristics of the
transaction in question in a TCE framework will predict vertical integration (market failure), a
competence perspective will predict differently if the new activity does not fit the firm's
existing operations. Accordingly, the probability of organizational failure is inversely related to
the degree of fit to the firm's existing operations. In this way a competence perspective can be
an answer to Williamson's (1994) requests for a theory of bureaucratic failure, a theory that
can explain the limits to internal organization. However, even though the competence
perspective can be viewed as a theory of organizational failure, there is still a need that "puts
the study of internal organization more nearly on a parity with the theory of markets and
market failure" (Williamson, 1994:46). Hence, there is a need to sort out if the theories
regarded in this study are compatible. Without examining and confronting the underlying
assumptions in the theories, this goal seems impossible. In order to make a synthesis of these
theories, it is important to make a trade-off between the behavioral assumptions underlying
TCE and the competence approach. This is the issue of the next chapter.
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3. BEHAVIORAL ASSUMPTIONS
Because TeE and the competence perspective start out with different assumptions, they end
up with different destinations. Accordingly, the different behavioral assumptions underlying the
two perspectives initially draw attention to different aspects of vertical integration. Starting
with the assumptions of contractual constraints and opportunism; TeE identifies different
modes of govemance based on reducing opportunistic potential, and leads attention to asset
specificity as the most important predictor ofvertical integration. The competence perspective,
on the other hand, emphasizes production constraints and indicates that closeness in
competence to an activity is one important determinant ofvertical integration. We believe that
further progress in theory development on the make or buy decision has been impeded by the
tendency to treat the behavioral assumptions from the competence perspective and TeE as
separate and distinct. Therefore, in order to give credibility to the controversy that these
theories are complementary, this chapter synthesizes arguments from TeE, Nelson & Winter
(1982), Penrose (1959) and Hennart (1982). The chapter shows that by relaxing TeE's
behavioral assumptions, answering the question of efficient organization gives room for both
competence and TeE-predictions.
In section 3.1 the assumption ofbounded rationality is outlined by using theory from TeE, EE
and Penrose (1959). Section 3.2 discusses the assumption of opportunism by using theory from
TeE and the knowledge transmission theory from Hennart (1982). A discussion of
implications is presented in section 3.3.
3.1 Bounded rationality
The bounded rationality assumptions of evolutionary economics (EE) and transaction cost
economics (TeE) were outlined in Section 2.2. Williamson (1985) classifies the two bounded
rationality views as organic (EE) and semistrong forms of rationality (TeE), respectively. He
further posits that these two views are complementary and that each will benefit from the
insights from the other. He does not, however, address how and why they will benefit from
each other. We argue below why both considerations should be regarded in the make-buy
decision.
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Nelson & Winter's basic criticism of neoclassical economics is like Williamson, connected to
the bounded rationality problem. Both TeE and EE serve as alternatives to orthodox micro
economic theory. Both stress the failure of equilibrium outcomes and maximizing behavior in
orthodox models. However, TeE explains this by the fundamental transformation process
(Williamson, 1985), that is, initially atomistic competitive markets will gradually be transmitted
to a bilateral monopoly, because of the irreversible process and 'lock-in' effect shaped by asset
specificity. And, "But for bounded rationality, all economic exchange could be efficiently
organized by contracts" (Williamson, 1981:553). TeE is first of all concerned with contractual
constraints as a result of human agents' cognitive limitations.
EE, as opposed to TeE, takes into account actors' cognitive limitations to perform production-
related tasks. The ability to perform new tasks will take time and involve expensive activities.
Therefore, the choice of organizational form must go beyond an assessment of contractual
limitations, and also appreciate the limited capability to perform new and different tasks. As
Penrose (1959) argued almost four decades ago, the expansion capability of firms is closely
connected to how existing resources can be redeployed. The core of Penrose's explanation
why firms will economize on growth is shown in the following simple but excellent argument.
New tasks and new decision problems take up individuals' and groups' time and attention. As
time passes, individuals and groups become capable of handling the former problems routinely,
and different activities will be performed in a routine way. A smooth and effective sequence of
routine behavior implies a high degree of tacit knowledge (Nelson & Winter, 1982).
Accordingly, the internalization of articulable knowledge into tacit knowledge's, releases
managerial as well as productive knowledge that can be used in the planning and performing of
other activities. As Williamson, Penrose is concerned about how firms can economize on
bounded rationality. However, opposed to Williamson, the Penrosian view is based on
production constraints. When previous problems have been routinized, resources become
available for solving tasks that have not yet been routinized (Penrose, 1959). These tasks need
to some extent be related to previously performed tasks, if individuals may be able to
19 Penrose's book came out before Polanyi's (1966) concept of tacit knowledge was introduced. However. the meaning she
put in her explanations is about the same: «Knowledge .... can be formally expressed and transmitted to others». or it can
result from «learning in the form of personal experience» (penrose. 1959:53). The former she labeled «objective»
knowledge [articulable], the latter she labeled «experience» [tacit knowledge}.
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economize on bounded rationality: "Since there is a physical maximum to the number of things
any individual or group of individuals can do, there is clearly some sort of limit to the rate at
which even the financial transactions of individuals or groups can be expanded" (Penrose
1959:45). The competence perspective, thus, supplements the bounded rationality assumption
as used in the TCE-program, by incorporating actors' limitations to perform new productive
activities. Thus, the linkage of an input to the firm's existing competence base is central and
constitutes a constraint as well as an opportunity for new input investments (Conner, 1991).
Using insights from both TCE and the competence perspective, the assumption of bounded
rationality in this study views economic actors as exposed to both production (cf. Nelson &
Winter, 1982; Penrose, 1959) and contractual constraints (cf. Williamson, 1985). Accordingly,
we assume that intendedly rational actors (Williamson, 1985) will take both considerations into
account when they evaluate the decision to integrate an activity or not. Actors need to regard
all of the relevant scarcities, including contractual problems and the cognitive limitations of
doing quite different things. The two considerations complement each other as they draw
attention to different aspects of the firm constraints.
3.2 Opportunism
The competence perspective does not consider the exchange costs involved in the evaluation of
integrating a new activity (Winter, 1988, Collis, 1991). The view is strictly based on the
assumption that it would be more efficient to produce something where the firm already has
some degree of relevant knowledge, compared with producing something not related to
current competence. Even though it is more attractive, ceteris paribus, for firms to produce
something where the existing competence can be used, using the market can additionally
reduce the production costs. Drawing on Williamson (1985) and economics in general, the
market will always provide lower production costs. However, the economic problem is not
restricted to production costs, but centers around combining inputs and outputs in a way that
minimizes both production and exchange costs. The fact that some human agents may act
opportunistically (Williamson, 1985), is what gives rise to exchange or transaction costs.
Accordingly, while TCE operates with the strong assumption of the selfish motives of actors
resulting in shirking and dishonesty, no such behavioral assumption is present in the
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competence perspective (cf. Section 2.3). However, we show below how the assumption of
opportunism can be incorporated into both perspectives by using the logic presented by Arrow
(1974) and Hennart (1982) as the "connecting bridge".
Following the work from Arrow (1974) on information and search costs, Hennart (1982) spells
out a consistent logic why opportunistic behavior is hampered internally, and why the notion of
trust, matters as it reduces search costs. Hennart extends Arrow's framework by stating that
the common codes internally impair the employees' ability to cheat, because these common
codes increase the possibility to detect and punish opportunistic behavior. According to Arrow
(1974), a code refers to "all known ways, whether or not inscribed in formal rules, for
conveying information" (p. 55)20.
The development of a common code is by Arrow argued to increase the efficiency of internal
information exchange and transfer of knowledge. The common codes or dialects make the finn
members able to receive messages, interpret the messages and perform the appropriate routines
(Nelson & Winter, 1982). These common codes or organizing principles "act as mechanisms
by which to codify technologies into a language accessible to a wider circle ofindividuals", and
"facilitate the integration of the entire organization" (Kogut & Zander, 1992:389-390). A
common code represents the common understanding of how to acquire, retrieve and transmit
relevant information.
As discussed in Section 2.3.3, from a contractual (TeE) point ofview, firms are constructed to
hamper opportunism, The reason why firms develop its common codes and, thus, enhance co-
operation compared with markets is because the common codes make firms better suited to
control potential opportunistic behavior. Through the existence of the employment contract
(Simon, 1951) and the ownership of assets (Williamson, 1985), firms provide mechanisms not
available in the market". Thus, a common code is a key source of the economies firms provide
(Arrow, 1974), as it is supposed to; (a) increase the efficiency of the internal information
20A common code (Arrow. 1974) is closely related to Nelson & Winters (1982) term organizational dialect. or Kogut &
Zanders (1992) organizing principles. Moreover. a firm's common codes correspond to our definition of organizational
competence in the way that the common codes are the organizational knowledge. which underlie the performance of
activities (organizational skills). This view of common codes as a part of the firm 's knowledge base is therefore consistent
with our definition of organizational competence (se Section 2.2 and Paragraph 3.3.1).
21 However, and further outlined below, the efficiency of the common codes will vary depending on the degree ofCPC.
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transmission in the firm (Arrow, 1974); (b) make it possible for a firm to effectively perform its
routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982) and; (c) increase the management's ability to detect and
punish opportunistic behavior inside the firm boundaries (Hennart, 1982)22. Therefore,
information exchange and transfer of knowledge are more easily and more efficiently obtained
within firms than in markets (Arrow, 1974; Hennart, 1982; 1988). Moreover, the enhanced
ability to develop common codes inside the firm, is the main reason why trust is more easily
produced within the firm than in markets (Hennart, 1982). Employees inside the firm "... are
not rewarded for the market value of the knowledge they sell but by their contribution to the
group" (p. 26), and their "obedience to managerial directives" (Hennart, 1988:366).
Autonomous firms, in contrast, willlack these common codes, which will impair the parties'
ability to detect cheating and dishonesty. Autonomous firms are to a low degree willing to
share proprietary information (Moorman, Zaltman & Desphande, 1992). This lack of sharing
hampers the parties ability to develop common codes of information transmission and
exchange. Beside, parties in interfirm relationships may also meet less often, and discussions
may be formal (Moorman et al. 1992) and tactical. Thus, this lack of knowledge-based codes
results in a lack of control compared with intrafirm conditions.
Hennart's theory is in accordance with TeE in the sense that one should choose governance
structures that reduce search and transaction costs, and that people are inherently
opportunistic. Accordingly, both perspectives assume that an attitude towards opportunism is
an inherent characteristic of economic actors. The main difference sterns from the solutions in
which opportunistic behavior can be hampered, and the costs connected to these solutions.
Hereafter, we refer to the behavioral manifestation of opportunism as opportunistic behavior,
and to the opportunistic attitude ofindividuals as opportunism (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996).
Even though both Williamson and Hennart acknowledge actors' attitude toward opportunism,
the explanations ofwhat prevents or hampers opportunistic behavior differ. Both theories state
that intrafirm conditions can prevent opportunistic behavior. However, while Williamson
argues that opportunistic behavior is hampered by the use of fiat, Hennart emphasizes that the
intrafirm common codes act as a condition that produces trust and decreases the degree of
22As outlined in detail in chapter 4, a and b is connected to how firms by using existing common codes economize on
production costs, while c is related to how these codes restrict opportunistic behavior and hence make firms able to
economize on transaction costs.
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opportunistic behavior. If the activities to be performed fit the code, the acquiring and
transmitting of information are efficient (Arrow, 1974). If new activities does not fit existing
codes, a deficiency in using them will arise, and such conditions increase the potential of
opportunistic behavior inside firm boundaries (Hennart, 1982). This is an important distinction,
because the TCli-view implies that increasing potential for opportunistic behavior only can be
hampered by increasing costs ofsafeguarding, which "are likely to adverselyaffect [the firm's]
performance" (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996: 16). Accordingly, in a TeE-framework, preventing
opportunistic behavior can only be done by added costs. Hennart, in contrast, specifies
mechanisms that prevent actors from having any incentive to act opportunistically. While
Williamson does not theoretically separate opportunism from its behavioral manifestation
(Ghoshal & Moran, 1996), this is implicitly what Hennart does.
Moreover, when Williamson (1991) explicates the notion of fiat, he compares it with how the
court solves disputes between autonomous firms. While the court grants firm disputes over
prices, damages ascribed to delays etc., it refuses to accept disputes between internal divisions
or units"; "access to the courts being denied" (Williamson, 1991:274). Hence, he emphasizes
firms' superior ability to solve disputes and better ability to deal with disturbances, because the
firm "... is its own court of ultimate appeal" (1991 :274). Williamson does not distinguish
between the way different internal condition affect firms' ability to solve disputes and reduce
opportunistic behavior. What he amplifies, however, is why a firm is able to efficiently use the
mechanism of fiat: ".. parties to an internal dispute have deep knowledge24 - both about the
circumstances surrounding a dispute as well as the efficiency properties of alternative
solutions" (Williamson, 1991:276). Hence, if the parties lack this deep knowledge, the power
of fiat will be reduced. If firms suffer from having this 'deep knowledge', they are not able to
detect cheating and dishonest behavior in the same manner. Accordingly, by the development
of common codes within the firm, the opportunistic behavior is hampered without using the
organizational mechanism of fiat (Hennart, 1982), or, the parties' 'deep knowledge' makes
firms able to efficiently utilize the power of fiat. This latter issue is not theorized by TeE. In
sum, Hennart's theory is complementary to TeE. The theory specifies the mechanisms through
which the costs of hampering opportunistic behavior may be reduced. The theory is also
23Leaving aside personnel disputes and issues like workers safety etc .• which is. of course. often resolved by the court.
24 The emph. is made by me.
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complementary to the competence perspective as it highlights that existing common codes or
routines are the main mechanism that reduce the employees possibilities to cheat.
Following Hennart, when introducing completely different undertakings, the degree of
opportunistic behavior may increase, because the parties in-house lack the main mechanisms to
codify the accomplishment of the new activity. One aspect of common codes is to know who
knows what and how different activities should be organized (Kogut & Zander, 1992). If
completely new techniques and routines have to be developed in order for a firm to perform an
activity, firms will surely lack this knowledge. This will impair the ability to detect cheating,
and the management will miss 'the detailed continuous information' regarding the employees.
In such situations firms will be exposed to many of the same problems as in markets>, This
argument mayalso explain why Nelson & Winter (1982) assert that firms' existing routines are
the stabilizing forces in firms, and represent a "truce" in hampering intraorganizational conflict.
Introducing new undertakings that cannot be supported byexisting routines, however, would
require introduction of new routines. In such situations selfish motives are relevant, because
the management's ability to detect cheating will be reduced (Hennart, 1982).
3.3 Implications
As shown, the behavioral assumptions of this study are extended compared to TeE
assumptions. The behavioral assumptions are based on the fact that firms are exposed to both
production (cf. Penrose, 1959; Nelson & Winter, 1982) and contractual constraints (cf.
Williamson, 1985), and we expect that intendedly rational actors will take both considerations
into account when integrating an activity. Additionally, we adopt the view from Williamson
and Hennart that opportunism (the opportunistic attitude of individuals) is a general
characteristic of economic actors. However, the development of common codes inside firms is
25jn this respect it is interesting to note that Alchian & Demsetz (1972:111) claim thatthefirm "has no power of fiat, no
authority, no disciplinary action any different in the slightest degree from ordinary market contracting". If the
management lacks detailed information about their employees, this information asymmetry condition will contribute to
reducing the power of fiat and put the firm in some of the unfavorable conditions involved in market exchange. Remember,
by having an assumption of opportunism as an attitude, the study operates on the same premise as TeE that economic
actors are self interested, seek to maximize their own utility - often at the expense of others - and will act strategically. By
acting strategically, the will behave opportunistically only to the extent thatthey perceive that their behavior will not visit
upon them consequences which completely obviate any of the gains they expected to achieve. Thus, if the management can
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expected to produce trust (cf. Hennart, 1982). The use of these common codes is the internal
mechanisms that reduce opportunistic behavior. The latter argument is built on Arrow and
Hennart: "[Firms] become less efficient in acquiring and transmitting information not easily
fitted into the code" (Arrow, 1974:57), and a deficiency in using existing codes, increases the
degree of opportunistic behavior and decreases the degree of trust (Hennart, 1982). When
existing codes and routines to a low degree can be used in performing a new activity, such a
condition will increase both transaction costs and production costs.
The attention to and distinction between production and contractual constraints, combined
with the fact that firms' common codes and routines produce trust and reduce opportunistic
behavior, make us able to capture predictions from both perspectives in the same model. By
using the existing competencies and routines, firms are able to economize on what we call
internal transaction costs as well as production costs. Scholars in the competence perspective
have previously emphasized the latter, while the former has not been an issue so far26• When
firms have closeness in competence to an activity, they can use their organizing principles or
common codes, as means to reduce opportunistic behavior and hence economize on
transaction costs, when integrating the activity. Simultaneously, if firms are acquainted with
the activity in question, the production costs will be lower, compared with integrating an
activity far away from the present competence base. Accordingly and contrary to previous
focus of scholars in the competence perspective, the competence predictions in this dissertation
are built on both production and transaction cost efficiency. TCE directs attention to how the
opportunistic behavior of external agents can be reduced or eliminated (i.e. contractual
safeguards). The assumption of opportunism used here, however, also leads the attention to
mechanisms expected to reduce the degree of internal opportunism Contrary to TCE, this
means that reducing opportunistic behavior and hence lowering transaction costs internally,
will be solved more easily when firms' common codes and routines can be used to control
behavior.
utilize its common codes in controlling behavior, employees act strategically inside firm boundaries if they have
"obedience lo managerial directives" (Hennart, 1988:366).
26 Foss (1996a), however, sketches some of the same arguments, He states that firm will be confronted with increasing
agency costs when moving away from its core competence, "as increasingly unfamiliar activities produce more severe
moral hazard and adverse selection problems" (p. 474.).
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Making use of these behavioral assumptions will raises several implications, and shape the
foundation for arguing that TCE and the competence perspective are complementary rather
than competing theories ofvertical integration (cf. Chapters 5 & 6).
55
4. INTERFIRM TRUST
The framework of this study is based on the assumption that people are inherently
opportunistic (opportunistic attitude). In Chapter 3, we argued that mechanisms based on
intrafirm knowledge may prevent people from acting opportunistically, and that these
mechanisms give employees incentives to develop trust relationships inside firm boundaries.
This argument implies that trust will only be produced when employees have economic motives
to develop it. This belief, we argue, is in accordance with Williamson (1993) and Dasgupta
(1988), when they argue that trust primarily involves a calculative process.
Trust is examined in several areas of the social sciences, and the definitions and
operationalizations of the construct differ markedlyacross disciplines (Ring & Van de Ven,
1992). Our focus is connected to trust as a mechanism for governing transactions. We operate
on the premise that trust can be a substitute for authority mechanisms and serve as an
alternative control mechanism (Bradach & Eccles, 1989)27. Further, our view of trust follows
what seems to be widely established in the literature, namely that there is a connection between
trust and opportunistic behavior, and between trust and risk (Chiles & McMackin, 1996).
Finally, our analysis is based on Shapiro, Sheppard & Cheraskin (1992) three types28 of trust
and Williamson (1993) and Dasgupta (1988) calculative reflection on trust. We argue that two
ofShapiro et al.'s (1992) types of trust may be incorporated into the framework of the study.
Thus, we argue that this calculativeness reflection on interfirm trust is consistent with this
study's behavioral assumptions.
Section 4.1 addresses how interfirm trust is conceptualized in the study. In Section 4.2 the
connection between trust and risk is thoroughly considered. Based on this discussion, we argue
that some of the mechanisms that facilitate knowledge-based control in hierarchy also to some
27 This premise seems to be widely established within the interfirm trust literature. As Ouchi (1979) observed: ''People
must either be able to trust each other or to closely monitor each other if they are to engage in co-operative enterprises"
(p. 846). and as Gulati (1995) asserts: '',4 detailed contract is one mechanism for making behavior predictability, and
another is trust" (p. 93). According to Ring & Van de Ven (1992), trust-based relationships imply that; "authority and
control systems related to performance outcomes can be loosely specified in the contracts. Incentive systems can be left
adaptable to the changing needs of the specific relationship, and made independent of the other systems employed by the
parties. Issues such as costs, quality, prices. volume, and other production-related matters can be left relatively open-
ended".
28 These are deterrence-based trust, knowledge-based trust and identification-based trust, and are defined below.
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degree may be present in interfirm exchange conditions. Section 4.3 defines the concept of
interfirm trust. Finally, a summing-up section is included.
4.1 Conceptualization of interfirm trust
Consistent with most interfirm studies of trust (Dahlstrom & Nygaard, 1995), this study
focuses on interpersonal trust>. Often a distinction between trust as a personal interaction and
a firm level phenomenon is discussed in the literature. Thus, the question regarding whether
there can be trust between two firms that are simply an accretion of individuals has been raised
(Gulati, 1995). As Gulati (1995:92) asserts, "Intuitively, trust is an interpersonal
phenomenon". However, trust developed at an interpersonallevel, taking place in the context
of a transaction, is expected to reflect trust on the firm dyad level. Thus, trust may exist on the
interfirm level (Bradach & Eccles, 1989). Even though expectations of trust ultimately reside
within individuals (Gulati, 1995), it is possible to think of interfirm trust in economic
transactions (Zucker, 1986).
Several conceptualizations of trust exist in the literature. What they generally share is a
distinction between trust based on cognitive expectation, and trust based on affective
preferences (McAllister, 1995). The former views trust as a conscious rational regulation of
the other party. The latter foundation connects trust to emotional ties linking individuals and
imply "genuine care and concern for the welfare of the partners" (McAllister, 1995:26).
According to Shapiro et al. (1992), three types of trust within an interfirm context exist;
deterrence-based trust, knowledge-based trust and identification-based trust. These types of
trust are connected sequentially and attainment on one level is expected to promote
development on trust on the next level (Shapiro et al., 1992). Deterrence-based trust is
explained as consistent rational behavior based on an e.g. partner's reputation. Knowledge-
29 The notion of trost has proved to be complex when attempts are made to unravel its meaning and importance.
According to Zucker (1986), there are at least three distinct forms of trust. Zucker's notion encompasses characteristic,
institutional, and interpersonal facets of trust. Characteristic-based trust is granted due to some feature (e.g., kinship,
ethnicity) inherent in the trading partners. Institutional-based trust is associated with social structures that guarantee that
transactions take place as promised. For example, the Uniform Commercial Code serves as institutional-based trost
governing interstate transaction in most of the U.S. (Dahlstrom & Nygaard, 1995). Interpersonal trost emerges through
experience with a trading partner and implies a willingness to rely on that partner (Moorman et al. 1992). Zucker argues
that these three forms of trust are supplements for one another. As one form of trust takes on greater importance, the other
tends to diminish (cf Williamson, 1993). When e.g. interpersonal trust is disrupted, characteristic-based trost or
institutional mechanisms may be developed.
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based trust occurs when one has enough information about a potential exchange partner to
understand and properly predict the partner's behavior. Identification-based trust implies
internalization of the other party's wishes and intentions. Accordingly, from a sociological
point of view, trust encompasses calculative and utilitarian aspects as well as affective
preferences (Gulati, 1995).
A total internalizing of another autonomous party's wishes and intentions implies a kind of
altruism (Smith, Organ & Near, 1983). Altruism implies that actors wish to contnbute with
assistance on completely unselfish motives, and refers to behavior that is: " ... directly and
intentionally aimed at helping a specific person in face-to-face situations" (Smith, Organ &
Near, 1983:657). However, as Williamson argues this kind of altruistic view may be very rare
in economic exchanges. According to Williamson (1993), real trust "should be characterized by
(1) the absence of monitoring, (2) favorable or forgiving predilections, and (3) discreteness" ...
and that "such relations are clearly very special", since most people "will need to figure it out -
to look ahead and recognize that calculativeness will devaluate the relation" (pp. 483-484)30.
This study follows Williamson (1993), and we expect trust relations to be developed on the
basis of economic motives't, and to be present in situations when both parties will calculate
that trust-based governance is more efficient than the alternatives. By having an assumption of
opportunism as an attitude, the study operates on the same premise as TCE that economic
actors are self-interested, seek to maximize their own utility - often at the expense of others -
and will act strategically. By acting strategically, they will behave opportunistically only to the
extent that they perceive that their behavior will not yield consequences which completely
obviate any of the gains they expected to achieve (Akerlof, 1970).
Thus, we distinguish between calculative (or 'trust-like' behavior) and 'real' trust (Chiles &
McMackin, 1996). The calculative aspect is connected to reputation and knowledge-based
30 Williamson (1993:483) gives a plausible explanation/or this. as he states that 'X reposes personal trust in Y if X (1)
consciously refuses to monitor y. (2) is predisposed to ascribe good intentions to Y when things go wrong. and (3) treats Y
in a discrete structural way". and that X would continue the relations e.g. even though Y does wrong (which affect X's
rents) because this act is "interpreted {good intentions] by X as stochastic events. or as complexity ....• or as peccadilloes. "
31By this we take the position that the conditions that generate trust are viewed through the lens o/ rational economics.
Chiles & McMackin (1996) identify in the literature three other conditions that generate trust: as a result o/ social norms
(e.g. Macneil. 1980); as a result of social embeddedness (e.g. Granovetter, 1985); or mediated through reputation (Chiles
& McMackin. 1996).
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trust (Shapiro et al., 1992), which are both cognitive components (McAllister, 1995)32. In
recent years there has been a certain debate on whether behavior based on calculative motives
may be described as trust (Williamson, 1993; Uzzi, 1997). We agree with those authors that
argue that such utilitarian and calculative behavior may be described as trust (e.g. McAllister,
1995; Gulati, 1995; Shapiro et al. 1992). Deterrence-based trust and knowledge-based trust
(Shapiro et al., 1992) imply calculative reasoning and may be incorporated in the framework of
this study. Accordingly, we do not follow Williamson (1993) and Uzzi (1997), which argue
that such utilitarian motives cannot be described as trust. Instead we view 'trust-like behavior'
(Chiles & McMackin, 1996) as an issue that may provide insights into economic analysis».
Identification-based trust (Shapiro et al., 1992), on the other hand, may be labeled as "real
trust" (Chiles & McMackin, 1996). A condition with established identification-based trust
implies some kind of altruism and a genuine care and concern for another party's welfare
(McAllister, 1995), and is neither consistent with the behavioral assumptions of TCE nor with
the synthesis of the study. We don not argue, however, that such ~eal trust behavior does not
exist in exchange relationships. We follow Williamson (1993), however, that "such relations
are clearly very special" (p. 485) in economic exchanges, and that identification-based trust
may be very difficult to explain and incorporate within an economic framework.
32 Deterrence-based trust and knowledge-based trust (Shapiro, 1992) are quite similar to what McAllister label cognitive
expectation-based trust.
33 Such behavior is illustrated in literature on repeated games (Axelrod, 1984). This research suggests that co-operation
can be raised among self-interested parties if the structure of the game permits rewarding or punishing prior moves. In this
view, purely self-interest or "calculativeness" determines cooperation. It is the expectation of gains involved in future co-
operations that reduce the incentive for opportunistic behavior.
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4.2 Trust and risk
In the social science literature, the terms risk and trust are used interchangeably (c.f. Bradach
& Eccles, 1989; Williamson, 1993). As Gambetta (1988:217) asserts, there is a convergence in
the definitions of trust:
Trust (or, symmetrically, distrust) is a particular level of the subjective probabilitywith which an agent
assesses that another agent or group of agents will perform a particular action both before he can
monitor such action (or independently ofhis capacity ever to be able to monitor it) and in a context in
which it affects his own action. When we say we trust someone or that someone is trustworthy, we
implicitly mean that the probability that he will perform an action that is beneficial or at least not
detrimental to us is high enough for us to consider engaging in some form of cooperation with him.
Thus, a source of risk in all transactions is ''the need to make definitions in the face of the
uncertainty of accomplishing tasks that require sustained cooperation with others" (Ring &
Van de Ven, 1992:487). Such risk can take many different forms, e.g. commercial,
technological, scientific and engineering risk (cf. Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). Whatever the
sources or forms may be, however, they all imply a lack of information, and ''will affect choices
regarding the design of governance structure" (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992:488). Clearly, there
is a risk involved in having a trust relationship, since it suffers from the safeguards that are
embedded in authority-based mechanisms (Gambetta, 1988; Bradach & Eccles, 1989). In
dealing with risk, ''parties to a transaction will select a governance structure that provides
appropriate safeguards against that risk" (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992:488).
The degree of risk inherent in any transaction will arise in direct proportion to decreases in
time, control and knowledge (MacCrimrnon & Wehrung, 1986). Thus, a condition with
information asymmetry will gradually be reduced with recurrent transactions with the same
partner: "Repeated personal interactions across firms encourage some minimum level of
courtesy and considerations, and the prospect of ostracism among peers minimizes individual
opportunism" (Ring & Van de Ven, 1994:48). Consequently, as a relationship develops, a set
of common knowledge-based codes may gradually be developed, and the interorganizational
relationship will show some similar features with organizational hierarchy. What rationalizes
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interfirm organization is not unselfish motives or a wish to belong to a moral community (as
argued by e.g. Kogut & Zander, 1996). However, as in hierarchies, such repeated interaction
shapes a condition with low-cost knowledge-based coordination mechanisms that reduce the
transaction cost. According to Doney & Cannon (1997:37) will ''repeated interaction enables
the party to interpret prior outcomes better, providing a basis for assessing predictability".
Consequently, as the relationship develops over time, information asymmetry decreases, and
trust may gradually substitute for authority. The calculative effort of relying on trust is initially
based on the other party's reputation in the market (i.e., deterrence-based trust)>. Initially, the
trust mechanism is to a great extent complemented with authority-based mechanisms. As times
passes, and the "business partners ... have successfully completed transactions in the past and
they perceive one another as complying with norms of equity" (Ring & Van de Ven,
1992:489), the risk of the other partyacting opportunistically will be calculated to decrease.
Consequently, prior alliances between firms may shift attention from deterrence-based to
knowledge-based trust, and, "this substitution is based on the intuition that two firms with
prior alliances are likely to trust each other more than other firms with whom they have had no
alliances" (Gulati, 1995:94). As time passes and the knowledge stock about the other party's
reliability increases, trust as a protective mechanism may increase at the expense of authority.
As MacCrimmon & Wehrung (1986) point out, a lack of control is usually accompanied by a
lack of information. This lack of information will affect the degree of risk faced by the parties
in a transaction (Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). As trust develops, the parties in an exchange may
be more willing to share proprietary information. However, even though the risk of the other
partyacting opportunistically is expected to decrease over time, some risk will always be
present. When parties increase the reliance on trust, the consequences if the other party cheats
also increase. This is the paradox with trust. The presence of trust establishes a condition for
its abuse (Granovetter, 1985). So, even though the probability of opportunistic behavior may
decrease, the risk cost involved in the relationship may be constant or even increase. As Ring
& Van de Ven (1994:93) state: " ... even though the parties may be confident of each other's
trustworthiness they also may be uncertain whether to rely exclusively upon it." Even iftrust-
based governance may be cheap and flexible, ''there always is the temptation of the golden
34 As emphasized by Ring & Van de Ven (/992:488): "... trust is more likely to be extended to an organization when that
organization earns a reputation in the market place for following norms of equity ",
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opportunity: the big chance to cash in on opportunisrn". (Nooteboom, 1997:17).
Consequently, a condition with low information asymmetry does not necessarily imply that
trust replaces authority in the relationship. Thus, we propose that in a relationship there are
two kinds of risks. First, there is the subjective probability that the other party will act
opportunistically. Second, there is the risk cost ifthe other party acts opportunistically (i.e., the
economic consequences ifhe does).
Recently, Nooteboom et al. (1997) make a similar classification. They get empirical support for
the distinction between the probability that the exchange partner will behave opportunistically
(i.e., the risk), and the loss for the ego (i.e., the focal agent) if the partner does (i.e., the risk
cost). They state that in a long-term relationship, because of investments in asset specificity,
''there is more at stake, yielding a positive effect on size ofloss (Nooteboom, et al., 1997:321).
But long term relations also offer more possibilities of trust to grow, "so the perceived
probability ofloss is lower" (Nooteboom, et al., 1997:321). Consistent with Nooteboom et al.
(1997), economic actors are expected to calculate the risk costs of governing the relationship
based on trust. To illustrate this argument, consider the following example:
Assume a 5% possibility of the exchange partner cheating and a dichotomy choice between trust and
authority as governance mechanism in a bilateral relation. If the exchange partner cheats and acts
opportunistically it will cost the other party, let us say $1.000.000. Assume further that the costs of
using contractual safeguards (authority mechanisms) is $50.000 higher than using trust, due to e.g.
expected extra bargaining and control costs. The risk costs of using trust alone is then estimated to
$50.000 ($1.000.000 '" 5%).
A risk-neutral actor> will be indifferent about the two choices, ceteris panbus. However, ifthe
costs of using authority mechanisms are calculated to be e.g. $60.000, the risk-neutral actor
will choose trust as a governance mechanism Trust and authority mechanisms are alternative
mechanisms that can be combined "in a variety of ways" (Bradach & Eccles, 1989:97). Thus,
the subjective probability of the risk cost of relying on trust at the expense of the more
expensive authority mechanisms, reflect the parties willingness to rely on trust as a governance
mechanism
35 We assume in the study, as TeE, economic actors to be risk neutral.
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It is important to note that ''trust's effects may be more tenuous in interorganizational
relationships than in intraorganizational relationships" (Moorman et al. 1992). While trust in
intrafirm organization was argued to be a result of internal common codes (i.e., employees'
opportunistic behavior may be controlled on knowledge-based grounds), such codes exist
much more limitedly between firms (Conner, 1991; Conner & Prahaled, 1996). Autonomous
firms are to a lesser degree willing to share proprietary information than actors within the firm
(Moorman, et al., 1992). Beside, the parties meet less often and the discussion may be more
formal and strategic (Moorman et al., 1992). Compared with firms, markets will always have
less ability to develop common codes of information transmission and exchange (Arrow, 1974;
Hennart, 1982), and there will always be some lack of knowledge-based control compared
with intrafirm conditions. Thus, the risk involved in losing control in interfirm relationships will
always make a trust-relation much riskier than when trust is secured through common codes
internally (Hennart, 1982).
4.3 Interfirm trust defined
When trust is used in the management literature, two significantly different definitions are
usually found; the goodwill trust perspective, and the risk-based perspective (Ring & Van de
Ven, 1992; 1994). The goodwill trust perspective emphasizes "faith in the moral integrity or
goodwill of other, which is produced through interpersonal interactions that lead to social-
psychological bonds of mutual norms, sentiments, and friendships ... " (Ring & Van de Ven,
1994:93). The risk-based perspective defines trust between parties as an expression of
confidence or predictability in their expectation that they will not be put at risk, by the actions
of the other party (Zucker, 1986).
Given the above conceptualization of trust as a calculative term, attention must be directed
toward the latter kind of definitions. We exclude those definitions that view trust on the basis
of ethics, customs, habituation or bonds of friend- or kinship (i.e., trust based on affective
preferences (McAllister, 1995) or identification-based trust (Shapiro et al., 1992)). The risk-
based perspective is consistent with a view of trust based on cognitive expectation (McAllister,
1995) or deterrence and knowledge (Shapiro et al., 1992).
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The definition should reflect the belief that the other firm will perform actions resulting in
positive outcomes for the firm (Williamson, 1993)36. Additionally, the definition should span a
behavioral component (Moorman et al., 1992). This implies that the belief should be reflected
in behavior as e.g. a willingness to share proprietary information". Thus, the definition is based
on Moorman et al. 's (1992) expectation about the other party's credibility, and Williamson's
(1993) view that this credibility is based on calculative economic motives. The construct is
defined as a "willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one has confidence"
(Moorman, Zaltman, & Deshpande, 1992:315), which again is developed and persisted on the
basis of credible commitments and calculative economic responses (Williamson, 1993).
4.4 Summaryand implications
The chapter has focused on the motives for entering and continuing interfirm trust
relationships. In adopting the calculativeness argument from Williamson, we are able to
incorporate the issue of interfirm trust in the model of this study by making use of the
behavioral assumptions outlined (cf. Chapter 3). Economic actors involved in autonomous
trading, we argued, will act opportunistically if they have motives to do so. For autonomous
firms involved in the exchange of products or services, an interfirm trust relationship may
function as long as both parties calculate that they will make a profit on using trust as a
governance mechanism
The above interfirm reflection on trust is consistent with the study's view on what will promote
trust inside firm boundaries. Employees inside the firm are rewarded for their contribution to
the group, and the intrafirm codes are what make the management capable to reward
appropriate behavior and punish opportunistic behavior (Hennart, 1982). If the management
should lack this ability, employees may cheat and act dishonestly, in favor of their own selfish
motives (Hennart, 1982). This awareness of what promotes intrafirm trust is consistent with
the conception that actors must have economic motives to enter into an interfirm trust
36 Thus, actors are supposed to take what Williamson (1993) calls 'calculative risks' because of their confident
expectation that their counterpart will act responsibly.
37 As Moorman et al. (1992) assert, believing that a partner is trustworthy without being willing to rely on the partner,
trust is limited. The reliance should also be reflected in behavior intention. Thus, "both belief and behavioral intention
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relationship. Interfirm trust relationships are created because the parties calculate that
governing the relation by trust is the most efficient one. Since the development of interfirm
trust is supposed to be based on calculative reasoning and expected economic gains, this will
constrain opportunistic behavior, simply because such behavior will not be efficient. The
development of trust is, accordingly, a result of self-interest seeking, and the assumption of
opportunism (as an attitude) still has relevance. Compared with firms, markets will always have
less ability to develop common codes of information transmission and exchange (Arrow, 1974;
Hennart, 1982), and there will always be some lack of knowledge-based control compared
with intrafirm conditions. Thus, interfirm relationships will always be riskier than when trust is
secured though common codes internally (Conner, 1991; Conner & Prahaled, 1996; Moorman
et al., 1992). Thus, from an economic point of view, trust cannot alone rationalize a market
contract. Given a certain level of asset specificity, however, trust may complement or replace
authority mechanisms on knowledge-based grounds (cf. Chapter 6 for further discussion).
An analogy can be drawn to our critique of previous competence-based perspectives on firms:
Without opportunism, nothing rationalizes the firm (cf. Section 2.3 and Foss, 199M; Foss,
1996b). Without opportunism, there is no risk in having an ongoing relationship. Trust is
unnecessary if one has complete knowledge about the action of another party: "If all future
actions and events were known with certainty, trust would be redundant" (Kay, 1996:252).
Consequently, perfect knowledge implies honest behavior through complete unselfish sharing
of information. Accordingly, without the risk of opportunism, there is nothing that rationalizes
the presence of trust (Chiles & McMackin, 1996). Relying on calculative trust, however, does
not imply that an opportunistic attitude is absent. What it implies, is that actors are willing to
trust the other party, because it is calculated that this will be an efficient solution. Economic
actors calculate that the risk of the other party's opportunistic attitude will not be manifested in
opportunistic behavior is low enough that their needs will be efficiently fulfilled. As Gulati
(1995:93) states: " ... trust can arise when untrustworthy behavior by a partner can lead to
costly sanctions that exceed any potential benefits that opportunistic behavior may provide".
Thus, opportunistic behavior and calculative trust are likely to be negativelyassociated.
components must be present/or trust to exist" (Moorman et al., 1992:315). And as McAllister (1995:25) asserts: "t'Trust
encompasses not only people 's belief about others, but also their willingness to use that knowledge as the basis/or action ..
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5.SUMMARY
Throughout the literature review in Part I, we have indicated some answers to research
question l and identified the major constructs in this study. Research question l was stated in
the following way: To what degree are the competence perspective and transaction costs
economics complementary theories of vertical integration, and to what degree is it possible to
develop a consistent synthesis ofthese perspectives?
In Chapter 2, transaction cost economics and the competence perspective were reviewed. We
concluded that these to perspectives lead attention to different factors as to what determines a
firm's integration activities. In Chapter 3, we argued that the behavioral assumptions of TCE
have to be relaxed in order to incorporate predictions from both perspectives in the same
model. On this foundation, we argued that TCE and the competence perspective are
complementary rather than competing theories of vertical integration, and may be integrated
into a consistent synthetic framework. In Table 5.1, the comparison of the different
perspectives discussed in the previous chapters is summarized. A summary of the arguments
established throughout Chapters 2 to 4 is provided.
Table 5.1 A comparison ofperspectives
Transacdon coot Evoludonary The Resource Knowledge A synthesis
economics economics (micro) based transmission
perspecdve perspecdve
Bounded radonallty Contractual Production Production Exchange Contractual
constraints constraints constraints constraints constraints
Production
constraints
Opportnnlsm Present/strong Not regarded Not regarded Present/strong Present/strong
Unit ofanalysls Transaction Institutional Internal Transaction Transaction
(A system resources/compe
perspective) -tencies
Major constructs Asset specificity Finn's routines Distinctive Trust CPC





Chapter 3 examined the behavioral assumptions in TCE and the competence perspective. The
competence approach neither evaluates nor rules out how to reduce opportunistic potential and
does not regard the contractual problems involved in interfirm exchange processes. Because of
this exclusion of opportunism and exchange costs in the analysis, the competence perspective
is only concerned about why an integration decision should be favored in relatedness situations
compared with non-relatedness situations. The perspective is not able to connect this
relatedness argument to contractual issues". In contrast, TCE does not regard firms' potential
production constraints and gives limited attention to intrafirm mechanisms' ability to hamper
opportunistic behavior.
The behavioral assumptions of this study are based on the fact that intendedly rational actors
(bounded rationality) will consider both production and contractual constraints when they
evaluate the decision to integrate in activity. One must therefore consider all the relevant
scarcities, including contractual pro olems and the cognitive limitations of doing quite different
things. Contrary to TCE, the distinction between the behavioral manifestation of opportunism
(opportunistic behavior) and the opportunistic attitude of economic actors (opportunism) was
emphasized. We acknowledge ane. assume the opportunistic attitude of economic actors.
Individuals will act opportunisticallv if they expect to profit by doing so. For employees in a
firm the possibility to act opportunistically will depend on the management's ability to detect
and punish opportunistic behavior. This managerial ability will depend on the degree in which
the firm's common codes can be used in controlling behavior. When these codes can be used,
the employees inside the firm will lave incentives for efficient knowledge transfer since they
will be rewarded for their obedience to managerial directives as well as for their contnbution to
the entirety of the firm. Accordingly, these knowledge-based mechanisms, supposed to reduce
internal opportunistic behavior, are not addressed by TCE. TCE directs attention to how the
opportunistic behavior of external agents can be reduced or eliminated (i.e. contractual
safeguards). The assumption of opportunism used here, however, also leads the attention to
38As discussed in Section 3.2, even though it will be more attractive, ceteris paribus, to produce something where existing
competence can be used, the production cos, 's by using the market will, regardless, be lower. Moreover, if the cost of
running the bilateral relation (that is transaction costs) is at a minimum (near perfect markets), some governance costs, in
contrast, will always be present in the hierarc. ly (Williamson, J 985).
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mechanisms expected to reduce the degree of internal opportunism Contrary to TCE, this
means that reducing opportunistic behavior and hence lowering transaction costs internally,
will be solved more easily when firms' common codes and routines can be used to control
behavior. These behavioral assumptions shape the foundation for arguing that TCE and the
competence perspective may be synthesized into one unifying framework (cf. Chapter 6).
Unit of analysis
The unit of analysis in this study is the transaction. The competence perspective might view the
transaction as the basic unit of analysis as troublesome. This is mainly because the transaction
in question will be substantially influenced by the existing transactions already in place (Winter,
1988). This is in line with any evolutionary perspective that focuses on incremental
adjustments. Thus, using the transaction as the unit of analysis is not consistent with either
RBT or EE. However, a view of the firm's boundaries at this micro level, leads us to avoid the
analysis in the competence perspective where the performance of the firm as a whole is
regarded. Such a view could mean that one part [e.g. a transaction] in the system can carry the
cost burdens ofless efficient parts [transactions] (Winter, 1988), which is surely not consistent
with an efficiency principle. The adoption from TCE of using the transaction as the unit of
analysis means that EE satisficing choices about micro level solutions (Nelson & Winter, 1982)
are not regarded.
Constructs affecting vertical integration
The constructs expected to affect vertical integration were selected or derived from TCE, the
core competence approach, the knowledge transmission perspective (Winter, 1987; Kogut &
Zander, 1993; Zander & Kogut, 1995), and the literature on interfirm trust and argued to be;
asset specificity (cf. Section 2.2), closeness to primary competence (cf. Section 2.4), tacitness
(cf. Section 2.3) and interfirm trust (cf. Chapter 4). The expected relationships and the
explanatory logic that connect the independent variables to the dependent will be addressed in
the next chapter when the model and the hypotheses are considered.
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PART III: HYPOTHESES AND METHODOLOGY
This part of the dissertation consist) of 2 chapters. In Chapter 6 the research model and the
accompanying hypotheses are presented. Chapter 7 discusses methodological issues connected
to the empirical test of the theory.
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6. RESEARCH MODEL AND HYPOTHESES
Based on the theoretical framework presented in Part II, a model (i.e., a formal representation
of the theory) that will be subject to an empirical test is presented in Section 6.1. In Section 6.2
the hypotheses and the underlying arguments are presented.
6.1 Research model
Based on research question 2 specified in Section 1.3 a formal model to be investigated
empirically is presented in this section. We recall from Section 1.2 that research question 2
addressed how central variables derived from the focused perspectives will affect vertical
integration (VI)39. Throughout the literature review, we have presented and identified the
major variables derived from the two perspectives. The independent variable chosen from the
TCE framework was the transaction specific investments (TSI), and the independent variable
from the competence framework was argued to be the buyer's closeness to primary
competence (CPC). In addition, interfirm trust and tacitness were identified as major variables
for explaining the phenomenon examined. All of these variables have been theoretically
elaborated and empirically tested in previous studies, except the variable ofbuyer's closeness to
primary competence. Accordingly, the variable of closeness to primary competence was
developed in Section 2.4.
First, we outline and argue for the relevance of incorporating the two main variables of the
study in the model. These are closeness to primary competence (cf. Section 2.3) and
transaction specific investments (cf. Section 2.2). We address the explanatory mechanisms that
connect these two variables to each other and to vertical integration. Particularly, we establish
the logic for an interaction effect between CPC and TSI on vertical integration. Next, the
relevance of incorporating tacitness and interfirm trust in our model is summarized.
39 Research question 2 was: "How do major concepts derived from the competence perspective and transaction cost
economics affect vertical integration?"
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Closeness to primary competence and transaction specific investments
The variables of closeness to primary competence (CPC) and transaction specific investments
(TSI) were outlined and defined in Section 2.4 and Section 2.2, respectively. Following
Williamson (1985), TSI was defined, as transaction specific investments required to realizing
least cost supply. Derived from the core competence approach (Prahaled & Hamel, 1990), but
at the same time distinguished from the core competence construct (Rumelt, 1994), CPC was
defined as the degree to which the finn 's existing primary competencies can be used as il
catalyst in the internal learning processes and in the process of imitating environment-
specific competencies. Moreover, the operationalization of environment-specific competence
was in the present study restricted to the competence represented by the vendor in the
transaction in question.
The complementarity of the two perspectives is shown in Figure 6.1, where the concept of
closeness of primary competence (CPC) is incorporated into Williamson's (1991) originally
heuristic model". The TCE prediction implies that the buyer will bring the activity in-house
with increasing degrees of transaction specific investments (TSI), ceteris paribus. However,
because production costs are expected to be in favor of the vendor, the point of TSI will
exceed 'switchover level'" K(M) in the Figure, before the sum of production and transaction
costs will favor an integration decision. When CPC is high, however, this level will come at an
earlier point at the X-axes, namely at level K(H). Accordingly, the interaction effect of these
two variables is expected to move the decision level ofintegration from K(M) to K(H)42. We
elaborate this argument below, and consider the buyer's decision to make or buy.
4°F or simplicity we exclude the hybrid form that Williamson originally included in his model, since it is not necessary for
establishing the logic here. Williamson 's reduced-form analysis focuses solelyon transaction costs. In our analysis we also
include production costs considerations.
41Following Williamson (1985), the "switchover" levels represent points where the buyers are indifferent between market
and hierarchy.
42Notice that some minimum values of TSI have to be present before an integration solution would be efficient. We return
to this argument below and in the presentation of hypothesis 2 (section 5.2).
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M(K)= Cost curve for market governance (including the hybrid mode)
H(K) = Cost curves for hierarchy under conditions oflow (L), medium (M) and high (H) degrees ofbuyer's
CPC
K(H), K(M), K(L) = Switchover levels for high, medium and low degrees on buyer's CPC
In Section 3.2 we posit that a common code is a key source of the economies a firm provides
(Arrow, 1974) as it (a) increases the efficiency of the internal information transmission (Arrow,
1974); (b) increases the effectiveness ofperforming routines (Nelson & Winter, 1982); and (c)
reduces the degree of internal opportunistic behavior (Hennart, 1982). When using the market,
a buyer is exposed to high transaction costs when rSI is great. However, if CPC is great, the
common codes contnbute to minimizing opportunistic behavior (see c) and reducing
transaction costs, if the activity is internalized. Hence, the behavioral uncertainty will be
reduced, which implies lower bargaining, monitoring as well as maladaption costs compared
with using a vendor. In addition, increasing degrees of CPC will reduce the production cost
differences (see a and b, above) between internal production and market exchange. As argued
in Section 2.4, buyer's CPC will contribute to solving the decoding problem by imitating
processes, and the available and tacit problem by internalleaming processes.
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To establish the logic for the interaction effect, we first consider the direct effect of buyer's
CPC on vertical integration. The direct effect of buyer's CPC on vertical integration is
discussed by holding TSI constant at an intermediate level". An increase in CPC will reduce
production cost differences between producing internally and using a vendor. This argument,
however, is not sufficient to predict vertical integration, since the high-powered incentives of
markets will be manifested through lower production costs (Williamson, 1985). Accordingly,
transaction cost considerations must also be regarded. At an intermediate level of TSI, some
requirements of special adaptive and safeguarding mechanisms to administer the relationship
(transaction costs) will exist. When CPC is great, however, the common codes contnbute to
minimizing opportunistic behavior and transaction costs internally. At a given level of CPC the
internal governance costs will be lower than the governance costs of market procurement. The
difference in production costs will, as argued, also decrease with increasing values of buyer's
CPC. Accordingly, the switchover level will be exceeded when the transaction cost savings
exceed the loss in production costs. In sum, internal organization is preferred when CPC is
great, given a minimum level ofTSI.
Next, we consider the interaction effect of the two variables. As Williamson outlines, when
TSI is great the transaction costs of market procurement is high. There exist safeguarding
problems because of the vulnerability due to the potential opportunistic behavior of the other
actor. Such increasing potential for opportunistic behavior can only be hampered by increasing
costs of safeguarding (Williamson, 1985). Accordingly, when both TSI and CPC increase, the
transaction cost differences between internal organization and market exchange will be
reinforced. The increase in TSI will increase the transaction costs of market procurement,
while the increase in CPC will, simultaneously, decrease the transaction costs with internal
production. The interaction effect will, however, not influence the production cost differences.
The potential production cost savings from increasing TSI will be neutralized by the potential
production cost savings from increasing CPC.
Moreover, medium degrees of CPC, K(M), will roughly be captured by TCE-considerations.
Level K(L), however, illustrates a condition with low degrees of buyer's CPC. In such
43 Notice that at the intermediate level o/TSI, transaction cost economics predicts the hybrid/orm (Williamson, 1991).
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situations we expect that even very high degrees of TSI will be in favor of market procurement
(the hybrid form). By internalizing in low CPC situations, the buyer will be exposed to both
high production costs as well as high internal transaction costs. We expect a buyer in such
situations to select the hybrid (Williamson, 1991) governance mode, and to invest in authority-
based mechanisms.
Tacitness and interfirm trust
Tacitness. The variables oftacitness was outlined and defined in Section 2.3. Based on Winter
(1987) and Kogut & Zander's works (1993), and evolutionary economics (Nelson & Winter,
1982) in general, tacitness was defined as the buyer's perceived degree of the tacit knowledge
underlying the vendor's performance of the activity purchased. A high degree of tacitness
represents knowledge that is difficult to transfer across firm boundaries (Winter, 1987; Kogut
& Zander, 1992; 1993). If tacitness is high the possibility to imitate knowledge from the
vendor will be reduced. If a major part of the knowledge underlying the performance of the
transaction is perceived as tacit for the buyer, this will reduce the ability to imitate and hence
decode this knowledge. If tacitness is high, we expect the buyer's production costs in
performing the activity hirnselfto increase compared with a situation where tacitness is low.
Interfirm trust. In adopting a calculativeness reflection on interfirm trust, the variable was
incorporated into the study's framework in Chapter 4. Economic actors involved in
autonomous trading will act opportunistically if they have economic motives to do so. For
autonomous firms involved in exchange of products or services, a interfirm trust relationship
will function as long as both parties calculate that they will make a profit from using trust as a
governance mechanism. Interfirm trust was outlined and defined in Section 4.3. The construct
was defined as a willingness to rely on an exchange partner in whom one has confidence,
which is developed and persisted on the basis of credible commitments and calculative
economic responses (Moorman, Zaltman, & Deshpande, 1992; Williamson, 1993).
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The model
In sum, these four variables along with the dependent variable of vertical integration (VI) form
the conceptual model shown in Figure 6.2. The independent variables of buyer's CPC,
tacitness, and the TSI are expected to affect the dependent variable (VI) directly. The expected
interaction effect between buyer's CPC and vendor's TSI are meant to illustrate the
complementarity of the two perspectives examined and was illustrated in Figure 6.1.
Accordingly, we expect a positive interaction effect of these variables on vertical integration.
By this we will test empirically, what we have argued theoretically, the complementarity of
transaction costs economics and the competence perspective. Additionally, we expect further
that interfirm trust will moderate the relation between vendor's TSI and VI. The underlying
arguments for the connection between the variables and the formal statement of the hypotheses
are presented in the next section.
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Figure 6.2 Model
The theoretical answering of research question l and 2, discussed throughout Chapters 5 and
6, is summarized in Figure 6.3 below. In the upper part of the figure the assumptions of the
study are shown. Next, the explanatory mechanisms derived from these assumptions are
formalized. Finally, the connections between the constructs in the model, logically deduced
from the explanatory mechanisms are shown in the bottom part of the figure.
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The vendor's transaction specific investments
Investments in specific assets will create a safeguarding problem because of the vulnerability
due to the potential opportunistic behavior of the other actor. Investments in such assets are
supposed to create a lock-in effect caused by a fundamental transformation ex-post
(Williamson, 1985). The lock-in effect will shape a condition where autonomous trading
conditions ex-ante will be supplanted by unified ownership (Williamson, 1985). The underlying
TeE argument for this proposition is that with high degrees of transaction specific
investments, the expected transaction cost savings by internalizing the activity will exceed the
extra production costs that are supposed to exist internally. Based on Williamson (1979, 1981,
1985) and earlier empirical TeE-studies on vertical integration (e.g. Monteverde & Teece,
1982; Masten 1984; Walker & Weber 1984; 1987; Masten, Meehan & Snyder 1989;
Lieberman, 1991), we state the following hypotheses:
Hl:
The buyer's investments in transaction specific assets will have a positive effect on
vertical integration.
The buyer's closeness to primary competence
EE holds that when firms grow by vertical integration they grow in a direction of something
closely related. RBT argues that firms will expand in those areas where their existing
competence is the foundation for a firm's value creating process. These two sources are the
theoretical departure for the expected relation between buyer's epe and vertical integration.
While EE gives the basic foundation for the understanding of economic actors' limited capacity
to perform new and different tasks, RBT gives an understanding of those competencies most
likely to generate rents. The competence perspective, however, is not able to connect these
arguments to transaction costs and opportunism The underlying arguments for the connection
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between these variables must therefore be further extended. Our discussion is based on the
behavioral assumptions outlined in Chapter 3, and contrary to previous attention in the
competence perspective, we connect the competence prediction to production cost as well as
to transaction cost efficiency. The underlying arguments for this hypothesis are divided into
two parts. First, we argue, ceteris paribus, why an integration decision based on relatedness
will be preferred compared with a non-relatedness situation. Next, it is argued that increasing
degrees of CPC will favor internal organizing compared with using a vendor.
Argument 1. Some of the barriers and problems that impede effective competence
accumulation for the buyer in buyer-vendor relations will be overcome if the buyer has CPC
regarding the activity in question. When CPC is high, the buyer can use his existing
competence as a guide in learning processes and in imitating relevant competence from the
vendor. The coding problem (available knowledge from the vendor must be decoded by the
buyer), the available problem (the vendor refuses to share his coded knowledge with the
vendor), and the tacit problem (not all knowledge embedded in the vendor's routines is
articulated in written documents), will through internal learning and imitating processes be
reduced ifthe buyer has CPC (cf. Paragraph 2.4.3). When CPC is low, in contrast, it will take
considerable time and spending of resources before the buyer will be able to absorb and learn
the relevant knowledge necessary to effectively perform the activity. Accordingly, as
previously argued by scholars in the competence perspective, if an integration of a newactivity
is not linked to the firms' existing competence base they will face high production costs. A
relatedness will provide gains from the redeployment of existing competence (Penrose, 1959)
as well as give the opportunity to economize on intraknowledge and information transfer. Note
that this statement roughly covers what scholars in the competence perspective previously have
emphasized (e.g. Winter, 1988; Conner, 1991).
Performing completely different undertakings, however, will also increase the transaction
costs. The selfish and dishonest behavior of actors inside the firm will increase if the
management lacks the common codes necessary to detect cheating (Hennart, 1982).
Accordingly, ifthe existing codes and routines to a limited degree can support the performance
of an activity, the firm is exposed to many of the same problems as in conventional market
transactions. An inability to detect cheating and dishonesty will increase the search and
transaction costs internally. This opportunism statement is an extension of previous works
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within the competence perspective. However, argument 2, must be included to give an
understanding of why high CPC will make integration decisions more efficient than market
procurement.
Argument 2. In absence of uncertainty/complexity complete contracting is, according to
Williamson (1975), possible. Bounded rationality has relevance "... only to the extent that the
limits to rationality are reached - which is to say, under conditions of uncertainty and/or
complexity" (Williamson, 1975:22). This limit on rationality is reached with relatively low
degrees of asset specificity in autonomous trading (Williamson, 1991). However, if
internalizing when CPC is high, a buyer economizes on bounded rationality. 'The limit of
rationality' is not reached when the degree of CPC is high enough. This possibility to
economize on bounded rationality assumes, however, that there exist some safeguarding
problems in the buyer-vendor relation. In a perfectly competitive marked, a buyer can, if
exposed to opportunistic behavior, simply recontract with other vendors. Discrete (Macneil,
1980) market transactions occur only when transaction specific investments are zero
(Williamson, 1991). Consequently, the expected effect of CPC on VI implies that a minimum
(constant) level ofTSI is present in the relationship. In Section 6.1, we argued that an increase
in CPC would reduce production cost differences between producing internally and using a
vendor. This argument, however, is not sufficient to predict vertical integration, since the high-
powered incentives of markets will be manifested through lower production costs (Williamson,
1985). Accordingly, the sphere of application for the hypothesized effect is restricted to
relationships where some minimum levels ofTSI are present+'.
Given this premise, as CPC increases, the buyer's production costs will gradually be
approaching the vendor's (cf. Section 6.1). At the same time, a great CPC will increase the
transaction cost differences, which will be in favor of internal organization. Accordingly, the
buyer will reach a level where these savings exceed the production cost loss: the greater CPC,
the higher the transaction cost differences and the lower the production cost differences
between internal organization and market procurement. We propose the following:
44 Although it is believed that the effect ofCPC on VI will depend on the level of Tsl.few transactions between firms are of
a discrete kind (Macneil, 1980), i.e., most transactions include some minimum levels of rsf. Thus, it can be argued that a




The buyer's epe will have a positive effect on vertical integration.
Interaction of buyer's epe and TSI
A firm's former investments and its repertoire of routines, restrict its future behavior (Nelson
& Winter, 1982). This follows because learning tends to be local (Cyert & March, 1963).
Thus, even though the buyer's existing competence may be close to the vendor's, the way of
doing things is different (Meyer & Rowan, 1977), and the buyer and the vendor will have
different common codes (Arrow, 1974; Hennart, 1982; Kogut & Zander, 1992; 1993). This
implies that the parties will react differently when trying to co-ordinate disturbances
(Williamson, 1991), which again will increase the bargaining costs of reaching an agreement
for solving the disturbances". In situations with great lSI, the buyer is therefore exposed to
high transaction costs, independent of the degree of CPC. Accordingly, the buyer's ability to
detect cheating and dishonesty from the vendor is initially low and can only be reduced by
added safeguardings, which increase the transaction costs. These transaction costs will
gradually increase with increasing degrees of lSI (Williamson, 1979; 1981; 1985). By
internalizing, the buyer will therefore economize on transaction costs by using their common
codes (Arrow, 1974; Hennart, 1982) and organizing principles (Kogut & Zander, 1992) as
guidelines in controlling behavior. Accordingly, the interaction effect ofCPC and lSI increases
the transaction cost differences between market exchange and internal organizing=: An
increase in lSI increases the transaction costs of market procurement, while an increase in
epc, simultaneously, decreases the transaction costs of internal organizing. Accordingly, we
propose:
45Note that this different reaction may be a result of disagreements on good intentions (Conner & Prahaled, 1996) or on
self-interested bargaining (Williamson, 1985), or on both. As Williamson (1991:278) asserts, failures of co-ordination
between autonomous parts may happen because they "... read and react to signals differently, even though their purpose
[might be] to achieve a timelyand compatible combined response".
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H3:
The interaction effect between the buyer's CPC and TSI on vertical integration will be
positive.
Tacitness
A high degree of tacitness represents knowledge that is difficult to transfer across firm
boundaries (Winter, 1987; Kogut & Zander, 1992; 1993). Accordingly, the more articulable
the knowledge underlying the activity is, the easier it is for the buyer to imitate relevant
knowledge from the vendor. By contrast, if tacitness is high the possibility to imitate
knowledge from the vendor will be reduced. If a major part of the knowledge underlying the
performance of the transaction is perceived as tacit for the buyer, this will reduce the ability to
imitate and hence decode this knowledge", If tacitness is high, we expect the buyer's
production costs in performing the activity himselfto increase compared with a situation where
tacitness is low.
The hypothesis is embedded in the broader framework within evolutionary economics'
perspective on the growth of the firms (Penrose, 1959; Nelson & Winter, 1982; Kogut &
Zander, 1992; 1993; Zander & Kogut, 1995). Thus, the rationale for the variable impact on
vertical integration is connected to production cost efficiency. Moreover, given some level of
asset specificity, the vendor will have incentives for not sharing his knowledge with a buyer",
Accordingly, as with hypothesis two, the expected effect of tacitness implies that a minimum
(constant) level of TSI is present in the relationship. As emphasized by agency theory, if the
outcome of a performance can be perfectly measured and/or evaluated (i.e., low asset
46 Note that the explanatory logic for the interaction effect is strictly based on transaction costs consideration. The
interaction effect will, not influence the production cost differences. The potential production cost savings from increasing
TSI will be neutralized by the potential production cost savings from increasing CPC (cf Section 6.1).
47We addressed this issues in depth in paragraph 2.2.3, when we stated that the tacitness problem and the availability
problem could be overcome by internal learning processes, while the coding problem was related to the imitation of the
vendor's competence.
48 That the vendor will not share his knowledge with the vendor may not be characterized as opportunistic behavior. Such
behavior is more connected to the neoclassical assumption of simple self-interest seeking (see Williamson (1985: Chapter
2) for the distinction between simple self-interest seeking and opportunism): However, when tacitness is low, there may
exist some opportunism independent transaction costs (Conner & Prahaled, 1996). Thus, the knowledge transaction cost,
i.e. the buyers' costs of absorbing the vendor's knowledge through co-operation may increase as tacitness increase (cf
Cohen & Levinthal, 1990). Again, however, we find it difficult to agree to this argumentation, because it implies a
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specificity implies that the market function, cf. Williamson, 1985), there is no need to engage in
the costs associated with controlling and monitoring behavior (Eisenhardt, 1989). Accordingly,
in the production of such kinds of goods and services (i.e., low asset specificity), it does not
matter iftacitness is involved or not: The markets do perfectly well.
Kogut & Zander (1993) received empirical support for the hypothesis that the degree of
tacitness is positively related to internal diffusion of manufacturing, and negativelyassociated
with using an agent. Thus, imitation of knowledge from firms that possess capabilities with
high degrees of tacitness may be extremely difficult. The extent to which capabilities can be
articulated and taught affect the time and resources necessary to imitate the knowledge. Thus,
as the knowledge becomes less codified, less easily thought and more system dependent (i.e.,
high degrees oftacitness), the less likely it is that the knowledge may be transferred from the
vendor to the buyer. Thus, the following hypothesis is proposed:
H4:
The buyer's perceived tacitness of the vendor's knowledge will have a negative effect on
vertical integration.
Modification effect of interfirm trust
To properly determine the characteristics of what he is buying, a buyer must strive to achieve
sufficient knowledge or information about the goods or services he intends to buy. There are,
at least, two possibilities of appropriating this information in bilateral relations; by developing a
trust relation or by using authority mechanisms and contractual safeguards. When trust is low
other control mechanisms are employed (Shapiro, 1987). Consequently, legalistic remedies
(e.g., accrediting organizations, insurance, bonds, guarantees) are established to compensate
for the lack of trust in exchange (Ring, 1997). Thus, to prevent opportunistic behavior from
the vendor, one solution for the buyer can be to invest in authority mechanisms. Research
investigating these kinds of mechanisms suggests that they may lead to higher level of mistrust
(Dahlstrom & Nygaard, 1995). Thus, a consequence of authority mechanisms may be absence
paradox: Absent opportunistic attitude, there are no incentives for the vendor not to share all his knowledge with the
buyer, and there are no incentives for the buyer to either absorb the knowledge or integrate the activity.
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of trust and appears to raise the costs of the relationship (Ring, 1997). These costs can exceed
the costs ofinternal organization (Williamson, 1985; Chiles & McMackin, 1996).
By contrast, trust seems to be a less expensive mechanism to use than authority. When trust is
present within relationships, the cost of transacting appears to be lower (Arrow, 1974;
McAllister, 1995; Chiles & McMackin, 1996; John, 1984; Ring & Van de Ven, 1992) as fewer
controls are needed to measure and monitor performance (Ouchi, 1980). Powell (1990) states
that "... trust reduces complex realities far more quickly and economically than prediction,
authority, or bargaining" (p. 305). A firm will reduce behavioral uncertainty and complexity by
having interfirm trust (Chiles & McMackin, 1996). Trust may solve problems associated with
contract specifications (Dwyer, Schurr, & Oh, 1987), and may facilitate adaption to
uncertainty (Macneil, 1980). Trust reduces the parties' withdrawal of information (Hennart,
1982). As trust increases among trading parties, the communication and information efficiency
will increase an establish a working relationship that facilitates performance (Dahlstrom &
Nygaard, 1995). Thus, relying on trust "profitability is enhanced, all other things remaining
equal" (Ring, 1997:6).
Consequently, trust is viewed as a way to economize on bounded rationality (cf. Chiles &
McMackin, 1996). However, this potential of economizing on bounded rationality come at an
expense. The risk costs of being exposed to opportunistic behavior increases. As discussed in
Chapter 4, relational risk has two dimensions: Size of probability (risk) and the size of possible
loss (risk costs) (cf. Chapter 4; Nooteboom et al., 1997). As empirically supported by
Nooteboom et al. (1997), asset specificity has a positive effect on the risk costs, rather than an
effect on its risk. Asset specificity increases the stake that the party has in a relationship and
therefore increases the size of risk costs, even though the subjective risk is shown to be
reduced (Nooteboom et al., 1997). Accordingly, the subjective risk may be reduced with
increasing levels of trust, while the estimated risk costs will not. Consistent with the behavioral
assumptions of this study, we expect that interfirm trust relationships are created on the basis
of calculative reasoning. Hence, if trust is present, the parties have calculated that
opportunistic behavior is not efficient. Accordingly, a rational actor will regard the size of loss
as the baseline when evaluating governance decisions. This trade-off is the issue of an
economist (i.e. the effort of calculating the most efficient solution).
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The TCE-framework assumes that the probability of the actors behaving opportunistically
increases as investments in specific assets increase (Hill, 1990). And as evidently illustrated in
the literature, trust is created in order to hamper or eliminate opportunistic behavior.
Consequently, trust may only be rationalized in the presence of transaction specific
investments. Accordingly, from an economic point of view trust cannot alone rationalize a
market relationship. Instead, the potential ability to economize on trust increases as the degree
of transaction specific investments increases. Chiles & McMackin (1996) propose that
interfirm trust will alter the efficient boundaries of the firm, since it decreases negotiating,
drafting as well as monitoring costs, and, hence economizes on transaction costs. Accordingly,
in the presence of trust, higher degrees of transaction specific investments are expected to
make market or hybrid governance more efficient than in the absence of trust. Accordingly,
based on Chiles & McMackin's (1996) theoretical framework and proposition, and the
discussion above, we expect that interfirm trust will modify the effect on the relationship
between transaction specific investments and vertical integration. We therefore propose:
H5:
Interfirm trust will moderate negatively the relationship between TSI and VI.
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7. METHODOLOGY
The chapter provides a description of the research design and data collection procedures for an
empirical test of the theory. In Section 7.1, considerations regarding the choice of research
design are addressed. Section 7.2 includes discussion and description of the empirical setting.
In Section 7.3, the sample frame and the sample procedures of the study are addressed. Issues
with respect to measurement are considered in Section 7.4. Section 7.5 provides
considerations with respect to control variables. Finally, data collection issues are addressed in
Section 7.6.
7.1 Research design
The hypotheses (cf. Chapter 6) impose certain requirements for the research design. The
empirical study is designed to conduct theory testing of the causal model of this research. We
discuss design requirements for testing such causal models in general, and why the model of
this study can be tested using a correlation design.
Causality
As our model has been argued to be a causal one, we briefly illustrate the three conditions
causality rests on. The necessary conditions for demonstrating causality are isolation,
association, and directionality (Bollen, 1989). Isolation means that no other variable, except
the ones included in the model must affect the association between the cause and the effect.
Thus, a potential influence of a ''third'' variable on the effect must be ruled out (i.e., absence of
spurious and masked associations between the constructs in the model). Association implies
that changes in the level of an independent construct (cause) must be associated with changes
in the level of the dependent construct (effect). Finally, directionality means that the direction
of influence must be temporal, i.e. the cause must precede the effect in time.
Different designs have different strengths and weaknesses. Most designs can to some extent
deal with the requirements of association and isolation. However, as discussed below,
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particularly the possibility to assess temporal asymmetry (i.e., directionality) differs with
respect to the research designs available.
Available research designs
Among the three main research designs available, the classical experiment, the quasi-
experiment and the non-experimental field study, the first two have superior features for
conducting tests of causal relationships. Especially with respect to the establishment of
temporal precedence, experiments and quasi-experiments are the most appropriate designs
(Cook & Campbell, 1979).
If manipulative variables can be used, one can change or manipulate one variable in a model
and examine subsequent effects on other variables, thereby determining cause-and-effect
relationships. The ability to control the situation, manipulate the treatment and make
comparisons between treatment conditions, makes the classical experiment appropriate to
establish the requirements for isolation and directionality (Calder, Phillips & Tybout, 1981).
However, when a model (such as this one) has several predictor variables, conducting an
experiment becomes difficult due to the need of establishing many experimental groups (Cook
& Campbell, 1979). This problem becomes even more complex when introducing moderator
variables. Additionally, the experimental testing procedure very often has a limited time
perspective. The variables used in our model are complex phenomena and presumed to develop
slowly over time. Manipulation of variables, such as trust, tacitness and closeness to primary
competence seems to be impossible in a short time frame. Moreover, treatment of manipulation
is difficult when firms or strategic business units represent the level of analysis (McGrath,
1982). Accordingly, experimental testing of the model is inadequate and excluded as a possible
option.
The quasi-experiment, the idea of study causality in natural settings (Cook & Campbell, 1979),
is not seen as a possible design options either. In such a design, subjects confronted with the
independent variable are compared with subjects not confronted with it. Using such a design,
the division of subject into experimental versus control groups should ideally be randomized.
Using quasi-experiments mean that we are allowed to manipulate the independent variables of
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CPC and TSI, in a subset of randomly chosen dyads. Next, we should be able to compare this
subset with another subset of dyads, without changing the value of the same variables.
Alternatively, we should have access to a group of dyads where some included were changing
values ofthese variables, and some did not. None ofthese options are available.
Regarding non-experimental designs, the best alternative to test the direction of influence is
through a panel design (Menard, 1991). Utilizing such a design, at least observations from two
periods are necessary to get the appropriate information. However, the resources available do
not allow the time scope and costs associated with a design involving two periods of data
collection. Consequently, this alternative is neither possible.
Choice of research design
The only realistic design alternative is considered to be the correlation design. However, such a
design has some limitations when testing causal models. Below, we discuss these potential
limitations with respect to the conditions of causality. The limitations as well as the advantages
of testing the theory using corrrelational design will also be addressed.
Isolation. Mitchell (1985) argues that Cook & Campbell's (1979) list of threats to internal
validity is of marginal help when using correlation designs. In such studies, the effort must be
connected to an identification of third variables through systematic thinking (setting
characteristics) and theory-reviews. Consequently, the isolation of other intervening influences
may be met by a homogenous population and by the use of control variables (Mitchell, 1985).
Association. Association may be reasonably established by correlational design. However, two
aspects are important to consider for establishing associations in the chosen design. First,
sufficient variance in the independent constructs is necessary to achieve covariations among
constructs (Calder, Phillips & Tybout, 1981; 1982). Drawing on previous studies, sufficient
variance in the independent constructs of TSI, trust, and tacitness will be obtained in most
buyer-vendor contexts. However, the variable of CPC is more problematic. If we select an
industry where the buyers are in no position to obtain close competence in performing the
activity they purchase, it will surely limit the range ofvariation in the variable. Thus, the choice
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of empirical setting should first and foremost be guided by the possibility to secure variation in
the variable of CPC. Second, the other aspect concerns the issue of stability. Causes do not
always produce their effects instantly (Hoyle, 1995). The reasonable solution is to measure the
effect when it has achieved equihbrium in not changing further (Hoyle, 1995). Usually in
correlation design, system equilibrium is assumed. This should not, however, be done without
some knowledge about the time distance between a change in the cause producing the
expected effect. The connection between the independent constructs and the dependent one is
complex. As argued in the theoretical discussion, a change in the independent variable of CPC,
TSI, tacitness and trust will influence the dependent variable through a set of mechanisms
(opportunism, transaction costs, production costs) that couple the causes to the effect. This
implies that the time since the relationship was established should be sufficient for the
mechanisms, by which the causal influences are transmitted to the effect, to be stabilized. How
the requirement of stability is secured is discussed in Section 7.3.
Directionality. For correlation design, temporal asymmetry poses the most serious problem
for inferring causality. Directionality may be established either by logic, theory, or, most
powerfully, by research design (Hoyle, 1995; McGrath, 1982). To test if the cause precedes
the assumed effect cannot be inferred by the chosen design. It may, however, be adequate to
conduct a causal study even though the time effect cannot be tested, if theory and/or logic
indicate the causal direction (McGrath, 1982).
The hypotheses developed all rest on arguments about causal relations, which, of course, also
imply directionality. Thus, theory supports the directionality of the hypotheses. However, the
use of theory "to justify an inference of directionality is the most problematic because often
there are competing theories that offer different accounts of the association among two or
more variables" (Hoyle, 1995: 10). Even though other "theories" exist in the literature (e.g., the
neoclassical power argument), these theories have been ruled out by TCE considerations
(Williamson, 1975; 1985; Argyres, 1996; Perry, 1989). Beside, these theories will first and
foremost imply potential problems for isolation rather than directionality (i.e., the theoretical
influence from TCE on the phenomena is highly accepted, cf. Perry, 1989). Thus, the issue is
more a question of to what degree the protective belt (cf. Lakatos, 1978) may be extended. A
competence theory, however, has not been ruled out by TCE (cf. Chapter 3 & 4). However,
TCE and the competence theory, previously viewed as competing theories of vertical
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integration, have been integrated into one theoretical framework in this study. Thus, the
direction of the hypotheses in the study's theory is; (1) supported by, and consistent with, the
literature, and (2) competing theories that offer different accounts of the direction ofinfluence
among the model's variables are, to my knowledge, absent.
Nevertheless, theory alone may not be sufficient to "confirm" causality when the chosen design
lacks the possibility to explicitly test directionality. Particularly, by conducting correlational
design it may be so that the real direction of influence goes the opposite way of the
hypothesized, or alternatively, that the influence is reciprocal. Thus, a priori statement for the
logic behind the direction of influence will further increase the confidence that causality may be
inferred (Hoyle, 1995; McGrath, 1982). Thus, in addition to theory, the way the study's design
is conducted implies that it is logically impossible that the influence can go the other way of the
one hypothesized. As illustrated in the next section, in order to appropriately capture CPC (i.e.,
closeness in competence to an activity), we have to select cases where the activity in question
is not performed in-house. For the purpose of this study, it will be meaningless to talk about
closeness in competence to an activity, which a firm already performs. Similar arguments yield
the other predictor variables in the model. Thus, the ways the variables are measured imply that
logic, in addition to theory, supports the directionality of the hypotheses.
Summary
As argued above, strong cause-effect influences can only be inferred from experimental
designs. As not all the three causality conditions are established by the chosen research design,
only association rather than causation can be inferred from the empirical study (Schumacker &
Lomax, 1996). The main reason for this was argued to be the difficulty involved in
encountering the requirement of temporal precedence. Thus, the chosen design is not alone
sufficient to establish causality. However, the temporal precedence is a priori established
through theory and logic. Beside, the two other conditions (isolation and association) will be
reasonably accomplished in the study. Accordingly, if the theory is empirically supported, we




As argued, the empirical study can be classified as a theory test. Internal validity should have
priority over external validity when conducting theory testing (e.g. Cook & Campbell, 1979).
By selecting a particular industry, one accounts for the potential impact of industry effects, and
thus, internal validity is improved. Additionally, the choice of one single industry may decrease
the amount of error variance, and statistical power will be improved. As a general theory of
vertical integration, the study's theory should hold for firms in general. A theory claimed to be
general can be rejected if it is falsified for any subgroup of firms (Calder, Phillips & Tybout,
1981). Even if the theory is supported in the study, however, establishing external validity can
only be done through several studies in different contexts (Salipante et al., 1982).
A description of the empirical setting is reported below. Further, we discuss the organization
of the activities in the chosen setting. The latter aspect is discussed in order to illustrate how
the setting satisfies the study's important requirement of properly measuring the construct of
CPC. The requirements for measuring this construct are therefore discussed first.
The construct of CPC and the choice of empirical setting
The possibility ofmeasuring this variable must be connected to criteria based on the theoretical
definition of the construct. In Section 2.4, CPC was defined as the degree to which the finn 's
existing primary competencies can be used as a catalyst in the internal learning processes and
in the process of imitating environment-specific competencies.
Accordingly, the units in the chosen empirical setting should be able to satisfy the following
criteria:
i) The activity or transaction examined must not be performed internally (cf. 'environment-
specific competence)
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ii) The units must perform other activities where some of the competence developed might be
of relevance for performing the activity now purchased and examined (cf. existing primary
competence).
Description of the empirical setting
The chosen industry is the Norwegian hydroelectric power industry. Up to 1991 the industry
was organized as a natural monopoly, and the local power stations covered the supply in
specific geographic markets. In 1991, however, the hydroelectric power market in Norway was
deregulated, which resulted in one of the most competitive power markets in the world (EnFo,
1995). The deregulation of the market opened for competition in the production and selling of
electric power. During the last six years, the industry has become more and more competitively
oriented and shows obvious similarities with completely unregulated markets.
The electric utility industry consists of many different sectors with respect to production and
distnbution of electric power. A major and central part of the power stations' activities
concerns the maintenance activities of the stations. These are divided into three main areas;
mechanical, electronic, and building and construction maintenance. The governance of
mechanical maintenance activities is the focus ofthis study. This part of the industry has never
been regulated, as the case was for distribution of electric power.
The level of analysis is the power station (i.e., either a firm or strategic business unit). A single
(or strategic) business unit is defined as the boundaries of an autonomous organizational
subunit (D'Aveni & Ravenscraft, 1994). The unit of analysis is the mechanical maintenance
activities, i.e., the transactions (cf. Chapter 5). Using the transaction in vertical relationships
between buyers and vendors as the unit of analysis, this study examine attributes of the
economic exchanges between buyers and vendors in the power station industry and regards
buyer's make or buy decision of the maintenance activity in question.
The empirical setting of the study is highly relevant for testing the theoretical model. It is
homogenous and is assumed to secure variation in the independent constructs. Below, it is
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shown how it is possible to isolate and categorize the different maintenance activities in the
examined sector of the power industry. This aspect allows us to measure CPC in superior way.
Organizing the activities of mechanical power maintenance
From field interviews, it appears that the mechanical maintenance activities in the power station
industry can be divided and ranked into seven different components or categories. The ranking
of the maintenance activities was based on expert evaluation of the degree of advanced
engineering competence necessary to perform the different categories or activities and their
relatedness to each other. The expert evaluation was done in two different rounds. First, we
worked closely with one expert on power maintenance activities, and developed the initial
categories. Later, in round two, six informants from different power station units were asked
to rank these activities with regard to the complexity of performing these activities, and the
degree ofrelatedness between the activitiesv. The results of this test gave reasonable matching
and convergent results, and corresponded and thereby confirmed the initial categorization in
round one.
Figure 7.1 illustrates that the inner circle represents an activity that requires less advanced
engineering competence than the next activity in the circle, and so on. Accordingly, we are able
to rank these categories with respect to the complexity involved in performing them (from l to
7 with increasing degree of complexity").
49Several interviews were conducted with experts in the industry. Additionally, a preliminary questionnaire (cf.
Gulbrandsen, 1996) concerning the issue of relatedness and complexity was distributed to managers of power stations
participating in a course held by EnFo in October 1995 (Vedlikeholds filosofi for kraftforsyning, Lederkurs, Ernst Park
Hotel, 18. -19. October 1995~.
so As we can see, several of the activities were reported to have about the same complexity, and were impossible to
distinguish on the evaluated criteria. Moreover, the complexity of the activity was evaluated by the degree to which
different disciplinary engineering knowledge must be combined in order to perform the activity adequately (cf. Kogut &
Zander, 1993).
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Figure 7.1. Ranking ofmechanical maintenance activities.
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Further, the expert evaluations showed that these maintenance activities are not unrelated to
each other. If a power station is able to perform the activity in circle 2, it is better suited to
perform the next activity. This means that being able to perform activity 2 in-house, a power
station is assumed to have some familiarity with and relevant knowledge to perform the next,
but the station will not be familiar with how to perform e.g. activity 6. The ranking of activities
is meant to represent the degree of closeness in competence to an activity. This aspect implies
that it is possible to regard the evolutionary economics' argument that closeness in competence
to an activity can be an important indicator of where integration will take place. Besides, the
maintenance activities represent one of the primary competencies the stations possess. This
was obvious from the preliminary studies, since without a high standard of maintenance, the
power stations will gradually be damaged, and they will not be able to meet the requirements
claimed by NVE (Norges Vassdrags og Energiverk). This latter aspect implies that it is
possible to regard RBT's argument that firms are expected to expand in areas where their
primary competencies are the departure for further growth. Thus, by having the mechanical
maintenance activities in the power industry as the unit of analysis, all the requirements for
properly measuring the construct of CPC are satisfied (i.e., the activities are related, existing
competence is of relevance, the activities can be ranked with respect to complexity and
connection, maintenance in one form or another is part of the power stations primary
competence, and the activities or transactions examined are not performed internally).
7.3 Sample frame and sampling procedures
Population, sample frame and sampling procedures
The industry consists of approximately 600 business units (EnFo, 1995). Some hydroelectric
power firms carry out both production and distribution of electric power, while other only
perform one of these operations. Only units accomplishing production maintenance activities
(i.e., production of electric power) are included. Thus, 411 units, which produce electric
power, were identified, and these units represent the sampling frame. The units were identified
from EnFO's ('Energiforsyningens Fellesorganisasjon') membership database".
51 99% oj all the power stationfinns in Norway are members oj EnFO (EnFO. /995).
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Data was collected from the buyer side of the dyads2• Each of the business units was informed
to select the last activity carried out by a vendor in whom the respondent was well informed.
Consequently, which one of the twelve activities the informants selected was not controlled by
the researcher.
Sample size
The appropriate size of the sample in this study will depend on the type of statistical method to
be used as well as the available cases. When conducting theory testing of models with latent
variables, structural equation modeling (SEM) has advantages over multiple regression (see
e.g. Joreskog and Sorbom, 1982, Bollen, 1989). Thus, SEM is probably the best method for
testing the measurement and structural model of the study. Even though "no hard and fast
rule" (Bollen, 1989:268) exists for determining sample size associated with theory testing in
SEM, tentative guidelines and simulations indicate that sample sizes down to 100 are often
adequate to give reliable test statistics (Bagozzi & Vi, 1988; Anderson & Gerbing, 1984).
Additionally, the greater the number of free parameters in a model, the greater sample size is
needed (Bollen, 1989). There is, however, little experience on which to base such
recommendations (Hu & Bentler, 1985). The study's model has a moderate number of
indicators, namely 21. Thus, following Bagozzi & Yi (1988) and Anderson & Gerbing's
(1984) suggestion, a sample size of more than 100 should be satisfactory in order to test the
model in SEM. The study, however, includes 2 moderators or interaction effects.
When moderators are included, the sample sizes requirements for testing structural models in
SEM increase. Jonsson (1997) states that if one interaction effect is included, the sample size
should be at least 400 cases. Klein et al. (1997) suggest that the requirements should be twice
as many n for every moderator included as when testing a model without moderators.
Consequently, following Jonsson and Klein et al., the sample size for testing the structural
model should be 800. Accordingly, given the available sample frame of the study (N=411),
52The often-discussed trade-off between selecting data from one or both sides of a dyad is of less relevance in this study.
Although divergent perceptions about the characteristics of the relation may exist (John & Reve, 1982), the interesting
issue here is to capture the buyer's perception of the research problem (cf Section 7.6 and Heide & John, 1991 for the
relevance of this).
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SEM cannot be used when testing the structural model. However, since the two-step modeling
approach (cf. Chapter 8 and Anderson & Gerbing, 1988) is used in this study, the measurement
model can be estimated using SEM, and product term analysis in multiple regression is applied
for the structural analysis (cf., Section 8.3).
Four factors must be specified to determine the necessary sample size when conducting
product term analysis (Jaccard, Turrisi & Wan, 1990). The balance between the two first
factors, known as the Type I and Type II errors dilemma, implies that a too small or too large
sample size is undesirable. With low statistical power= a potentially important effect may go
undetected, while a too high alpha level54 might give a bias toward accepting false effects.
Ideally, one should take into account the experience from previous studies when determine the
appropriate sample size (Kaplan, 1995). However, for the variables in the model there has not
been reported any information regarding effect size and power (i.e., the variable of CPC has
never been measured). Thus, common standards in the social sciences are regarded as
appropriate rule-of-thumb for determining the power and alpha level for the study.
First, the desired level of power of the statistical test must be set. Following Cohen (1988),
0.80 is viewed as an appropriate criterion. Second, one must specify the Type I error rate
(alpha level) for the test. The rate of the study is 0.05, which is the common standard in the
social sciences (Jaccard et al., 1990). Third, one must estimate the population squared multiple
correlation for the main-effects-only model. Fourth, one must additionally estimate the squared
multiple correlation for the model including the product terms (Jaccard et al., 1990). The
difference between the third and fourth estimate is the estimated strength of the interaction
effect (Jaccard et al., 1990). Since there is little help in previous research, we have few
guidelines when estimating the squared multiple correlation of the population. A solution
would be that a relatively small squared multiple correlations was assumed. However, in the
theory chapters it is argued that the synthesis of the two perspectives forms a strong paradigm
for explaining vertical integration. Consequently, these theoretical guidelines will indicate a
relatively great squared multiple regression. In the social sciences a squared multiple
53 Power refers to the probability of correctly rejecting the null hypotheses (i.e., the probability of not making Type II
error).
54 The alpha level (or Type I error rate) refers to the probability of rejecting the null hypothesis when it should be
accepted.
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correlation less than 0.20 is not uncommon. However, given that previous research in the
TCE-framework has been successful, we estimate the population square correlation for the
main effects to be 0.40, and, when including the product terms to be 0.45. Thus, the
approximate sample size needed to achieve the a priori power ofO.80 for alpha = 0.05 with an
estimated population square correlation of the main-effect-only model of 0.40 and the full
model of0.45, is 88 (cf. Cohen, 1988; Jaccard et al. 1990). However, ''the greater the number
ofinteraction terms, the lower the power" (Jaccard et al. 1990:36). Following Jaccard et al. a
sample size of 110cases should be sufficient when two product terms are included. Thus,
while the sample size necessary to test the measurement model in LISREL was estimated to be
100, the sample size necessary to estimate the structural model when conducting product term
analysis in multiple regression, is 110. Consequently, the sample size is set to 110.
7.4 Measurement
This section addresses the measurement procedures applied in the study. First, the
measurement process is described. Next, we describe how the observed variables were
measured. The full set of measures representing the constructs and the questionnaire are
presented in Appendix B and A, respectively». Validity and reliability issues are addressed
together with the assessment of the measurement models in Chapter 8.
7.4.1 The measurement process
Four steps should be included in a measurement process (Bollen, 1989); (l) give the meaning
of the construct (i.e., the theoretical definition), (2) identify the dimensions and latent variables
to represent it, (3) form measures, and (4) specify the relation between the measures and the
latent variable. The first two steps were accomplished in Part II. As we recall from the part, all
of the constructs except tacitness were argued to consist of one dimension. Measurement is
how a construct is linked to one or more latent variables, and how the latent variables are
linked to observed variables (Bollen, 1989). Thus, latent variables are the representations of
constructs in measurement models (Bollen, 1989). A construct can consist of one or several
55 Note that the items reported have been translated into English. The original items have Norwegian wording.
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dimensions. Consequently, one latent variable per dimension is needed. Accordingly, the model
of the study consists of five constructs and seven latent variables (the construct of tacitness is
represented or formed by three latent variables or dimensions).
To form measures that represent the latent variables (step 3), the study relied on Churchill
(1979) recommends to adopt measures used and validated in other studies. The dependent
construct of this study has previously been measured and operationally defined in a number of
different ways. Thus, considerable effort was made to find appropriate measures representing
this construct. Moreover, the study includes four independent constructs, in which three have
to various degrees been used and validated in previous studies. While the constructs of TSI
and trust have been operationalized and measured in a number of earlier studies, the
dimensions representing tacitness have been operationalized in rather few studies. The variable
of CPC has never previously been operationalized. Several interviews and preliminary tests (cf.
Section 7.2 and Gulbrandsen, 1996) were particularly accomplished in order to establish
content validity for the construct.
Regarding step 4 (i.e., the connection between the measure and the latent variable), all the
latent variables were measured using reflective scales=. Moreover, all the observed variables
except one were measured by perceptual data. Annual sales represent a control variable (cf.
Section 7.5), and are based on data available from EnFO's annual report. Below, the measures
representing the latent variables in the theoretical model are presented.
56 The dimensions or latent variables of codifiability, teachability and system dependence form the concept of tacitness.
The observed variables representing the dimensions. however. are argued to be reflective measures (cf Chapter 2).
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7.4.2 Vertical integration
There have been a number of different ways to defining and measuring vertical integration in
the literature, and one of the key problems in vertical integration research is with respect to
measurement issues (Spiller, 1985; MacMillan, Hambrick & Pennings, 1986; Wiggins, 1991;
Perry, 1989). Our review of different measuring strategies of vertical integration suggests that
the ways of measuring vertical integration may be classified into three major categories. The
first is by measuring the variable as dichotomous (Monteverde & Teece, 1982). The second is
connected to some kind ofa portion ofvalue added to sales or costs (Adelman, 1955). A third
way is to use the method of hypothetical choices (Whyte, 1994). Below, the different
categories are reviewed and assessed, and it is argued why the third strategy is chosen.
Dichotomous measuring
Most previous studies on backward vertical integration in a TeE-framework have been based
on measuring vertical integration as a dichotomous variable (Joskow, 1988). Examples ofsuch
studies in a TeE-framework include Monteverde & Teece (1982); Masten (1984); Walker &
Weber (1984: 1987); Masten, Meehan & Snyder (1989); Lieberman, (1991). The advantage of
this approach is that the definition ofvertical integration is clear and precise (Spiller, 1985). As
an example of this kind of studies, Monteverde & Teece (1982) investigated the effects of
human asset specificity (defined as worker-specific knowledge or 'application engineering
effort') on the make-buy decision of automobile manufacturers. Their dichotomous dependent
variable takes on a value of one if the component is manufactured internally and zero
otherwise.
This operationalization, however, is not able to distinguish between TeE-explanations and the
competence proposition that firms continue to do what they are good at, and thereby gradually
develop this ability. For example, the theoretical rationale behind the Monteverde & Teece
(1982) study includes, in addition to transaction cost efficiency, also the difficulties in
transferring competencies across firms' boundaries: "This article attempts to draw together the
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literature on transaction costs and industrial know-howt :.. The existence of transaction-
specific know-how and skills and the difficulties of skill transfer mean that it will be costly to
switch to an alternative supplier" (p. 206). The latter argument corresponds closely to the
motives for integration as emphasized by Hennart (1982) and Kogut & Zander (1992; 1993),
that firms specialize in knowledge and skills that are difficult to transfer across boundaries and
that this, and not safeguards against opportunistic behavior, drive boundary decision.
Accordingly, by measuring vertical integration this way, one blends together two motives for
vertical integration: namely the competence motive and the transaction cost motive. One can
therefore, alternatively to the 'I'Cls-consideration, interpret the results that firms continue to do
what they have done earlier. Thus, this category of empirical studies does not draw attention to
the standard TCls-argurnent that parties are locked into a relationship ex-post, which again
creates the fundamental transformation process (Williamson, 1985). Moreover, by measuring
what a firm already has integrated, it is rather obvious that it has sufficient present competence
to perform it. Therefore, since Cl'C is included in the model, a dichotomous operationalization
of the dependent variable is excluded.
Portion of value added of production
Value added measures (Adelman, 1955) are viewed as the difference between total production
(or sales) and the costs of the purchased inputs (Tucker & Wilder, 1977). Operationalizing
vertical integration as a ratio of value added to sales or costs has been done in different ways in
the literature, and include value-added-to sales ratio (e.g. Levy, 1985), and the portion of the
cost of the manufactured product incurred by the firm itself (MacMillan, Hambrick &
Pennings, 1986). The use of value-added measures, however, has been criticized to reflect
other factors than vertical integration (e.g. Tucker & Wilder, 1977; Harrigan, 1985; Perry,
1989). Of special importance for this study is the argument by Perry (1989) that the
operational definition on vertical integration should be strongly affected by the theoretical
rationale behind the model.
According to Perry, value added measures are appropriate as long as the studies consider
vertical integration raised from transactional economies. However, these measures are less
57 The emphasizing is done by me.
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appropriate when the models are based upon production decisions, because this can confound
the cause with the effect (MacMillan, Hambrick & Pennings, 1986; Perry, 1989).
Consequently, the danger of committing this tautology may be present in the study as the
theoretical rationale is based upon production cost logic as well as transaction cost logic, i.e.,
the competence rationale for vertical integration stems from contractual issues as well from
production considerations. Accordingly, value added measures are not seen as an appropriate
operationalization of the dependent variable of the studyeither.
Hypothetical measure
The method ofhypothetical choices (Whyte, 1994) is used to indicate ifthe unit will continue
to purchase the goods from the vendor or ifhe will perform the activity in-house. According to
Whyte, hypothetical measures are a reasonably valid indicator of the vertical integration
decision, and have "fewer weakness than may seem apparent at first blush" (p. 293).
The weaknesses of hypothetical measures have been indicated by studies in the field of
cognitive psychology. According to Tversky & Kahneman (1986), a normative model of
rational choice does not provide a satisfactory foundation for a descriptive theory of decision
making. The most common problem with the normative theory has been described as the
preference reversal problem (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1983). In short, the observed preference
reversal phenomenon relates to a discrepancy between an individual's preferences and choices.
Even though much effort has been made to reject this phenomenon, preference reversals
remain much in evidence (Grether & Plott, 1979). Therefore, this phenomenon is inconsistent
with the traditional preference theory, where preferences and choices are expected to be
consistent. The studies focusing on preference reversal, however, have been made by
empirically examining individuals' behavior in lottery. Consequently, the broader implication of
this phenomenon connected to economic action and theory on firm levels is, however, still
undiscovered (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1983; Whyte, 1994). Accordingly, to what degree the
hypothetical measure is a valid indicator of real choice behavior cannot be inferred by the
design chosen. We expect, however, that the characteristics of the dimensions surrounding the
transaction will affect the evaluation of hypothetical choices connected to buying or making.
Accordingly, we expect that increasing transaction specific investments and closeness to
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primary competence will induce an increased preference toward integration. This implies that
we adopt a rational choice approach and assume preferences to be consistent with choices.
Therefore (and consistent with the behavioral assumptions of the study), we expect economic
actors to be effective in pursuing their goals and that choices can be descnbed as a
maximization process.
As the above discussion implies, this measure is included for two reasons. First, since some of
the arguments underlying the competence prediction are connected to production cost
efficiency, this measure covers the weakness associated with the value-added measure (the
second best alternative). Second, Williamson (1985) presumes that economic actors, though
bounded rationally, are able to calculate beforehand the efficiency consequences of various
governance modes. According to Williamson, the bounded rationality assumption does not
imply non-rationality or irrationality. In fact, economic actors are expected to economize on
bounded rationality: "Given limited competence, how do the parties organize so as to utilize
their limited competence to best advantage?" (Williamson, 1985:47). This means the
dimensions describing the transaction are expected to shape preferences for governance forms.
Measures of vertical integration
The empirical test concerns backward vertical integration by expansion. The setting
characteristics exclude backward merger or acquisitions as available options in the industry,
since mainly three large companies in Norway and two large companies abroad represent the
vendor side of the dyadic relations. Given the limited attention vertical integration has been
given in the competence framework, it may be more suitable to study expansion rather than
merger or acquisition. According to Penrose (1959), a theory of firm growth may best be
understood and developed as a theory of internal expansion: "The significance of merger [and
acquisition] can best be appraised in the light of its effect on the process of and limits to
internal growth" (1959:5).
The construct is operationally defined as the degree to which the units intend to continue to
purchase the goods from the vendor or ifit will perform the activity in-house (Whyte, 1994).
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The four measures representing the construct are listed below (7-point scale, anchored by
"very poor description" and "very good description").
1. In the longer term, the principal responsibility for carrying out the maintenance activity will be
executed by our own organization.
2. If the need for maintenance should arise unexpectedly, the activity will next time be carried out
internally in our own organization.
3. Ifthe need for maintenance can be foreseen, the activity will next time be carried out by our own
organization.
4. It is very likely that our own staffwill carryout the activity next time.
7.4.3 Independent variables
Buyer's Transaction Specific Investments (TSI)
The buyer's TSI scale will describe the extent to which the buyer has made specific investments
tailored to the specific relation. Thus, a high amount of specificity represents sunk costs that
have little value outside of a particular exchange relationship. Williamson (1985) identifies four
types of specificities, of which one (human asset specificity) is of most relevance in the power
maintenance industry. Human asset specificity is also the one most commonly assessed in
empirical studies (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). Human assets specificity refers to specialized
investments in human competence tailored to the specific transaction. Below, based on
previous empirical research (Stump & Heide, 1995; Haugland, 1994; Buvik, 1995), the items
reflecting this conceptualization of the construct is listed (5 item, 7-point scale, anchored by
"very poor description" and "very good description").
1. We have spent significant resources in reorganizing the power production in connection with this
particular co-operation
2. Employees working together with our supplier were given specialized training
3. During the collaboration we brought into notice significant aspects of our supplier's operations.
4. We have spent significant time to acquire knowledge about our supplier's technical standards
5. We have spent resources on training and development of our supplier's employees tailored to the
particular situation
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Buyer's Closeness to Primary Competence (CPC).
Core competencies (and subsequently primary competencies) are very difficult to measure
directly on a consistent basis across different industries (Verdin & Williamson, 1994). The
measures of buyer's closeness to primary competence reflect this, and may not be appropriate
indicators across different industries. We have, however, identified one possible way of
measuring such competencies in one industry by careful inspection of the characteristics
surrounding the chosen setting. Buyer's CPC is operationally defined as the buyer's perceived
degree of closeness to the vendor's competence. A "pool" of 14 items, based on the construct's
definition and interviews and discussions with experts in the industry, was initially developed
(cf. Gulbrandsen, 1996). Further expert evaluations and preliminary tests (cf. Section 7.2)
resulted in the following items reflecting the construct (4 item, 7-point scale, anchored by
"very poor description" and "very good description").
1. The competence our unit already possesses is close to the competence our supplier offers in
accomplishing the activity
2. Our unit's knowledge can be compared with the knowledge our supplier's employees possess in
carrying out the activity
3. Our unit's skills are suitable for carrying out the activity, compared with our supplier's skills.
4. Our routines and procedures are suitable in accomplishing the activity approximately as well as
our supplier
Tacitness
The dimensions of codifiability, teachability and system dependence forming the tacitness
construct are derived from Kogut & Zander (1993) and Zander & Kogut's (1995) scales. The
original items were revised, since the study concerns the buyer's perception of the vendor's
tacit knowledge. Moreover, Kogut & Zander's measures were specially developed for
measuring the tacitness of knowledge connected to manufacturing, which is quite similar with
the study's requirements. The items reflecting each dimension follow (8 item, 7-point scale,
anchored by "very poor description" and "very good description"):
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Codifiability :
l. A useful manual describing how the supplier carries out the maintenance activity can be written by our
power station
2. Extensive documentation describing critical parts of how the supplier carried out the activity exists in
our unit
Teachability:
1. Our personnel can easily learn how to carry out the maintenance activity by talking to skilled
personnel
2. Our personnel can easily learn how to carry out the activity by studying a complete set ofblueprints
3. New personnel can easily learn how to accomplish the maintenance activity, if they possess general
technical power station practice
System dependence:
l. It is possible for one person to know everything about how to carrying out the entire activity
2. To accomplish the activity satisfactorily, it is important that the personnel have experience from
corresponding tasks
3. Workers accomplishing the activity have to be in constant contact with others having different
expertise than themselves
Interfirm trust
The operational definition of the construct is a perceived willingness to rely on an exchange
partner in whom one has confidence (Moorman, Zaltman, & Deshpande, 1992), which is
developed and persisted on the basis of credible commitments and calculative economic
responses (cf. Williamson, 1993). The construct is based on the scale from Moorman, et al.
(1992). The original items are somewhat adjusted in order to also reflect Williamson's
calculative term. The items are shown below (3 item, 7-point scale, anchored by "very poor
description" and "very good description")
l. We trusted our supplier to accomplish the work in a 100% honest and truthful way
2. We have full confidence that our supplier will act with our best interests in mind
3. We generally trust our supplier to a great extent
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7.5 Control variables, rival predictors and explanatory mechanisms
In addition to the variables in the theoretical model, three types ofvariables are included in the
empirical tests. First, we include those control variables that are important for meeting the
requirement of isolation (Le., overcoming potential spurious and masked effects). Second, the
most evident variables representing rival explanations for vertical integration are included. As
discussed in Chapter l and 2, several different motives for vertical integration exist in the
literature. Thus, by accounting for other possible determinants for vertical integration than our
focal theoretical variables, the adequacy of the model in terms of explanation power can be
assessed. As argued by Meehl (1990) and Joreskog & Sorbom (1993), in order to increase our
confidence in the proposed model, it should be compared with competing "theories". Third,
tests of some of the study's explanatory mechanisms are provided. Below, the measures are
presented.
7.5.1 Control variables
Vendor's transaction specific investments. Previous studies have shown a high correlation
between buyer's and vendor's transaction specific investments (Buvik, 1995; Stump & Heide,
1995). Additionally, vendor's transaction specific investments may be associated with vertical
integration. In other words, vendor's TSI may be positively correlated with buyer's TSI and
vertical integration, and thus, may be a potential source of masked or spurious effects. The
measures, based on Stump & Heide (1995), Haugland (1994), and Buvik (1995), are the
following (5 item, 7-point scale, anchored by "very poor description" and "very good
description").
1. Our supplier spent significant resources in reorganizing the production in connection with this
particular co-operation
2. Our supplier gave their employees specialized training in connection with this particular c0-
operation
3. During the collaboration the supplier brought into notice significant aspects of our unit's
operations.
4. The supplier spent significant time to acquire knowledge about our unit's technical standards
5. The supplier spent resources on training and development of our unit's employees.
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Environmental uncertainty. Uncertainty regarding future events is a common feature of
many trading relationship (Williamson, 1985). The primary consequence of environmental
uncertainty is an adaption problem, i.e., difficulties with modifying agreements to meet the
changing circumstances (Rindfleisch & Heide, 1997). According to TCE, high level of
environmental uncertainty increases the transaction costs of adapting contractual agreements.
Thus, if the level of asset specificity remains constant, then an increase in uncertainty increases
the likelihood of vertical integration. Even though several studies have examined the effect of
uncertainty on vertical integration, the findings provide mixed results. Studies by Anderson &
Schrnittlein (1984), Levy (1985) and Walker & Weber (1987) support the hypothesis that
demand or volume uncertainty is positivelyassociated with vertical integration, while Harrigan
(1985, 1986) finds a negative relationship between demand uncertainty and vertical integration.
Thus, empirical studies have illustrated either negatively or positively relationship between
uncertainty and vertical integration. Additionally, an increase in uncertainty may lead a firm to
invest in less transaction specific assets (Mahoney, 1992). Given the mixed results involving
the uncertainty concept, no particular hypothesis about the concept's impact on vertical
integration is provided. However, due to the concept's potential variation with both vertical
integration and transaction specific investments the concept is included as a control variable.
Environmental uncertainty is defined as ''unanticipated changes in circumstances surrounding
an exchange" (Noordewier, John & Nevin, 1990:82). The measures of the construct, based on
Noordewier, et al. (1990), are the following (5 item, 7-point scale, anchored by ''very poor
description" and ''very good description"):
1. Availability of alternative vendors in the market is highly uncertain.
2. Uncertainties in accomplishing the maintenance activity in the market are a real problem
3. The market in which we buy the maintenance activity is complex.
4. Supply of accomplishing the maintenance activity in the market is not stable.
S. Prices for accomplishing the maintenance activity are volatile
Size. Williamson (1985) argues that because of the potential to economize on scale and scope,
larger firms or units will tend to integrate more easily than smaller firms or units.
Consequently, size may be correlated with CPC as well as with VI. Hence, including the
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variable may capture a possible spurious connection between CPC and VI. The size of the
business unit is measured as annual sales. This measure was available from EnFO's database.
7.5.2 Rival predictors
The buyer's dependence on the vendor. Pfeffer & Salancik (1978) reported a number of
strategies used to manage interorganizational dependence in order to reduce uncertainty. Of
particular interest in the current setting is the argument that a buyer will fear integrating an
activity if this can lead to vendor retaliation. A buyer may backwardly integrate one of the
maintenance activities, but still, to some degree, be dependent on a particular (large) vendor.
The buyer can be in a position where he is not able to satisfy all the input demands of the
activity himself, or he can be dependent on the particular vendor with respect to other
transactions. The vendor can in such situations take punitive action (e.g. refuse supply), if the
buyer wishes to buy a portion that cannot be supplied by his own integrated capacity
(MacMillan, Hambrick & Pennings, 1986). In the power station industry the most powerful
actors possess important information regarding the particular power stations units. The
vendors could then as a punitive action, refuse to share this information with the buyer.
Accordingly, even though the performance of one activity can be a cost efficient solution, other
activities can be impossible to perform in-house. Accordingly, a buyer's integration decision
can be a trade-off between a cost efficiency solution and a danger of retaliation from the
vendor, as the latter may have consequences for the efficiency of other transactions. Thus,
even though the only included motive originally derived from sociology, the dependence
argument may have efficiency consequences for the units in the setting. The following item was
used to measure this variable (1 item, 7-point scale, anchored by "completely independent" and
"completely dependent").
How dependent is the unit on this particular supplier for carrying out the maintenance activity?
Technological economies. The investment in "hard-core" technology for performing one
activity may to some extent affect the decision to integrate another activity. As long as the firm
has access to production equipment that can be used in performing another maintenance
activity, this can to some degree affect the integration decision. A unit can for example, invest
in material saving and capital augmenting technology, originally meant to support another
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activity, which is of relevance for the performance of the activity in question. One measure
(reversed) was developed (1 item, 7-point scale, anchored by "very poor description" and
"very good description").
In order to accomplish the activity in-house, we have to undertake great investments in technology and
production equipment.
Capacity utiIization. Interviews with respondents in the setting indicated that the degree of
free productive capacity of personnel to some extent will affect the decision to make or buy
maintenance activities. Accordingly, an indicator of free capacity utilization is included. One
measure was developed (1 item, 7-point scale, anchored by "very poor description" and "very
good description").
In order to accomplish the activity in-house, to a great extent we have to employ new personnel.
Formalization. In a situation with medium investments in asset specificity, Williamson (1991)
proposes that the hybrid mode will be an efficient solution. The hybrid form means those
intermediate forms between market and hierarchy (Williamson, 1991). According to Buvik
(1995), formalization is an appropriate reflection of the hybrid mode. Formalization refers to
the extent to which the interorganizational exchange is regulated by rules, procedures and fixed
policies (e.g. Dwyer & Oh, 1987). The degree of formalization reflects contractual issues and
specifies the rules of the game to be followed in the relation. Hence, formalization may be
negatively related to vertical integration. Based on previous studies (John, 1984; Dwyer &
Welsh, 1985; Dwyer & Oh, 1987; Haugland & Reve, 1993; Haugland, 1994; Buvik, 1995), the
following measures were selected (4 item, 7-point scale, anchored by "very poor description"
and "very good description").
1. All aspects regarding quality control of the activity we purchased from the supplier were stipulated
in a contract.
2. The daily control relationship was expressed in written agreements.
3. We outlined procedures for how the supplier should follow up agreements and sendings
4. Written contracts managed the handling of discontent, complaints and disputes.
Some potential rival predictors are ruled out by the setting. These are:
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Scale economies. In this study the neo-classical scale argument is ruled out by the setting.
First of all, the power maintenance activities are to a great degree specialized for the specific
power stations, depending on the extent of the waterfall, the specific topography surrounding
the station and so on. Besides, if any scale advantages are available, this should favor the
vendors in the market. None of the power stations are expected to start out as competitors to
the vendors. Accordingly, no scale economies are available or will act as determinants for the
power stations' decision to integrate maintenance activities.
Market power. The market power motives for vertical integration are mainly determined by
the possibility to secure large shares of markets, raise barriers to new entrants, deter existing
competitors from getting access to the supplier side (Crandell, 1968; Gould, 1977; Etgar,
1978) or enable producers to evade surcharge imposed by suppliers (Spengler, 1950).
However, as with scale economies, no such motives are available on the buyer side in the
power maintenance market. For example, if a power station in e.g. Telemark integrates an
activity, this does not prevent another power station (in e.g. Vestfold) from getting access to
market shares or the supplier side.
7.5.3 Explanatory mechanisms
In the study, the underlying logic for the hypotheses was specified as a set of mechanisms
coupling the assumed causes to the effect. According to Mulaik & James (1995:l32): "When
formulating causal hypotheses, one should specify the mechanisms ... by which causal
influences are transmitted to their effects ... [and] one must show that the mechanisms ...
coupling the causes to the effects are intact and uninterrupted". Usually this is only done by
logic without the possibility (or necessity) of empirical illustrations. In Chapter 5 and 6, the
underlying logic for the hypotheses was specified as a set of mechanisms coupling the assumed
causes to the effect. The main contribution of the study is centered around the theoretical
arguments of the effects of CPC and TSI on VI. Thus, individual empirical tests of the
mechanisms by which the influence from CPC and TSI are transmitted to the criterion will be
included.
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When testing the mechanisms, we used previously established scales on opportunistic behavior
(John, 1984; Gundlach, Achrol & Mentzer, 1994; Provan & Skinner, 1989; Morgan & Hunt,
1994) and transaction costs (Buvik, 1995). To test the mechanisms coupling the influence of
CPC on VI, we developed and constructed two variables; expected opportunistic behavior if
integrating the transaction; and expected transaction costs if the transaction is integrated.
These latter measures were derived from the scales used to measure transaction costs and
opportunistic behavior, respectively. The measures (7-point scales, anchored by "very poor
description" and "very good description") are as follows.
Transaction costs
1. We used too much time controlling the supplies ofthis supplier
2. It was time-consuming and difficult to get necessary verification of production performance and costs
from this supplier
3. The co-ordination and governing of the relationship with this supplier was very costly
4. Our firm did not manage to utilize the skills and production resources of this supplier very well
5. It was difficult to agree with this supplier about specifications of products and services
6. Negotiations about price and payment terms with this supplier proved time-consuming
Opportunistic behavior
1. Occasionally, our supplier altered information in order to carry out things his own way
2. Sometimes our supplier promised to do things without actually doing them later
3. Sometimes, our supplier altered the facts slightly when negotiations were carried out
4. We could expect the supplier to keep back information in order to protect his own interest
Expected transaction costs if integrating the transaction
1. We will use a lot of time to control and monitor our own employees when they carry out the activity
2. It may prove difficult and time-consuming to make agreement with our employees about specifications
and procedures for performing the activity
3. The co-ordination and governing of the employees will be very costly
Expected opportunistic behavior if integrating the transaction
1. We may expect our employees to alter or keep back information about the activity if this is to their own
advantages
2. We will expect that our employees will alter procedures in order to get the things they want
3. We will expect our employees tokeep back information in order to protect their own interests
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7.6 Data collection
Information about the constructs was gathered through primary data. Key informant data
through the application of structured mail questionnaires, was applied for the study. To reduce
the risk of biased information, however, ideally one should use multiple informants (Phillips,
1981). In interorganizational research it is not uncommon to select data from both sides of the
dyad. However, the often-discussed trade-offbetween selecting data from one or both sides of
a dyad, is of less relevance in the study. Although divergent perceptions about the
characteristics of the relation may exist (John & Reve, 1982), the interesting issue here is to
capture the buyer's perception of the research problern". Thus, information was only gathered
from the buyers. Moreover, another possible option would be to use multiple informants from
the units in the study. However, the use of multiple informants raised some problems in the
setting. It was rather difficult to identify two (or more) informants in each unit that were both
responsible for mechanical maintenance activities and knowledgeable about a specific buyer-
vendor relationship. Consequently, the risk of missing data from a major portion of the units
was very high. Accordingly, choosing a key-informant approach may be considered to be
justifiable due to the relevance of capturing the buyers' perception and the benefits associated
with increased sample size.
The questionnaire was designed in accordance with guidelines of 'the key informant' literature
(Phillips, 1981; John & Reve, 1982; Heide & John, 1991). Thus, one individual in each unit
reports on behalf of the organization. The individuals were deliberately selected by virtue of
their position within the unit and their knowledge (John, 1984) about the issues reported.
Thus, questionnaires were sent to the top-level manager of the firms, and the managers were
asked to distnbute the questionnaires to the respective responsible managers of the firm's
business units. If the firm consists of only one unit, the top managers (or if available, the
manager responsible for the maintenance activities) were asked to answer the questionnaire on
behalf of the firm. The respondents were instructed to respond to one of the twelve activities
reported in Figure 7.1. The informants were instructed, in accordance with the above
description, to select the focal transaction or activity in the introduction of the questionnaire.
58See e.g. Heide & John (1991) for the relevance ofthis approach: .....firms will act upon their specific interpretation of a
situation, regardless of whether thefirms' perceptions are accurate, or converge with that of its exchange partner" (p. 18).
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118 out of 21459 hydroelectric power firms were contacted, and 411 business units were
identified (the different firms varied from consisting of l to 5 business units). Before the
questionnaires were mailed out, all of the 118 firms were first contacted by phone. 5 of the
firms stated that they were inappropriate as informants for the study, either because the firms
were to a lesser degree engaged in this kind ofproduction and/or because they did not have the
time to respond to the questionnaire. Questionnaires were mailed to all of the remaining 113
firms in April 1997. 5 questionnaires were mailed to firms with 5 units, and 4 questionnaires
were mailed to firms with 4 units, and so on. Totally, 411 questionnaires were mailed. Total
response rate (first and second round) was 28% (116 cases out of 411). The response rate
from the contacted firms was 64% (i.e., 75 out of 118 contacted firms responded with one ore
more questionnaires). 88 questionnaires were returned within May 1997, when a second
mailing to the informants was administered. 28 informants responded to the second mailing
within June 1997.
59 As discussed in Section 7.2, some hydroelectric power firms perform both production and distribution of electric power,
while some only perform one of these activities. Only firms that accomplish production of electric power are relevant, since
these firms conduct production maintenance activities.
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PART IV: ANALYSES AND DISCUSSIONS
This part consists of two chapters. In chapter 8 the results of the different analysis conducted
in the study are presented. The last chapter of the dissertation, Chapter 9, contains a discussion




The chapter contains the different analyses conducted in the study. Descriptive statistics for the
variables are presented and discussed in Section 8.1. Further, the analyses follow the
recommended two-step approach from Anderson & Gerbing (1988). First, confirmatory factor
analysis, using LISREL 8.14 (Section 8.2), is conducted. Next, the structural relationships
among the latent variables are examined, and the research hypotheses outlined in chapter 5 are
tested in Section 8.3. Due to a too small sample size for testing interaction effects in LISREL,
multiple regression is used to test the structural relationships among the latent variables in the
model. Finally, a summing-up section (8.4) is included.
8.1 Descriptive statistics
The first step in the analysis includes an assessment of the adequacy of input data and the
statistical assumptions underlying the estimation methods being used (Bagozzi & Vi, 1988;
Hair et al. 1995). A summary of the descriptive statistics is shown in Table 8.1.
An assumption for multivariate analysis is that the variables have multinormal distribution. The
distributional aspects of the variables are captured in the reported values for skewness and
kurtosis. Highly skewed data and high kurtosis may cause biased parameter estimates, leading
to unreliable standard errors and overall model fit (Bagozzi & Vi, 1988). Thus, if possible,
variables that are highly non-normal should be deleted from further analysis. Based on a review
offindings regarding non-normality and consequences with respect to model fit, Kaplan (1990)
suggested that skewness and kurtosis values exceeding l in absolute value should be treated
with caution for moderately sized samples (such as this).
With some exceptions, skewness and kurtosis seem not to impose specific problems in the
sample. In terms ofabsolute values, 16 out of24 items have both kurtosis and skewness values
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less than 1. Two of the items (item 11 and 24) have clearly unsatisfactory normality, and are
excluded in the measurement model presented in the next section".
Of the remaining 22 items, four items (item 2, 17, 18 and 19) have both kurtosis and skewness
values of more than 1 (absolute value). Item 2 (skewness: 1.289; kurtosis: 1.012) and item 18
(skewness: -1.141; kurtosis: 1.401) are close to the "critical" values of both skewness and
kurtosis. Thus, the departure from normality with respect to these two items is not dramatic
and they will be retained in the further analysis. By contrast, item 17 (skewness: -1.484;
kurtosis: 2.416) and item 19 (skewness: -1.334; kurtosis: 2.308) seem to be somewhat
problematic, as indicated by their negative skew and leptokurtic distribution. Both of the
''problematic'' items are measures of trust. They seem to be items that are too easy to agree
with in the setting, and, thus, do not entail a satisfactory variance and normal distnbution.
However, the items represent two out of three measures for the construct and cannot be
excluded without causing construct validity problems. However, both the skewness and
kurtosis values indicate that these items should be treated with caution in the further analysis.
Missing values do not appear to be a problem in the sarnple62• 15 of the 24 examined items
have no missing values at alL Of the remaining 9 items, 7 items have only one missing value,
while 1 item has two and 1 item has three missing values, respectively. Overall, the data is
evaluated to be missing by random Thus, pairwise deletion of missing data seems justified.
61 Item 11 is derivedfrom Zander & Kogut's (1995) "system dependence" scale. However, the wording in the original scale
states ...... long experience from ... .. while the item in this study leaves out the word "long" (see question b9_9 in the
questionnaire). I presume that this "mistake" explains the extremely high mean value of the variable (6.114), and,
accordingly, the negative skewness (-2.089) and probably the very high peakedness of the distribution (kurtosis: 5.979).
Item 24 is derivedfrom Buvik (1995) "Buyer Specific Assets" scale. As with item 11, the wording of item 24 (see question
b2_9 in the questionnaire) is different from the original scale and suffers from the expression "a lot of'. Accordingly, we
would expect this variable to have a higher mean value relatively to the other items representing the construct. However,
the opposite is the case. We do not have any other explanation of this than that the item is not a particularly relevant
sample item in the specific setting (as a kurtosis of 3.593 may indicate).
62 However, two cases were excluded from the sample due to a very high degree of missing data (more than 50%) and
particularly because all the items representing the dependent variable were missing (Hair et al. 1995).
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Table 8.1. Descriptive statistics of the sample (Evaluative Dimensions)
...........................................................M !!! ~ ..§!~:~~.y.:.. ...........~~~~!~.~.~.. ........~!!r.!~.~~..............~.................
Vertical Integration
Item l 2.788 1.724 0.846 -0.432 113
Item 2 2.368 1.592 1.289 1.012 114
Item 3 2.588 1.828 0.976 -0.312 114
Item 4 2.421 1.708 1.346 0.943 114
Codiafiability
Item 5 3.807 1.504 -0.172 -0.909 114
Item 6 3.947 1.703 -0.081 -0.964 114
Teachability
Item 7 4.319 1.633 -0.378 -0.764 113
Item 8 3.982 1.603 -0.169 -0.748 113
Item 9 4.114 1.655 -0.149 -1.080 114
System dependency
Item 10 a 4.263 1.900 -0.181 -1.225 114
Item Il b 6.114 1.062 -2.089 5.979 114
Item12 4.184 1.659 -0.394 -0.791 114
CPC
Item 13 3.430 1.551 0.177 -0.935 114
ltem14 3.596 1.550 1.575 -0.822 114
Item 15 2.921 1.575 0.824 -0.218 114
Item 16 3.018 1.609 0.586 -0.664 113
Trust
Item 17 5.798 1.199 -1.484 2.416 114
Item 18 5.526 1.249 -1.141 1.401 114
Item 19 5.737 1.065 -1.334 2.308 114
TSI (Human)
Item 20 2.901 1.763 0.721 -0.560 111
Item 21 2.416 1.450 1.118 0.324 113
Item 22 2.688 1.513 0.945 0.036 112
Item 23 2.699 1.362 0.693 -0.303 113





The two-step modeling approach, emphasizing the analysis of two conceptually distinct
models, measurement and structural, is employed for this study. Thus, the fit of the
measurement and the structural model should be assessed independently. Joreskog & Sorbom
(1993: 113) summarize these thoughts when they state:
The testing of the structural model, i.e., the testing of the initially specified theory, may be
meaningless unless it is first established that the measurement model holds. If the chosen indicators
for a construct do not measure that construct, the specified theory must be modified before it can be
tested. Therefore, the measurement model should be tested before the structural relationships are
tested .... In doing so, one should let the constructs themselves be freely correlated, i.e., the covariance
matrix of the constructs should be unconstrained.
LISREL 8.14 was applied to the measurement models reported in this section. In confirmatory
factor analysis the factor-analytic technique is used to confirm that the a priori set ofvariables
define the construct or factor. Accordingly, the objective is to test the hypothesized theoretical
measurement model. A test of the measurement model is a test of the measures'
unidimensionality, i.e., internal and external consistency= (Gerbing & Anderson, 1988). A set
of items is unidimensional if their covariations are accounted for by a common factor model
with just one common factor (Kumar & Dillon, 1987). When testing the usefulness of the
scales, unidimensionality as well as the reliability and validity of the constructs in the model are
assessed.
Before assessing the full measurement model (Section 8.2.2), the dimensionality of the concept
oftacitness is estimated and evaluated (Section 8.2.1).
8.2.1 The dimensionality of tacitness.
All the measures in the study, except the measures representing tacitness, are argued to be
effect measures (i.e., the indicators or items reflect the latent variable). The theoretical
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discussion of the concept of tacitness suggested that there were three relevant dimensions of
the construct (Winter, 1987; Kogut & Zander, 1993; Zander & Kogut, 1993). Theoretically, it
has been stated that tacitness represents a concept formed by several dimensions (Winter,
1987), i.e., the dimensions cause the latent variable of tacitness. However, empirical studies
(e.g. Kogut & Zander, 1993; Zander & Kogut, 1995) have treated the dimensions as separate.
Accordingly, the literature does not seem to agree about how the concept should be
conceptualized. Thus, this section is concerned about how the three dimensions should be
treated in the general measurement model as well as in the structural model of the study.
Should tacitness be treated as (1) separate dimensions (Kogut & Zander, 1993; Zander &
Kogut, 1995), (2) as a reflective unidimensional concept, or (3) as a higher-order formative
concept caused by the three dimensions (as theoretically argued by Winter (1987) and further
outlined in this study).
Below, we first regard the two former alternatives, and evaluate how the concept should be
treated in the general measurement model. If the different dimensions warrant separate
treatment (i.e., the different dimensions have their own sets of effect indicators), the
dimensions should be treated as unique dimensions in the measurement model. If, however, a
unidimensional solution indicates a better fit, at least an empirical argument can be offered that
the concept should be treated as a unidimensional concept in the general measurement model.
However, iftacitness is caused by the indicators measured in the study, by chance there should
be a very low probability that these measures are internally consistent. Thus, we expect that the
three-dimensional conceptualization obtain a better model fit. The two different models are
presented in Figure 8.1.
63 Internal consistency is to which degree the items included in a construct's domain are reproduced by a single factor.
External consistency implies to which degree the items only reflect the intended construct when other constructs are added
to the measurement model.
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The first model (a) includes a unidimensional conceptualization oftacitness, while the second
(b) includes the three dimensions of codifiability (~1),teachability (~), and system dependency
(~), respectively. Below, the results of the model estimations are presented.
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In Appendix C we provide an overview and justification for the fit indexes chosen for model
selection and evaluation based on the characteristics of the study. All the fit indexes indicate
better fit for the three-dimensional conceptualization of tacitness. The chi-square difference
between the two models is 31.17 (with 3 df), i.e., the difference is significant. Moreover, the
incremental fit indexes also show a clearly better fit of Model B than Model A. Thus, all fit
indexes satisfy the required values (cf. Appendix C) for Model B, while none are satisfied for
Model A. As the dimensions clearly warrant separate treatment, the dimensions should be
treated as separate in the overall measurement model. Accordingly, empirical support is given
to the argument that tacitness does not represent a unidimensional concept, Thus, the
indicators in the study are not effect indicators of the concept of tacitness. Instead, we receive
support for the argument that each dimension should be treated separately with its own set of
effect indicators.
However, it remains to be assessed if the three dimensions reflect the concept (tacitness as a
reflective higher-order concept) or if the three dimensions cause the concept (tacitness as
formative higher-order concept). Indicators or dimensions reflecting a concept should be
internally consistent, and, thus, positively correlated (Bollen & Lennox, 1991). Accordingly,
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dimensions reflecting a higher-order factor s!J,Quld_b_~bigb!y_~!~correlated. By contrast, if_-- --------=---------- .._--~-_.--_.--_ ...~-
tacitness is caused by the dimensions, the dimensions will be highly intercorrelated only by
chance. In Table 8.3 the estimated intercorrelations between the three dimensions are reported.











Table 8.3 shows moderate to high intercorrelation between codifiability and teachability (0.38)
and between teachability and system dependency (0.49). However, the intercorrelation
between codifiability and system dependency is zero. Causal dimensions of the same concept
may have positive, negative, or no intercorrelation (Bollen & Lennox, 1991). The
intercorrelations between the dimensions vary between zero to 0.49. Consequently, the
empirical data do not support tacitness as a reflective higher-order concept. Accordingly, the
conceptualization oftacitness as a formative higher-order concept is retained.
If a construct is complex and consists of many facets, then "each dimension should be treated
separately with its own set of effect indicators" (Bollen & Lennox, 1991:308). Thus, as
empirically supported, we treat each dimension separately in the measurement model. In the
structural model, the construct of tacitness is viewed as composed by its set of causal
indicators. The final conceptualization of the concept oftacitness is illustrated in Figure 8.2.
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Figure 8.2 The final conceptualization of tacitness
8.2.3 The overall measurement model
The evaluation of the constructs in the measurement model follows the recommended steps by
Gerbing & Anderson (1988). First, we evaluate the measures' unidimensionality by assessing
various goodness-of-fit indices. Next, the reliability and validity of the constructs in the
measurement model are assessed.
Assessment of overall model fit.
The measurement model includes the concepts (or evaluative dimensions) of vertical
integration (~l= VI), codifiability (/;2 = COD), teachability (I;J =TEACH), system dependence
(~ = SYSDEP), closeness to primary competence (~=CPC), trust (!;t;), and buyer's human
transaction specific investments (~7=TSI). In addition to the paths in the measurement model
(as illustrated in Figure 8.3), all latent constructs were allowed too freely correlate with each
other (Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993; Anderson & Gerbing, 1988). Accordingly, the absence of
structural constraints enables the test of the measurement model since lack offit can only come
from the relations among the measures and the latent variables and from the relations among
the measures' error terms. The final version of the measurement model is illustrated in Figure
8.3.
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Three different models were tested. The overall fit of the models is reported in Table 8.4. The
first model, i.e., the general model based on the original conceptualization, received reasonable
model fit. Even though the fit indexes imply that substantial improvements were not necessary,
one item (representing CPC) was deleted due to high crossloadings with other constructsø. By
excluding the item, a substantial improvement in chi-square (from 271.77 to 196.06 with 188
and 168 df, respectively) with the p-value of 0.068 was observed. Improvement in RMSEA
was also observed (RMSEA=0.038, p(close fit) = 0.80). Additionally, improvements in the
other reported indexes were also obtained. Thus, Model 2 received adequate and good fit
according to all the fit indexes.
Finally, a third model was tested based on potential X2 - improvements from allowing
crossloadings and correlated error terms. According to the information in the modification
indices from Model 2, no items had significant and substantial crossloadings to other
constructs. Accordingly, there was no indication for allowing crossloadings in Model 3. By
contrast, allowing for correlated measurement errors between two items showed a chi-squared
improvement of 7.16. However, only minor improvement was shown in the other reported
indices. Due to a potential loss of interpretability and theoretical meaningfulness=, the more
parsimonious Mode12 was preferred over Mode13. As can be seen from Table 8.4, Mode12
receives acceptable and good fit by all fit indexes. Accordingly, Model 2 is chosen as the final
measurement model of the evaluative dimensions in the study and was illustrated in Figure 8.4.
The model holds satisfactorily in dimensionality since all factors are significant (cf. Table 8.5)
and there are no crossloadings and correlated error terms. The next steps are to evaluate the
reliability of the measures, and validity of the constructs in the measurement model.
64 According to Anderson & Gerbing (1988:417): "Given a converged and proper solution but unacceptable overall fit,
there are four basic ways to respecify indicators that have not "worked out as planned ": Relate the indicator to a different
factor, delete the indicator from the model, relate the indicator to multiple factors, or use correlated measurement errors ",
The first two solutions are always, ceteris paribus, preferred because they preserve the potential to have unidimensional
measurement, whereas the latter two do not, because they may "obfuscating the meaning of the estimated underlying
construct" (Anderson & Gerbing, 1988:417). The exclusion of item 13 may thereby be an adequate and "straightforward"
solution, since several items representing the construct of CPC exist, and because no theoretical rationale for relating this
item to another factor exists.
65 The use of correlated error terms may ideally only be justified when they are specified a priori (Anderson & Gerbing,
1988), or, altematively, at least one should have theoretical and/or methodological reasons justifoing the modification er-
post (Bagozzi & Yi, 1988). 111the study we did not have any a priori explanation or a good el" post theoretical rationale
that could justifo the correlation between these two errors terms. Thus, in generalone should not respecificate in such
situations because the cost of a consequent loss of interpretability and theoretical meaningfulness may be high, and
empirical studies have demonstrated that use of correlated error terms can mask a true underlying structure (Anderson &
Gerbing, 1984). Additionally, in this study the "clean" and parsimonious model showed a good fit, and, accordingly,
hardly any rationale actually exists for not choosing Model 2.
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Table 8.4 Fit indexes of measurement models
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Below, the three reliability measures recommended by Bagozzi & Yi (1988) are evaluated. All
these three reliability measures (individual item reliability, composite reliability, and average
variance extracted) as well as the factor loadings and error terms with the accompanying T-
values, are presented in Table 8.5. The structure is the same as given in Figure 8.4. The item
reliability is defined as; Pi = Ai varT / (Al varT + eii), where T = Si (in standardized solutions,
varSi = l). This formula is valid and meaningful in situations, like this one, where each of the
measures is unidimensional; i.e. only one latent variable has influence on the specific item
(Gerbing & Anderson, 1988; Bagozzi & Vi, 1988). Individual item reliabilities are computed
directly in the LISREL-output and listed as multiple correlation for the x, variables. Average
variance extracted is defined as follows: pv = L.A.i2 varT / (L.A.? varT + Leii), where values
greater than 0.5 are considered adequate (Bagozzi & Vi, 1988). Composite reliability is
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defined as: pc = (D..i varT / «D-l varT + Leii), and values exceeding 0.6 are desirable
(Bagozzi & Vi, 1988). As with item reliability, composite reliability measures are valid only
under unidimensionality (Bollen & Lennox, 1991; Gerbing & Anderson, 1988).
Table 8.5. Measurement model: Reliability measures and factor loadings
Factor loadings" Error term' Item Average Composite
IT-values IT-values reliability variance reliability
extracted
Vertical integration
AI.I 0.84 10.83 01,1 0.30 6.58 0.70
A2.1 0.89 11.93 O2,2 0.21 6.00 0.79
A3.1 0.92 12.78 03,3 0.15 5.10 0.85 0.8 0.94
~,I 0.93 12.88 04,4 0.14 4.96 0.86
Codifiability
AS.2 0.80 4.93 Os,s 0.36 1.55 0.64
A6.2 0.57 4.28 06,6 0.68 4.61 0.32 0.48 0.64
Teachability
A7,3 0.83 10.36 07,7 0.31 5.27 0.69
As,3 0.93 12.21 Os,s 0.14 2.54 0.86 0.70 0.87
~,3 0.75 8.80 09,9 0.46 6.48 0.54
System dependency
AIO,4 0.71 4.87 010,10 0.50 2.76 0.50
All.4 0.44 3.79 Oll.ll 0.80 6.38 0.20 0.35 0.50
CPC
A12,S 0.70 8.32 012,12 0.51 7.05 0.49
AU.S 0.90 12.10 013,13 0.19 4.60 0.81 0.74 0.89
AI4,S 0.95 13.27 014,14 0.09 2.44 0.91
Trust
A15.6 0.66 7.54 015,15 0.56 6.73 0.44
AI6,6 0.90 11.00 016•16 0.20 2.76 0.80 0.66 0.85
A17.6 0.86 10.48 017,17 0.25 3.61 0.75
TSI
AIS,7 0.45 4.76 018,IS 0.80 7.27 0.20
A19.7 0.55 5.90 019,19 0.70 7.03 0.30
A20,7 0.95 11.15 020,20 0.11 1.15 0.89 0.48 0.77
A21,7 0.71 7.99 021,21 0.49 5.81 0.51
"Standardized coefficients
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The item reliability varies from 0.20 to 0.89. Even though no exact rule for sizes of item
reliabilityexists, a rule-of-thumb may be 0.2566• The two items having lower size than 0.25 are
item Il and item 18. Accordingly, the reliability of these two items implies that they may
explain a small portion of the variance of the construct they reflect. With the exception of 1;..
(system dependency), all the theoretical constructs in the study have adequate sizes of
composite reliability and average variance extracted. Item Il (which reflects 1;..) was the only
item that to some extent violated the assumption of unidimensionality. Thus, part of the
systematic variance of this item is not attributable to its latent construct. Therefore, the
systematic variance is reflected in the item's relatively low item reliability size. However, item
11 is not radically below the 0.25 limit and the test of composite reliability of 1;.. showed a
value of 0.5. Beside, the construct of system dependency is only measured by two items.
Accordingly, the item will be retained. The problem with item 18 is mainly attributable to its
high random error variance (Le. the low reliability seems mainly to be caused by random, rather
than systematic error variance). High inter-correlations, however, are alone not sufficient in
order to obtain sound measurement, if we are not able to capture all facets of the construct
(Bollen & Lennox, 1991). Thus, this item is included in the further analysis in order to maintain
a broader domain for the TSI construct.
Validity
Above, we have demonstrated unidimensional and reliable measurement scales. However, in
order to test the theory, we must be able to prove the construct validity of the scales, i.e.,
assessing ''that the meaning of the underlying factor corresponds to the construct of interest"
(Gerbing & Anderson, 1988:191). Several measures regarding aspect of construct validity are
proposed in the structural equation modeling (SEM) literature. Bollen (1989) suggested
several measures that could compensate for some weaknesses associated with the traditional
validity approaches. Although all of his suggestions can be used when a measure depends
.solely on one latent variable, they appear to be more useful when severallatent variables affect
the measure. For instance, Bollen's standardized validity coefficient is equal to the A,'S in Table
8.5, but since no items are measured with more than one latent variable the relative influence is
66 This rule-of-thumb is derived from Bagozzi and Yi's preliminary fit criteria, implying that factor loadings ideally
should exceed 0.5. Given theformula ofitem reliability this should approximate a value ofO.25.
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not obtainable. Similarly, Bollen's unique validity variance equals the item reliability when the
measures depend on one latent variable only.
The assessment of convergent and discriminant validity is done using the approach offered by
Anderson & Gerbing (1988)67. According to Anderson & Gerbing, convergent validity can be
assessed by determining whether each indicator's estimated pattern coefficient on its
hypothesized underlying construct is significant. The T-values for the A'S in Table 8.5 show
that all ofthem are significant, and, thus, based on Anderson & Gerbing's criterion convergent
validity is assured (see also e.g. Hoyle & Panter, 1995). Discriminant validity can be assessed
by determining whether the confidence interval (+/- two standard errors) around the
correlation estimate between two factors include 1.0 (absolute value). In Table 8.6 the
estimated correlation matrix between the latent constructs including the standard errors is
reported.
Table 8.6 Estimated correlation matrix between latent constructs





SYSDEP -0.35 -0.08 -0.54
(0.13) (0.15) (0.13)
CPC 0.70 0.28 0.51 -0.46
(0.05) (0.11) (0.08) (0.12)
TRUST -0.18 -0.08 -0.13 -0.04 -0.24
(0.10) (0.12) (0.1 O) (0.13) (0.10)
TSI 0.36 0.09 0.02 0.04 0.16 0.00
!0.092 !0.122 !O.IO) ~0.132 !0.102 !O.l°2
a Standarderrors
The correlation matrix shows that no correlation estimate includes 1.0 in its confidence interval
(5th and 95th percentile). The closest relationship is between VI (~I)and CPC (I;s) where the
correlation is estimated to be 0.70 with the corresponding confidence interval between 0.65
and 0.75. Thus, discriminant validity is assured according to Anderson & Gerbing's (1988)
requirement (see also Hoyle & Panter, 1995).
67 Another complementing way of assessing construct validity is through the set of relationship of the construct with other
constructs as specified by some theory (Gerbing & Anderson, 1988). The nomological network in which the different
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Concluding comments on the measurement model
The above consideration leads us to conclude that the measurement model is good. The model
is valid, both in terms of unidimensionality, reliability as well as construct validity given the
assessment presented above. According to Anderson & Gerbing (1988:412), the distinction
between exploratory and confirmatory factor analysis is often "obscured", because the initially
"specified measurement model almost invariably fails to provide acceptable fit" and that
normally a "series of respecifications" have to be done before an acceptable fit is reached.
However, the analysis conducted here is as close to an exclusively confirmatory analysis one
can hope to reach. As we recall, only one item was deleted, due to high crossloadings, from the
a priori specified model.
Moreover, the fact that no crossloadings or correlated error terms were necessary to obtain a
good model fit provides us with greater confidence in the forthcoming structural analysis.
Thus, we can provide a clear theoretically driven unidimensional constructs solution. By this
we avoid the conflict between preferences for interpretability vs. goodness of fit scholars often
experience (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). This is especially important since we have to use
multiple regression in the hypotheses testing phase. Accordingly, a major reduction of the
potential biases by using multiple regression instead of SEM may then be obtained, compared
with using a measurement model that would have to allow for correlated error terms or
crossloadings in order to get acceptable model fit. In the latter case, such a model would surely
reduce the confidence in our hypotheses testing, and would to a higher degree than what is the
case here, ask for a structural analysis that could estimate the measurement and structural
models simultaneously (as e.g. LISREL).
constructs are a part of will be tested in structural analysis in the next section. Moreover. a test of the underlying
explanation mechanisms that drive the predictions in the model is shown in Section 7.3.
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8.3 Structural analysis
Below, the hypotheses outlined in Chapter 5 as well as the significance of the structural model
will be tested (8.3.2). Section 8.3.3 includes tests of control variables. In Section 8.3.4, the
proposed model will be compared with rival models. Section 8.3.5 tests the adequacy of the
underlying explanatory mechanisms that maintain the logic of the arguments for the
hypotheses. First, however, the statistical methods used and the test procedures applied, are
discussed (8.3.1).
8.3.1 Statistical methods
Below, the independent and moderator variables included in our theoretical model are
classified. Based on the classification, the choice of statistical methods and test procedures to
be used are assessed and chosen.
Type of variables in the model
Sharma, Durand & Gur-Arie (1981 :292-294) distinguish between three different types of
moderator variables; homologizer, quasi moderator and pure moderator. The first type implies
that the strength (and not the form) of the relationship between the predictor and the criterion
is influenced by the moderator. None of the moderators in the study are ofthis type. The study
has hyphotesized a bilinear functional form of the modification effects. This implies that
moderator variables (Z's) are hypothesized to change the form of the relationship between a
predictor (X) and the criterion (Y). Thus, the slope of the relationship between X and Y are
supposed to change across values of the moderator. A quasi moderator as well as a pure
moderator interacts with the X to modify the form of the relationship, and is not significantly
related to X. What distinguishes a quasi moderator from a pure moderator, is that the former
kind of variable will act as predictor variable itself.
As evident from the theoretical arguments in part 1, the construct of trust is in the study
hypothesized to be pure moderator (cf. Chapter 6; hypothesis 5). By contrast, the variables of
CPC and TSI are argued to be quasi-moderators. In the case of two quasi moderators one
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cannot interpret which of the variables moderates the other one: "... the moderator effect [i.e.,
quasi moderator] is not clear because each of the independent variables can, in turn, be
interpreted as a moderator" (Sharma, Durand & Gur-Arie, 1981:294). Thus, in Chapter 6 it
was hypothesized that CPC and TSI will interact (hypothesis 3) as well as being predictor
variables themselves (hypotheses l and 2).
Moreover, summated scales of the observed variables are used as the method for calculating
the latent variables. The score is computed as the average of the items reflecting its latent
construct. Other methods for selecting factors are the use of surrogate variables and factor
scores (Kim & Mueller, 1978; Hair et al. 1995). Surrogate variables are best suited in
explorative research (Hair et al. 1995). If the scales are well-constructed, valid, and reliable
instruments (as have been proven in Section 8.2), the summated scale is the best alternative
(Hair et al. 1995).
Statistical method
Choice of statistical method. Three methods have been widely used when testing for
interaction or modification effects; (1) median split analysis, (2) moderator median split
analysis, and (3) product term analysis in multiple regression (Jaccard et al., 1990). The
product term method is applied for the structural analysis. As emphasized by Jaccard et al.
(1990:49): " ...dichotomization or trichotomization reduces precision (and subsequently
statistical power) and represents a somewhat crude approach to the analysis of interaction
effects." However, subgroup analysis (i.e., methods l and 2) may be appropriate if the
moderator variable is a homologizer (Sharma, Durand & Gur-Arie, 1981), or if scale reduction
is theoretically appropriate and meaningful (Jaccard et aL 1990). None of these aspects,
however, are ofrelevance for the study.
Type of product term test. It is proposed that the most adequate way of testing interaction
and modification effects is by using hierarchical F-tests (see e.g. Hair et al, 1995; Jaccard et al.
1990). Utilizing this method, one first estimates the unmoderated equation and then estimates
the moderated relationship, and, finally, one examines if the change in R2 is statistically
significant. In such tests the direct effects of both the X's and Z's (i.e., both predictors and
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moderators) are included in both equations, regardless in which the moderators are quasi or
pure moderators (cf. Hair et al. 1995; Jaccard et al., 1990). Utilizing such a method may,
however, only be justified if the proposed variables are quasi moderators (i.e., direct effects are
hypothesized in addition to the moderator effect). If the moderator is a pure moderator,
however, such a method may not be justified (i.e., since no direct effect of the moderator on
the criterion is proposed in such models), if theory testing is the issue. However, the
hierarchical F test yields the same substantive results as the t test (i.e., t squared yields the
same value as F for incremental). Thus, the confirmatory design of the study implies that the
theory is tested by one equation. Consequently, the t test of the multiplicative terms as well as
for the direct effects is assessed in one equation.
Test procedures.
Four types of empirical tests are conducted in this section. First, the ''pure'' theoretical model
is tested. Thus, a test of the study's research hypotheses is provided. Second, we include the
control variables to test the robustness of the findings (parameter estimates) from the pure
theoretical model. Accordingly, the possibilities of masked and spurious effects are accounted
for within such an approach.
Third, models that include rival predictors are included. The most common way of testing
theories is to adopt a strictly one-time confirmatory approach (Meehl, 1990). There may,
however, be weaknesses in choosing such an approach as the only test. Arguments have been
offered for including additional tests in order to "prove" that the proposed theory is the best
approximation (e.g. Meehl, 1990; Joreskog & Sorbom, 1993). Usually rationalized by some
theory, a rival model may consist of a respecification of the structural paths. No such rival
theory is proposed in the study. However, in the literature there exist several predictor
variables in addition to the variables proposed in the study. Consequently, in Section 7.5
additional variables that may add exploratory power to the criterion (i.e., rival models) were
presented. For all of these variables, except capacity utilization, there exists some theoretical
rationale for their potential influence on the criterion. Clear preferences, though, for the study's
theoretical model have been offered in the dissertation. Thus, these variables should not be
included in the main model as long as theory testing is the issue. However, the tests of the rival
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models are more exploratory than confirmatory in nature and may therefore be justified.
Accordingly, there are mainly two reasons for testing models including these variables. First, as
argued by e.g. Meehl (1990) and Joreskog & Sorbom (1993), in order to increase our
confidence to the proposed model, it should be compared with competing "theories". Second,
use of rival models may be an indicant of the parsimony of the theoretical model with respect
to its ability to explain the dependent variable.
Fourth, tests of the study's explanatory mechanisms are provided. The main contnbution of the
study is centered around the theoretical arguments of the effects ofCPC and TSI on VI. Thus,
empirical tests of the mechanisms by which the influence from CPC and TSI are transmitted to
the criterion are provided.
8.3.2 Test of hypotheses
In Chapter 5 we proposed the rationale for the following five hypotheses. The hypotheses
were:
HI: Closeness to primary competence (CPC) has a positive effect on vertical integration
(VI).
Hl: Buyer's human transaction specific investments (TSI) has a positive effect on VI.
Hl: The interaction effect of CPC and TSI has a positive effect on VI.
H4: Tacitness has a negative effect on VI.
He Trust will moderate negatively the relationship between TSI and VI.
Three main effect hypotheses, one quasi moderator hypothesis and one pure moderator
hypothesis are proposed. Following the recommendations of Cronbach (1987) and Jaccard et
al. (1990), we centered the composite X's prior to forming the multiplicative terms in order to
avoid the multicollinearity problem": In appendix D the correlations between all the variables
in the equation, including the product terms, are illustrated. As expected (cf. Jaccard, 1990),
multicollinearity is not a problem in the study.
68 The multiplicative term of CPC and TSI [(CPC)(BTSI)} is formed by the following equation: CPCTSI = (CPC -
meanvalue)(TSI - meanvalue). Identical procedures are done whenforming the other multiplicative term (i.e., TSITRUST).
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In Table 8.7 the parameter estimates for the estimated model is reported. The model is
significant with an F value of 17.46 (Sig. F< .001). The main effects ofCPC (T=S.09, p<.OOl),
TSI (T=4.37, p<.OOl) and tacitness (T=-3.20, p<.OI) on VI are all significant (hypotheses 1,2,
and 4, respectively). The interaction effect ofCPC and TSI [(CPC)(TSI)] on VI (hypothesis 3)
is significant (T=2.12, p<.OS). Thus, hypothesis 3 is supported. Hypothesis 5 is not supported.
The results show that TSI effect on VI does not significantly decrease with increased values on
trust. Thus, trust does not negatively mediate the relationship between TSI and VI. In sum,
hypotheses 1, 2, 3 and 4 are supported while hypothesis S is not supported.
Table 8.7 Results from OLS regression analysis
Dependent variable: Vertical integration (VI)
(n=114~
Beta"
HI Closeness to primary competence (CPC) .434 5.098***
H2 Buyers transaction specific investments (TSI) .322 4.373***
ID Interaction effect between CPC and TSI .164 2.120*
H4 Tacitness -.265 -3.201 **
H5 Modification effect ofTrust on TSI and VI -.056 -.755
"Standardized regression coefficients bOne-tailed test
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
R2 .466




8.3.3 Including control variables
In Table 8.8, the results of a multiple regression test including the control variables are
reported. In addition to the control variables presented in Section 7.5, the construct of trust is
included. According to Jaccard et al. (1990) one should control for the direct effects of the
variables forming a product term. Notice, though, that no theory for this is proposed in the
study. Thus, in addition to the variables in the baseline model, the model includes trust,
vendor's transaction specific investments (vendor's TSI), annual earning and uncertainty.
The overall fit of the measurement model including control variables is presented in the table
along with the OLS regression results. The model received acceptable model fit. Descriptive
statistics and factor loadings for the items reflecting the constructs of vendor's TSI, annual
earning and uncertainty are shown in appendix E. Reliability measures and factor loadings for
these measures were all satisfactory.
The inclusion of the control variables does not change the overall pattern observed in the
baseline model. From Table 8.8 one can see that the Beta and T values for the independent
variables included in the baseline model show only minor trivial changes when the control
variables are added to the baseline model. The results indicate no spurious or masking effects
for the relationships in the theoretical model, given the included control variables. Trust has,
however, a significant effect on VI (T=-I.77, p<.05). We return to the implication of this
finding in Chapter 9.
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Baseline model + Control variables
(n=114)
Beta' TD Beta' 1'"
5.098*** CPC 0429 5.019***
4.373*** TSI .294 3.238**
2.120* (CPC)(TSI) .172 2.189*
-3.201** Tacitness -.250 -2.872**















R2 0466 R2 0489
R2 Adj. 0439 R2 Adj. 0441
F 170463 F 10.193
Sig. F .000 Sig. F .000
Measurement '"I: = 196.06 Measurement X2= 467
model" (df=168) model" (df=390)
(p=0.068) (p=0.0043)
RMSEA = 0.038 RMSEA = 0.042
(p(close test) = 0.80 (p(close test) = 0.83
NNFI= 0.97 NNFI= 0.94
CFI = 0.98 CFI = 0.95
IFI = 0.98 IFI = 0.96
"Standardized regression coefficients; DOne-tailedtest - OLS regression; cLISREL8.14
*p < 0.05; "p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
8.3.4 Tests of rival models
Below, several rival models are tested. The approach utilized evaluates if the inclusion of
additional predictor variables increases the predictability (R2) of the criterion significantly (se
e.g. Berry, 1993; Jaccard et al. 1990). Byentering a new variable at each step, the increase in
R2 on each step is assessed in terms of statistical significance on the F test. The test of the null
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hypotheses that this increment is zero is yielded by the following formula: F = [(R22 - Rl2)/(k2 -
kl)] / [(1-R2 2)/(N_ k2 -l)].
In Table 8.9 the results of four hierarchical multiple regression tests are reported. The first
model includes buyer's dependence of the vendor, in addition to the variables in the baseline
model. The second model adds technological economies (T_E), the third includes T_E and
capacity utilization, and the fourth includes T_E and formalization.
The overall fit of the different measurement models is presented in Table 8.9 along with the
OLS regression results. All the models received acceptable model fit. Except the chi-square
values of Model 3, all models were significant (RMSEA and chi-square). Additionally, all
models received adequate and good fit-values on the incremental indexes. Descriptive statistics
and factor loadings for the items reflecting the constructs rival predictors are shown in
appendix E. Reliability measures and factor loadings for these measures were all satisfactory.
Thus, on overall the assessment of the measurement models included in this section indicates
that they all are valid.
The increment in R2 associated with model l and the baseline model is not statistically
significant (F (l, 107) = O). The same pattern (i.e., not significant) yields models 3 (F (l, 107)
= O), (and 4 (F (1, 107) = O». In sum, no significant increases in R2 emerge when other
variables are entered, except for the model including technological economies (T_E). The
increment in R2 in model2 is statistically significant (F (l, 107) = 11.15, p<.Ol). The strengths
ofT_E's effect (i.e., the increment in R2-adjusted) is .05.
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Table 8.9 Hierarchical regression: Stepwise inclusion of rival predictors
D~endent variable: Vertical inte_æ:ation ~n=1l4l
Variable entered Measurement model" Total Total R2 increment F for
multiple F inR2 (s?t increment
corr. {R)b
Baseline model (B)d .68 17.46 .47 .47 17.46
















3. B+T_E X2 = 231.72 .73 15.97 .53 .01 2.25
+ Capacity (196 dg)
utilization (p=0.041)
RMSEA = 0.040




4. B + T_E X2 = 302.10
+ Formalization. (264 dg)
(p=0.OS3)
RMSEA = 0.036




.72 15.09 .52 .00 O
"LISREL 8.14; bOLS regression analysis; c sr, sernipartial correlation;
dThe theoretical model of the study (cf. 8.3.2)
*p<.OS: **p<.OI
In sum, three out of four potential variables that may add exploratory power to the criterion
have been rejected. T_E, however, accounts for 5% of the variance of the criterion, and, thus,
its inclusion in the model is statistically significant. The inclusion of this variable does not
change the overall pattern observed in the baseline model, and, thus, additional support is given
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to the adequacy and parsimony of the theoretical model of this study. The latter issue is
supported by the results shown in Table 8.10, where Beta and T values for the variables in the
two models (i.e., the baseline model and model 5 from Table 8.8) are compared. From the
table one can see that the Beta and T values for the independent variables included in the
baseline model show only minor trivial changes when T_E is added to the baseline model. The
results indicate that T_E cause neither spurious nor masking effects. Thus, empirically the
inclusion of T_E as an additional predictor variable seems relevant. A discussion of this
empirical finding will be returned to in the next and final chapter.
Table 8.10 Comparison between the theoretical model and the theoretical model + T_E
Dependent variable: Dependent variable:
Vertical integration Vertical integration
Baseline model Baseline model + T_E
n=114
T Beta" T
CPC .434 5.098*** CPC .357 4.348***
TSI .322 4.373*** TSI .280 3.927***
(CPC)(TSI) .164 2.120* (CPC)(TSI) .154 2.086*
Tacitness -.265 -3.201 ** Tacitness -.213 -2.616**
Trust mod. -.056 -.755 Trust mod. -.050 -710
TSI effect TSIeffect
on VI on VI
T_E -.256 3.258**
R2 .466 R2 .518
R2 Adj. .439 R2 Adj. .489
F 17.463 F 17.721
Sig. F .000 Sig. F .000...................................~_~_~_...L..~ _
• Standardized regression coefficients; One-tailed test - OLS regression
*p < 0.05; **p < 0.01; ***p < 0.001
8.3.5 Test of explanatory mechanisms
Empirical tests of some of the mechanisms by which the influence from the predictors are
transmitted to the criterion are provided below. As argued in Chapter 6 and 7, the effect of
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CPC on VI is rationalized through the arguments that CPC has an impact on production as
well as transaction costs. We recall from Chapter 6 that compared with low CPC, high CPC
reduce internal production costs, if internalizing the activity in question. Accordingly, high
CPC (l) increases the efficiency of the internal information transmission, and (2) increases the
effectiveness of performing the appropriate routines, compared with low CPC, if internalizing.
Additionally, high CPC will also reduce the degree of internal opportunistic behavior and
internal transaction costs compared with low CPC, when internalizing. Thus, it is proposed
that CPC will be negatively related to both expected internal opportunistic behavior and
expected internal transaction costs ifinternalizing the activity. The rationale for TSI's effect on
VI is a straightforward TCE logic. As Williamson outlines, when TSI is great the transaction
costs of market procurement is high. In such situations, there exist safeguarding problems
because of the vulnerability due to the potential for opportunistic behavior of the other actor
(i.e., the vendor). Such increasing potential for opportunistic behavior can only be hampered
by increasing costs of safeguarding (Williamson, 1985), i.e., increasing transaction costs. Thus,
it is expected that TSI will be positively related to opportunistic behavior and transaction costs,
respectively". The theoretical arguments for the mechanisms coupling CPC and TSI to VI are
summated in Table 8.11 below.













decreases the possibility to
cheat with increasing CPC
Existing common codes
increases the possibility to
detect and punish opportunistic
behavior with increasing CPC




TSI Reduced Incentives for opportunistic
behavior increase with
increasing TSI
High TSI increases the
potential for opportunistic
behavior and increases the
costs of safeguarding
68 Note also that TSf will reduce production costs (cf. Section 2.4; Williamson. 1985).
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The study (cf. Chapter 3) emphasizes the importance of the distinction between the behavioral
manifestation of opportunism (opportunistic behavior) and the opportunistic attitude of
economic actors (opportunism). The scale used to measure opportunism reflects this, and
measures opportunistic behavior and not attitude toward opportunism Accordingly (and to my
knowledge not emphasized by previous empirical research), in line with the study's arguments,
the fact that opportunistic behavior will vary, does not contradict the assumption that the
attitude toward opportunism still may be present. Consequently, the analyses illustrated below
do not test the assumptions, i.e., the hard core of the synthesis (bounded rationality and an
attitude toward opportunism). Instead, we test the adequacy of the logic derived from these
assumptions. We test whether the theoretical arguments underlying the empirically supported
results reflect the core of the argument ofthis study; namely that actors calculate the efficiency
of different governance forms. Accordingly, we assess the degree to which the economic
actors assess opportunistic behavior and consequently transaction costs based on the degree of
CPC and TSI, when they evaluate the criterion of the study.
When the rationale for the CPC prediction is tested, we control for TSI, and when testing the
mechanisms coupling TSI and VI we control for CPC. Thus, when the CPC logic is tested, we
expect no significant effect of TSI on expected internal opportunistic behavior and expected
internal transaction costs, respectively. The same will yield for CPC on opportunistic behavior
and transaction costs, when testing for the underlying TSI logic. Strictly speaking, these
variables should not be included in the model as no rationale for their influence is present.
However, given the expected effect of e.g. TSI on transaction costs, a negative effect, zero
effect, or no positively significant effect of CPC on transaction costs, will give additional
support to the logic offered in the study. In Table 8.12 the results from four different multiple
regression tests are reported.
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Table 8.12 Test of explanatory mechanisms: Results from OLS regression analysis





..Y.~.\~p.!.~ ~!?!~~ y.~!.!.~~!~ ~~~~~ T.. .
TSI .222 2.348** TSI .1364 1.415*
CPC -.022

















"Standardized regression coefficients; One-tailed test - OLS regression; cLISREL 8.14
*p < O.l; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
b. Test of the explanatory logic rationalizing the CPC hypothesis
Dependent variable:
Expected transaction costs






























"Standardized regression coefficients; OLS regression - One-tailed test; cLISREL 8.14
*p < 0.1; **p < 0.05; ***p < 0.01
The overall fit of the different measurement models is presented in the table along with the
OLS regression results. All the models received acceptable model fit. Except for the chi-square
value of model l, all models were significant (RMSEA and chi-square). Additionally, all
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models received adequate and good fit-values on the incremental indexes. Descriptive statistics
and factor loadings for the items reflecting the explanatory mechanisms, are included in
appendix E. Reliability measures and factor loadings for these measures were all satisfactory.
Consequently, the assessment of the measurement models included in this section indicates that
they all are valid.
The results show that TSI has a significantly positive effect on transaction costs (T=2.348,
p<0.05) and opportunistic behavior (T=1.415, p<O.l). CPC has a significantly negative effect
on expected internal transaction costs (T=-4.666, p<.OI) and expected internal opportunistic
behavior (T=-2.033, p< -.05). Regarding the controls, CPC has, as expected, no effect on
either transaction costs or opportunistic behavior. Note that this is a support to our arguments
throughout the study that CPC do no reduce the transaction costs in a relationship nor the
opportunistic behavior of a vendore. Moreover, TSI has a positively significant effect on
expected internal opportunistic behavior, which also is a support of the study's argument.
However, TSI has a significantly negative effect on expected internal transaction costs (T=-
1.476, pc.l). Thus, all the four predicted effects are supported, while three out of four
predicted zero effects are not rejected. Overall, great support is given to the underlying logic
of the hypotheses empirically supported in Section 8.3.2. Thus, empirical support is given to
the theoretical arguments of the proposed set of mechanisms coupling the two main
independent variables to the dependent. Consequently, support is given to the argument that
actors assess opportunistic behavior and transaction costs based on the degree of CPC and TSI
when they evaluate the criterion of the study. A further abstraction will lead us to conclude
that the results also indicate a support of the core economic assumptions of the study (as well
as the Williarnsonian), namely, that economic actors calculate the efficiency of different
governance forms.
69 In Section 2.4 (see also Chapter 6},following Nelson & Winter (1982), we argued that a firm 'sformer investments and
its repertoire of routines, restrict its future behavior. This follows because learning tends to be local (Cyert & March,
1963). Thus, even though the buyer's existing competence may be close to the vendor's, the way of doing things is different
(Meyer & Rowan, 1977), and the buyer and the vendor will have different common codes (Al7'Ow,1974; Hennart, 1982;
Kogut & Zander, 1992; 1993). This implies that the parties will react differently when trying to co-ordinate disturbances
(Williamson, 199I), which again will increase the bargaining costs of reaching an agreement for solving the disturbances.
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8.4 Summary
In Chapter 6 we presented five hypotheses about proposed effects on the criterion of vertical
integration. In Table 8.13 the hypotheses are listed together with the accompanying results
from the empirical study.






















Trust on TSI and VI
O
"One tailed test
The results of the regression analyses showed that four out of five hypotheses were supported.
The direct effects of CPC, TSI and tacitness as well as the interaction effect of CPC and TSI
were all significant. Finally, the hypothesis containing the modification effect of trust on CPC
and VI was not supported.
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9. DISCUSSION AND IMPLICATIONS
This final chapter contains four sections. After a brief summary of the study, Section 9.1
discusses the overall results of the empirical tests conducted. In Section 9.2 implications for
research and practice are discussed. Section 9.3 addresses the study's strengths and limitations
and suggestions for future research are provided. Finally, concluding remarks are presented.
9.1 Summary
The main purpose of this dissertation has been to extend the two perspectives addressed by
developing a synthesis and to test that synthesis empirically. Consequently, we have combined
insights from both perspectives and developed a unifying framework with consistent common
assumptions. Particularly, the study has argued that many of the perceived shortcomings in
earlier empirical and theoretical works of TCE and the competence perspective are in part
attributable to inadequate specifications of the behavioral assumptions. We have illustrated
how the behavioral assumptions can be extended to incorporate constructs and predictions
from both perspectives in an integrated model. From this theoretical model, five testable
hypotheses were derived. Using a correlational design, the hypotheses were tested empirically
in the Norwegian power station industry. The summary in Table 9.1 shows that four out of five
hypotheses were supported.
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Table 9.1 Summary ofhypotheses
Constructs Hypothesized Findings Sign. level"
Effect on VI




Hl' + + (p<O.OOl )
Buyers transaction
specific competence (TSI)







Trust on TSI and VI
a One tailed test
Several tests were conducted in order to secure a critical test of the theory. After testing the
overall theoretical model, a test including control variables was conducted. Additionally, in
order to prove that the proposed theory was a good approximation, rival predictors that may
increase the explained variance of the dependent variable, were introduced in separate tests. All
these tests indicated that the theory was a good approximation of the phenomenon studied.
Finally, we also found empirical support for the underlying mechanisms by which the influences
from CPC and TSI are transmitted to the criterion ofvertical integration.
The discussion of the results below follows the same steps as the test procedure from Section
8.3. Thus, first, the test of the hypotheses is discussed (9.l.l). Next, Paragraph 9.1.2 discusses




Four out of five hypotheses were supported. The direct effects ofbuyers' closeness to primary
competence (CPC) and buyers' transaction specific investments (TSI) as well as the interaction
effect of CPC and TSI were all significant. Additionally, the hypothesis involving tacitness'
effect on VI was supported. Hypothesis 5, containing the modification effect of trust on CPC
and VI, was not supported. The information from the descriptive statistics and reliability
analysis, respectively, showed that the concepts of trust had to be treated with caution (cf.
Section 8.1). Particularly, all the items representing trust have high mean values and low
standard deviation. Consequently, these items seem to be items that are easy to agree with in
the setting, and, thus do not entail a satisfactory variance and normal distnbution. Accordingly,
it seems like the items representing the construct was poorly measured. This may be one
reasonable explanation for the rejection of this hypothesis. The probability that the
interpretability of this construct was obscured in the structural analysis is higher than for the
other variables included in the model.
The support of four out of five hypotheses indicates the relevance of integrating competence-
based and transaction cost economics explanations into a unified framework. The theoretical
and practical implications of the findings will be returned to in the following sections.
9.1.2 Controls, rivals and explanatory mechanisms
Control variables. The result from the test including control variables indicated no spurious
and masked effects for the relationship in the proposed model. Regarding vendor's transaction
specific investments the results are interesting. Arguments have been offered that reciprocal
assets may tend to moderate opportunistic behavior by serving as 'hostages' in a relationship
(Williamson, 1983). However, no such motives are indicated by the results in the study. The
results from the study follow previous research in that the correlation between the two
constructs is high (cf. Buvik, 1995). However, the effect ofbuyer's investments on VI is still
significant when introducing the vendor's specific investments in the model. Accordingly, there
is no indication of a spurious effect between the buyer's transaction specific investments and
vertical integration. Moreover, the analysis also shows clearly that TSI is the most powerful
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variable within the TeE-framework. Uncertainty, however, is a part of the TeE-framework.
Because of the mixed results involving the uncertainty concept, we did not hypothesize any
effect of the variable's impact on vertical integration. Absent asset specificity, however, TeE
does not predict that uncertainty would itself lead to hierarchical governance (Williamson,
1985). Uncertainty depends on competitive conditions, and, thus, it is hypothesized to interact
with asset specificity. According to Shelanski & Klein (1995) the failure of studies not to take
this aspect into account may explain some of the conflicting results on the effect ofuncertainty.
Thus, further studies may include and test the interaction of environmental uncertainty and TSI
on VI within the study' s framework.
Rivals predictors. The empirical analysis showed that the main factors explaining vertical
integration are the three major variables derived from the two synthesized perspectives as well
as the interaction effect between Cl'C and TSI. Other factors (dependency, technological
economies, capacity utilization and formalization) that may have an influence on vertical
integration are, except technological economies, not supported in the study. Empirically, the
inclusion of technological economies as an additional predictor variable seerns relevant.
However, even though the variable increased the predictability of the criterion significantly, the
«specification of a model should be determined by theoretical considerations rather by rigidly
following a rule of thumb based on an empirical measure of goodness-of-fit» (Berry &
Feldman, 1985: 16). The rationale for the variable's effect sterns from the literature ofindustrial
organization, where technological possibilities are expected to increase the possibility of
getting monopoly power. Following the arguments from Williamson (1975; 1985) and Argyres
(1996), however, a theoretical rationale for its impact on vertical integration is difficult to
find?'. Beside, the tests of the rival predictors were somewhat exploratory in nature. When
testing four rival predictors in an exploratory way, I presume that the possibility of a chance
effect is present (i.e. that one out of the four predictors will be significant by chance).
71 TCE rules out the traditional scale argument by stating that scale economies do not determine the make or buy
decisions (Williamson, 1975: 16-19). The argument for this is that any scale economies available to e.g. a vendor should be
similarly available to each of the buyers, except for the other buyers potential opportunism problems, in selling inputs to
customers, i.e. competitors in the same industry. It is the potential costs of opportunism combined with the fact that all
future contingencies cannot be foreseen, that prevent the buyers from realizing scale economies. Accordingly, "true
production cost differences between firms due to scale economies are creatures of high transaction costs; they do not
independently affect make-or-buy decisions" (Argyres, 1996:130). However, the efficiency due to different and unique
competence, plays an independent role in the make or buy decision. This aspect, as opposed to the scale argument,
however, is not ruled out by TCE considerations (Williamson, 1994).
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Moreover, the variable was measured by only one item, and, thus, this fact may further
increase the probability of a chance effect. We have previously indicated preferences toward
the Williamsonian logic (i.e., ruling out the technological economies argument). Thus,
following Williamson and the possibility of a chance effect, we do recommend the variable to
be included in the framework of the study.
Explanatory mechanisms. Theory and hypotheses should be rationalized by a set of
mechanisms that transmit the influence from the predictor to the criterion (Mulaik & James,
1995). As our confidence in a theory increases if the hypotheses are supported by the data, the
confidence will further increase if the explanatory logic that connects the predictor to the
criterion is empirically supported. Thus, the test of the explanatory mechanisms is a support of
the explanatory logic underlying the predictions of the study.
9.2 Theoretical and managerial implications
Below, the theoretical implications of the study are addressed (9.2.1). Paragraph 9.2.2
discusses the managerial implications of the study.
9.2.1 Theoretical and empirical implications
In a recent review of transaction costs economics, Rindfleisch & Heide (1997) summarize the
research needs within the transaction costs framework. First, further research is needed to
clarify the role of production costs vs. transaction costs in determining appropriate governance
structures. Second, research is needed to assess the costs of internal organization, i.e., to what
degree transaction costs may exist within firms. Third, they ask for studies that address the
implications of deviations from opportunistic behavior. Additionally, Shelanski & Klein (1995)
criticize empirical studies for not testing alternate hypotheses that may also fit the data as well
as the TCE-variables. Thus, they argue that there is a need for studies that explicitly compare
TCE derived hypotheses with hypotheses derived from other perspectives.
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From a competence-based point of view, Bamey (1996) asks for studies that integrate a
competence-based view with transaction cost economics. According to Barney (1996), such
new knowledge or resource-based theories have to explain why firm organization is needed,
which implies a discussion of the limitations and weaknesses of TCE theories of the firm. He
continues by asserting that this to a lesser extent has been incorporated in previous knowledge
theories of the firm.
This study has provided an answer to research needs addressed from TCE and the competence
perspective. Consequently, the study may been seen as an extension of both the competence
perspective as well as TCE. Accordingly, the main contnbution of the study lies in the
consistent theoretical arguments for a synthesis of the two perspectives. However, arguments
can be offered that the framework instead can be viewed as an extension of the TCE-program.
Related to Lakatos' (1978)72 terminology, we have to some extent kept in line with the hard-
core of TCE. Moreover, we have extended the so-called protective belt or positive heuristics
by introducing "new" explanation variables. One can argue that conducting this strategy is
keeping in line with the research program of TCE. However, as should be evident from the
discussion in the study, we have emphasized and argued in direction of a synthesis of the two
perspectives. We have extended the content in the behavioral assumptions, which is in fact is a
modification of the hard-core (Lakatos, 1978) of the TCE-program?3.
We have shown how important insight from the competence perspective can be incorporated
into a model intended to explain vertical integration. The competence perspective, like TCE,
assumes actors to be bounded rationally. This is explicitly discussed in Nelson & Winter's
(1982) book. Moreover, the assumptions underlying the resource-based perspective are that
firms are heterogeneous with respect to the resources they control, and that resources are not
perfectly mobile across firms (Bamey, 1991). If the actors were perfectly rational, resources
would be mobile and competitive advantage, because of heterogeneity (out of equihbrium),
would only be temporary. Accordingly, the industry would in a short-term perspective be
brought back to equilibrium. What we have done in this study is to incorporate and emphasize
72 According to Lakatos. a scientific research program consists of a "hard-core" (specifications of assumptions) that by
definition is viewed as not falsifiable. and a "protective belt" of "auxiliary" hypotheses.
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the issue that firms have production constraints as well as contractual constraints. This
argument clearly deviates from TCE, as it sees firms as existing only because of their ability to
attenuate opportunism (Conner, 1991; Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). Accordingly, we have
emphasized the issue that firms are repositories of knowledge and skills, which in some
circumstances provide firm advantages over autonomous market exchange with respect to
efficiency and adaptation.
Moreover, we have shown that in order to throw light on the actual costs firms are exposed to,
the assumptions of opportunism must also be addressed in order to predict the most efficient
governance form. In two respects, our assumption of opportunism deviates from TCE. First,
we distinguish between opportunism as an attitude (assumed present), and opportunism as a
kind of manifest behavior (opportunistic behavior). This distinction is absent in Williamson's
formal theorizing (Ghoshal & Moran, 1996). Second, we are able to specify the mechanisms
(i.e. the use of common codes) through which internal opportunistic behavior is reduced.
Accordingly, our assumption of opportunism also rests on arguments from the competence
perspective.
As shown above, we have used extensive arguments from both perspectives when outlining the
synthesis. Consequently, we do not view the theoretical arguments and the model developed in
this study as a modification of the TCE-program, but rather as a synthesis of the competence
perspective and TCE. According to Knudsen (1996: l), "it is probably not feasible at this point
to describe the competence-perspective as a coherent research program, or paradigm,
characterized by a common hard-core and positive heuristics." However, by connecting
arguments that are inherent in the competence perspective and combining these with TCE-
arguments, we have also contributed to showing how further progress in outlining the
behavioral assumptions of the competence perspective can be made.
Moreover, asset specificity's effect on vertical integration is consistent with previous research.
within a TCE-framework. CPC's effect on vertical integration fits well into evolutionary
economics and resource based perspectives theorizing on the growth of the firm. The
73 However. the assumptions are not radically changed. as the use of TCE-explanations is still. though relaxed. assessed
relevant. It would be impossible to change dramatically or leave out one or both of the behavioral assumptions of
opportunism and bounded rationality and still be able to utilize the explanation power in the TCE-framework.
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operationalization of the CPC-construct represents an empirical contribution to the literature.
Additionally, our research shows that tacitness has a significantly negative effect on VI. This
observation is a support of previous studies examining related issues (e.g. Kogut & Zander,
1993; Zander & Kogut, 1995), and is consistent with a broader evolutionary framework. The
interaction effect of TSI and CPC is an important empirical contribution, since this illustrates
empirically the relevance of integrating the framework.
Following Rindfleisch & Heide (1997), few studies have explicitly examined the TCE-
proposition that investments in asset specificity increase opportunistic behavior and transaction
costs. Our study gives empirical support to the TCE-proposition that the costs of safeguarding
contractual agreements increase as the level of asset specificity increases. Additionally, this
study shows that as CPC increases, internal opportunistic behavior and internal transaction
costs decrease.
9.2.2 Managerial implications
Ghoshal and Moran (1996) argue that TCE is "bad for practice", mostly having in mind the
normative implications of the TCE assumption of opportunism, Not only are the prescriptions
drawn from TCE likely to be wrong, they state, but "also dangerous for corporate managers
because of the assumptions and logic on which it is grounded" (p. 1). Our model, we think, has
to some extent added more realism to the assumptions compared with TCE. Even though it
seems to be widely recognized that some (or maybe many) economic actors act
opportunistically (Milgrom & Roberts, 1992), studies have also shown clear discrepancy from
such behavior. We presume most managers have experienced that not all employees act
opportunistically. However, maybe they also have experienced that actors will act
opportunistically if the organizational competence and routines do not contnbute to an
evaluation of the performance of their work. Our practical guidelines imply that the
organizational routines and common codes may be suitable for controlling the opportunistic
behavior of employees. As long as the existing managerial capacity supported byexisting
routines can capture the extent to which the work is being done in an appropriate way, the
employees are expected to act in accordance with managerial directives. In this way, managers
should distinguish between opportunism as an inherent attitude and opportunistic behavior.
154
Following TCE, increasing potential for opportunistic behavior can only be hampered by
increasing costs ofsafeguarding, which "are likely to adversely effect [the firms] performance."
(Ghoshal & Moran, 1996:16). In contrast, managers offirms can choose to perform activities
when existing common codes can be used as a means in controlling behavior. Accordingly, by
emphasizing the effort in this direction, they will economize on internal transaction costs, and
the potential threat of opportunism will not necessarily increase the transaction costs.
Moreover, when managers evaluate integration decisions, they cannot only be concerned about
transaction-cost-economizing calculus, Le. the costs connected to solving contractual issues.
They should also be concerned about the ability to perform activities within their own
boundaries. If only using directives derived from TCE, managers will certainly draw attention
away from capability evaluations. Maybe the latter has caused the "...dearth of practical advice
for managers that it [TCE] has produced" (Chiles & McMackin, 1996:94). Our guidelines
imply that firms should use more time, and more resources to map and identify the competence
resources they possess, and evaluate which activities they in different time perspectives are
capable of performing inside their boundaries if they decide to grow. Managerial guidelines as
to how such mapping and evaluations can be done are e.g. found in part 3 of Hamel & Heene's
(1994) work. Finally, managers might evaluate critically the efficiency of creating interfirm
trust relations. Our guidelines imply that closer and tighter relationships (i.e. building trust
relations) between buyer and seller, as often emphasized in practice oriented reporting (Buvik,
1995), will not always be desirable. By governing a relation solely based on trust, firms are laid
open for potential opportunistic behavior from the exchange partner. Introducing contractual
safeguards will contribute to decreasing the potential of opportunistic behavior from the
exchange partner. However, added authority mechanisms will increase the governance costs
and reduce the adaptation abilities. Accordingly, managers should make comparative efficiency
calculations of the consequences of using trust or authority (or a combination) as governance
mechanisms.
9.3 Strengths, limitations and suggestions for future research
Paragraph 9.3.1 discusses some strengths of the study. In Paragraph 9.3.2, limitations in the
study are discussed and suggestions for future research are provided.
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9.3.1 Strengths
One strength of the study is the outlining of clear and precise assumptions. This, in tum, gave
us the possibility to specify consistent underlying explanatory mechanisms for the predictions in
the developed modeL Lakatos (1978) and Camerer (1985) among other factors inspired this
way of deductive theorizing. However, a careful inspection and specifications of the underlying
behavioral assumptions that drive the predictions in a theoretical framework will always come
at an expense. Consequently, there will be a trade-off between the clarity and precision in the
assumptions and the realism in predictions derived from a model. The choice of assumptions is
the foundation of a theory, as it influences the selection of variables included in the model
(Simon, 1991). Thus, the danger of omitting relevant (or including irrelevant) variables is
present. However, compared with TCE, we have added more realism to the assumptions. That
is, we believe that our assumptions more clearly correspond to the real motives of firms.
Accordingly, our intention has not been restricted to only presenting a logical model for its
own sake, but also emphasizing the understanding of vertical integration as a case of real firm
behavior.
Figure 9.174 illustrates the way the theory was built up, and how the study utilized a deductive
theorizing approach (Camerer, 1985; Lakatos, 1978). Thus, we started at the "bottom" of the
theory with discussions and definitions of the theory's assumptions. Next, the explanatory
mechanisms derived from these assumptions were logically outlined. Finally, the connection
between the variables in the model, logically deduced from the explanatory mechanisms, was
approached. The test procedure was approached the opposite way. First, we started with
testing the theoretical model, i.e. the connections between the variables. Second, we controlled
for potential spurious and masked effects. Third, we included a test of rival predictors, and
fourth, we provided tests of the explanatory mechanisms. We believe that this way of outlining
a theory followed by the four-step empirical test is a strength of the study. Thus, we believe
that this gives confidence to the whole framework that constitutes the theory.
74 In thefigure, the mechanisms coupling tacitness and trust lo VI are removed (see Figure 6.3 where these are included).
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Figure 9.1 The theoretical and empirical part of the study.
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Another major strength of the study is the focus on firms' underlying competence as departure
for growth. Thus, we have taken seriously the insight from resource-based theory that
knowledge and competencies, and not a particular product or service, are the foundation of
value-creating processes. As Conner (1991:145) asks: "To what extent should outcomes [e.g.
products] of application of firm resources be used as proxies for the underlying resources?"
She continues by asserting that the reason for this application is ''that reliable measures of
underlying resources pose a heavy burden on empirics"(p. 145).
Several studies have supported the efficiency of related diversification through horizontal or
vertical integration (cf. Teece, Pisano & Shuen, 1997). However, other studies have found that
even unrelated diversification is positivelyassociated with profitability (cf. D'Aveni &
Ravenscraft, 1994). What can be the reason for this empirical anomaly? Most empirical studies,
examining these issues, have often used fixed classification systems of companies and
industries". One criticism of the use of these classification systems has been that most major
companies are in a multiple line of business (MacMillan, Hambrick & Pennings, 1986).
However, this criticism is based on the same assumption that firms classified in the same code,
share or are quite similar with respect to the generic resources and competencies they possess.
Our criticism, in contrast, is more fundamental. We think there should be sufficient evidence
(e.g. in the theory of the growth of the firm, in the organizationalleaming literature, in the new
institutionalism in organization theory and in the resource-based theory) that producing the
same or similar products, does not necessarily imply that two firms share or have identical
resources and competence. As Conner (1991:145) asserts, "firms measuring identically on
launches may have entirely different components of ... capabilities". Ifthe latter is correct, we
may be skeptical to studies that a priori state that Standard Industrial Classification codes are
appropriate ways of studying integration strategies. These studies de-emphasize the possibility
that the firms' underlying worker competence and managerial capability are what gives rise to
most synergies (Penrose, 1959). As for example emphasized by Prahaled & Hamel (1990), a
firm's underlying competence can give rise to several distinctive and unrelated markets. This
implies that companies classified within the same four-digit code are not necessarily more
closely connected than companies not classified within the same code. If this is right, an a
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priori assumption of synergies of such integration will indeed be wrong. The key issue is to
what extent firms can deploy their existing primary competence and resources as a departure
for growth, whether this is made in so-called related or unrelated markets. Accordingly, the
possibility to accumulate existing competence and resources in a dynamic growth perspective
will both give the opportunities and set the limits for a firm's growth.
In sum, the way we study vertical integration here should clearly be distinguished from those
studies that start out with industry or firm classifications. Contrary to the present study, these
studies assume a priori that companies within the same four-digit or three-digit SIC code are
quite homogenous with respect to the technology, competence and resources they possess.
Thus, these studies are very close to the neoclassical assumptions of resource mobility and
homogeneity that we so seriously have neglected in this study.
9.3.2 Limitations and future research
We have throughout this dissertation exclusively used efficiency, as a part of the study's hard-
core in addition to the two behavioral assumptions of bounded rationality and opportunistic
attitude. Accordingly, in the theoretical discussion we have a priori assumed that firms pursue
their goals in a rational economizing way. First, this implies that we have always searched
explanations based on firms' interest in choosing the most efficient governance form. Second,
this implies that firms beforehand are assumed to calculate the efficiency of different
governance forms, and consequently, that they will choose the most efficient one. This a priori
assumption is also reflected in the way we operationalize our dependent variable (cf. Section
7.4). As stated, different motives for vertical integration, as e.g. power and resource
dependency, exist in the literature. Many ofthese motives, however, have no direct connection
with efficiency. The exclusion of these motives may, especially from a sociological point of
view, be criticized", As Chiles & McMackin (1996:95) assert: "Ultimately, the question of
which paradigm or alternative explanation is capable of explaining the most variance in
governance structures is an empirical one". Accordingly, future studies may examine the
75 As Conner (1991:145) states, this may be tempting, since "it appears that reliable measures of underlying resources
pose a heavy data burden on empirics ",
76 Ho-wever, many o/the relevant rival motives have been controlled/or.
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sociological explanations for vertical integration and compare the effect of these explanations
with the efficiency-driven explanations provided in this study.
Moreover, the empirical test of the study has examined integration as a strategy of internal
expansion. Thus, no effort was made to distinguish between the different options available for
vertical integration?". The theoretical framework outlined may also be appropriate for
explaining merger/acquisition. However, we think that additional variables may be
incorporated. We think that further progress when studying merger/acquisition can use and
further elaborate many of the arguments from Penrose (1959). As we see it, the insight from
Penrose might be even more important today than it was nearly four decades ago, because of
the progress done in the resource-based theory and evolutionary economics. Accordingly, the
below discussion is mainly connected to Penrose's work from 1959.
We recall from Section 2.3 Penrose's (1959) main argument why firms will economize on
growth: When previous problems can be handled routinely, managerial and productive
resources are released and become available for planning and performing new activities.
Moreover, a firm considers two groups of resources - its own inherited resources, and those it
must obtain in the market in order to carry out its production and growth program (Penrose,
1959). If a firm decides to expand, individuals with relevant experience can to some extent be
hired. In a short-term perspective, however, the possibility of efficient use of new employees is
limited, because new employees will lack the experience within the given group or firm
(Penrose, 1959). Besides, if some people should have this experience, such workers may be
available to limited degree. In contrast, merger and acquisition strategies can be used as a
means of obtaining new managerial and productive resources as a supplement to the firm's
own resources (Penrose, 1959). But still, according to Penrose, such strategies must rely on
resource relatedness in such a way that existing resources can be more appropriately used:
"Acquisition is often a profitable process precisely because the firm has peculiar qualifications
77 As discussed in Section 7.4, the empirical test concerns backward vertical integration by expansion. The setting
characteristics exclude backward merger or acquisitions as available options in the industry, since mainly three large
companies in Norway and two large companies abroad represent the vendor side of the dyadic relations. Given the limited
attention vertical integration has been given in the competence framework, it may be more suitable to study expansion
rather than merger or acquisition. According to Penrose (1959), a theory of firm growth may best be understood and
developed as a theory of internal expansion: "The significance of merger [and acquisition] can best be appraised in the
light of its effect on theprocess of and limits to internal growth" {1959:5}.
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in the new field" (1959:129). Firms conducting merger/acquisition strategies are expected to
search for potential firms, which can complement or supplement their existing resources
(Penrose, 1959). Accordingly, while a high degree of relatedness (great buyer's CPC) may be
related to internal expansion, medium closeness will probably be related to merger/acquisition.
Consequently, a proposition can be offered that the increase from low to medium degrees of
buyer's CPC is expected to be positively related to merger/acquisition.
However, we expect that other factors to a larger extent than is the case with internal
expansion, may determine the decision of merger and acquisition. Penrose introduces factors
such as the ease of developing appropriate co-ordinating procedures between the firms, the
issue that the former independent firm requirement of autonomy, potential financial problems,
merger or acquisition must be profitable for both parties, as representing possible modification
effects. Thus, a proposition may be that increasing degrees of buyer's CPC (from low to
medium) will be positively related to merger or acquisition, if:
The buyer's present routines are stabilized (and, accordingly, managerial and
productive resources are released).
The acquired firm also will profit from the merger or acquisition.
The co-ordinating procedures are expected to be easily developed.
The acquiring firm has sufficient financial support or strength.
From this very general proposition, several testable hypotheses can be derived in future
research. The "if statements", we presume, can act as moderating variables between the main
effect in a model. The problem of conducting large-scale studies must, however, be examined.
As previously stated, we do not think that e.g. standard industry classification systems will be
an appropriate departure for such empirical work. Moreover, much effort must be directed to
the operationalization of the "moderating" variables, especially with respect to "routine-
stability". One strategy can be to measure for how long present activities have been performed
in the firm. The longer the time, the more stabilized the routines, and the more resources may
be released. The proposition can also be extended to distinguish between when merger and
acquisition strategies will be chosen instead of internal expansion. As the increase from low to
medium degrees ofbuyer's CPC is expected to be positively related to merger/acquisition, the
increase from medium to high degrees of buyer's CPC is expected to be positively related to
internal expansion. However, some firms may choose merger or acquisition if they for some
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specific strategic reasons wish to acquire knowledge unrelated to current competence. In such
situations, however, the firms must dedicate a strong degree of effort and willingness "... to
sacrifice current output as well as gains from specialization to permit .. , personnel to acquire
the requisite breadth of knowledge that would permit absorption of knowledge from new
domains" (Cohen & Levinthal, 1990:149). This is, however, beyond the Penrosian and RBT-
perspective on how firms are expected to get 'above normal rents', and cannot be explained
within this framework. However, firms in such situations must be able to devote a large
amount of investments to maintain the efficiency of the firm. Not only must they make
extensive investments in the new field, they must also "keep up with competitor's innovation
and expansion in its existing field" (Penrose, 1959:137).
Moreover, this study has focused on the choice between market versus hierarchical and
governance forms. However, during the last decade increasing attention has been directed
towards the intermediate forms between market and hierarchy. Interfirm arrangements are
often viewed as intermediate or hybrid forms along an institutional continuum of market to
hierarchies. Our study is faced with the limitations of not trying to explain these hybrid forms.
Below, however, we outline an initial step to how the framework of the study may be utilized
in the study of the hybrid form.
In Table 9.3 the variables of transaction specific investments (TSI) and closeness to primary
competence (CPC) have been combined to form a typology based on the theoretical
framework of the study. The four cells represent different kinds of costs determined by the
value of the variables in the table. Transaction and production cost differences in favor of
either market or hierarchy are classified as high difference, marginal differences or no
differences. In parenthesis it is indicated which governance mode is the most efficient solution
with respect to production costs and transaction costs, respectively (either Marked (M),
Hierarchy (H) or no). The most efficient governance mode based on the sum ofproduction and
transaction costs is indicated after the number of the cell (e.g. in CellI, marked is proposed to
be the most efficient solution).
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High PC differences (M)
High TC differences (M)
2. Marked





Marginal PC differences (M)
No TC differences
4. Hierarchy
High TC differences (H)
Marginal PC differences (M)
Using a strict cost efficiency analysis, utilizing the arguments from the study's synthesis,
markets will be preferred in three out of the four cells. The way the synthesis differs from TCE
and the competence perspective is illustrated in Table 9.4, where the cells indicate what TCE,
the competence perspective, and the synthesis will predict, respectively.
Table 9.4 Comparing the predictions in the perspectives
TCE Competence Syntheses
Perspective
Celli Market Market Market
Ce1l2 Hierarchy Market Market
Ce1l3 Market Hierarchy Market
Ce1l4 Hierarchy Hierarchy Hierarchy
Both the competence perspective and TCE will predict "right" in three out of four cases.
However, TCE is "wrong" in Cell 2 while the competence perspective is wrong in Cell 3.
Notice, however, that the two perspectives predict similarly in two of the cases. However, the
fact that the two perspectives do not account for the main variable in the other perspective is a
crucial shortcoming of both perspectives. Using only the TCE-framework when TSI is high,
one does not know if Cells 2 or 4 represent the described situation. This is acute, since Cells 2
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and 4 in our framework actually predict different governance modes. The same problem is
present using only the competence framework when CPC is high. If using only the competence
perspective one does not know if Cells 3 or 4 represents the described situation.
Case 1 and 4 are the straightforward situations, where market and hierarchy are preferred,
respectively. In Cells 2 and 3 the situations are not so clear-cut. In Cell 2, due to high
production costs differences and similar transaction costs, the market will be preferred (note
that this contrasts the standard TCE-predictions). The situation is even more complex in case
3, where the only cost efficiency argument that speaks for market is marginal TC-differences in
favor of a market solution. In such situations there will be marginal cost differences between
the two choices and other aspects than cost efficiency analysis will probably influence the
decision. However, both cases in Cells 2 and 3 may alternatively be governed by a kind of
hybrid form (Bradach & Eccles, 1989). Thus, we propose that further research on the hybrid
form may utilize the framework developed in this study to examine the situations descnbed in
Cells 2 and 3 in Table 9.4.
Moreover, the only hypothesis that was not empirically supported, was trust's expected
modification effect on TSI and VI. In Section 9.1 we provided one possible post-hoc
explanation for the negative finding (i.e., the construct was poorly measured). The other
interpretation, addressed below, may question the behavioral assumption ofthis study.
We argued that trust might be seen as a necessary condition for recurrent transactions, but not
as a sufficient one (cf. Chapter 4 and Ring & Van de Ven, 1992). However, the direct effect of
trust on vertical integration was significant (see Table 8.8). This empirical finding is
inconsistent with our theoretical arguments. By contrast, this finding may fit well into those
competence theories, which try to rationalize economic organization as the desire of belonging
to a moral community (cf. Section 2.3 and Kogut & Zander, 1992; 1996). Within this
framework, firms exist in light of being distinct social entities because of their ability to
develop shared identities among its members (cf. Section 6.2; Kogut & Zander, 1996; Conner
& Prahaled, 1996). Consequently, if interfirm relationships may provide the satisfaction of
belonging to a moral community (Kogut & Zander, 1996), markets will do as well as firms.
Thus, both firms and interfirm relationships may be viewed as 'social communities of
voluntaristic action' (Kogut & Zander, 1996). Consequently, in some contexts the issue of
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having social ties and interpersonal relations provide an incentive in itself for continuing the
relationship. This potential extension of Kogut & Zander (1996) and Conner & Prahaled's
(1996) works, however, result in the paradox that they therein are not able to rationalize the
firm on knowledge grounds. If interfirm relations may satisfy the same requirement as firms,
transactions may be governed equally in markets as in firms. The proposition would be that as
long as the wish of social belonging to a moral community is satisfied, market and firms do
equally well.
Within a calculative economic framework, such a view cannot explain the difference between
firm and market organization. In Chapter 4, we distinguished between calculative and real trust
(Chiles & McMackin, 1996). We argued that the calculative aspect is connected to reputation
and knowledge-based trust. By contrast, real trust implies a total internalizing of somebody
else's wishes and intentions and some kind of altruistic behavior. According to Williamson
(1993:484), real trust makes no sense in an efficiency framework: "Be that as it may, trust, if it
obtains at all, is reserved for very special relations between family, friends, and lovers".
However, may it be that the actual problem of the treatment of real trust primarily is a result of
the trade-offbetween consistency and realism in assumptions (Simon, 1991). Thus, may it be
that so-called real trust (based on ethics, kinship, friendship, and empathy, cf. Nooteboom et
al., 1997) may have positive effect on efficiency?
Our study shows that trust has a direct effect on vertical integration. However, this study is a
reduced form of analysis and efficiency is not tested explicitly. Thus, it is examined whether
actors behave according to the theory, and it is assumed that the choice of governance from is
an efficient one. To address efficiency explicitly, one should examine governance forms' effect
on efficiency depending on the level of asset specificity. Thus, future research may address to
what degree trust as a calculative and an affective component, respectively, may have an
impact on efficiency. Two hypotheses should be examined. Further studies should examine
both the calculative dimension of trust as well as test the real trust dimension effect on
efficiency. Both hypotheses may be addressed as interacting with asset specificity. However,
the inclusion oftrust's effect on efficiency is not just an empirical question. Ifthe issue of real
trust has something to tell economics, theoretical "answers" are even more important.
However, in light of our study, one should be careful with changing the assumptions of
opportunistic attitude of economic actors. All the other predictions in the study, based on this
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assumption, were supported. Thus, the theoretical challenge of solving the issue of real trust is
a great challenge for future research.
The present findings should be interpreted in the light of the study' s methodological
limitations. The use of hypothetical measures on the dependent variable may introduce some
uncertainty in the interpretation of the results. Especially, the most common problem with this
normative theory has been described as the preference reversal problem (cf. Section 7.4). The
broader implication of this phenomenon connected to economic action and theory on firm
levels is, however, still undiscovered (Slovic & Lichtenstein, 1983; Whyte, 1994), and should
be subject to further research. When studying vertical integration one can e.g. conduct a
longitudinal design measuring preferences at one point of time, and subsequently follow up
with measuring real choice behavior. Consequently, the consistency between preferences and
behavior can by used to evaluate to what degree the hypothetical measure is a valid indicator.
The operationalization of the dependent variable is, however, consistent with a rational choice
approach, assuming preferences to be consistent with choices. Additionally, the results
obtained (i.e., asset specificity's impact on vertical integration) are consistent with previous
research within the transaction cost economics framework.
Moreover, since the buyers in the empirical setting are subject to some economic regulation by
state regulatory agencies (e.g. the distribution network of electric power is still regulated), a
more complicated set of incentives is probably present than when studying the supply
arrangement of completely unregulated firms (Joskow, 1985). However, the maintenance part
of the industry, which is examined in this study, has never been regulated. Nevertheless, it is
necessary to be sensitive to potential biases in supply arrangements that may be caused by the
special circumstances surrounding the setting. The inclusion of control variables was expected
to contribute to this. Additionally, the chosen empirical setting is very homogeneous. Thus,
some possible third variables were ruled out by the setting (cf. Section 7.5). Thus, with respect
to internal validity the study seems valid. However, given the correlational design, causality
cannot be established from this study alone. Our focus was to examine if the pattern of
relationships was consistent with a specific causal understanding. Thus, the present findings are
an initial step on the road to causality determination. In order to establish directionality,
subsequent longitudinal field studies will prove useful in further research.
166
The study's sample includes private as well non-privately owned organizations. The latter
category, though, is to a large degree forced to act competitively. Thus, the results from the
study may prove useful for all organizations present in environments with some pressure on
economic profit. However, further research is needed to establish the generalizability of these
findings to other kinds of contexts.
9.4 Concluding remarks
In this dissertation we have shown how the study of vertical integration can benefit from an
integration of transaction cost economics and the competence perspective. By doing this, we
also indicated the promise of a fruitful integration oftransaction cost and competence theories
in general. This chapter has shown that, as is common for most academic endeavors, the study
has both strengths and limitations. However, most of the limitations arise out of the fact that
no one study can address all aspects relevant for studying a particular phenomenon.
Particularly, this is evident with respect to our choice of assumptions, our choice of
methodology and the way the dependent variable was operationalized. As we see it, however,
these limitations may illustrate useful directions for future research. It is only through a
collection of studies that the issue of integrating transaction cost economics and the
competence framework can be properly unraveled.
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STUDIE AV LEVERANDØRRELASJONER I KRAFTVERKSBRANSJEN
Undertegnede gjennomfører for tiden et dr.grads arbeid om leverandørrelasjoner i kraftverksbransjen. Studien
gjennomføres i samarbeid med EnFO (se vedlegg). Innkjøp og forsyning er områder som har fltt stor
oppmerksomhet i norsk næringsliv den senere tid. Et sentralt punkt er hvordan bedrifter kan effektivisere sine
innkjøpsrutiner. Denne studien analyserer sentrale faktorer som påvirker styring og organisering av
leverandørrelasjoner i kraftverksbransjen. For å realisere studien er vi imidlertid avhengig av Deres velvilje til
å delta. Vi ønsker derfor å kartlegge de erfaringer Deres organisasjon har vedrørende kjøp av mekaniske
vedlikeholdsakti viteter .
Vedlagte spørreskjema inneholder spørsmål omen mekanisk vedlikeholdsaktivitet, hvor en leverandør har hatt
hovedansvaret for gjennomføring. Den som svarer kan selv velge hvilken aktivitet hanJhun ønsker å ta
utgangspunkt i. Kravet er at leverandør ble benyttet sist gang aktiviteten ble utført. Vedlagt finner De 5
identiske spørreskjemaer. Vi ønsker at De evt. svarer på ett av de vedlagte spørreskjemaene. I tillegg ber vi om
Deres velvilje til å distribuere resterende skjema til andre i Deres organisasjon som har kjennskap til og en
viss innflytelse på leverandørhåndtering i mekaniske vedlikeholdsaktiviteter. Disse personene bør være
lokalisert i underavdelinger eller separate organisatoriske enheter. Hvis f.eks. Deres organisasjon returnerer 4
skjemaer, skal4 ulike aktiviteter omhandles og helst besvares av 4 ulike personer. Vi håper naturligvis at flest
mulig av de 5 skjemaene besvares, men uansett er vi er svært takknemlig for de skjemaene som returneres.
Vi gjør oppmerksom på at alle opplysninger vil bli behandlet strengt konfidensielt. Dataene vil kun benyttes i
aggregert form. Det vil altså ikke vil være mulig å tilbakeføre opplysninger til den enkelte organisasjon. Vi
takker for at De og Deres organisasjon vil delta i undersøkelsen. Vennligst returner utfylte spørreskjemaer i de
vedlagte svarkonvolutter innen torsdag 17. april. De personer som svarer på spørreskjemaet vil fl tilsendt et
sammendrag av undersøkelsens resultater. I tillegg vil alle som sender et ferdig utfylt skjema, fl en musikk-
CD tilsendt i posten. Dersom De har noen spørsmål angående undersøkelsen, vær vennlig å ta kontakt med
Boge Gulbrandsen (tlf.: arbeid - 32 Il 72 08/ privat - 22 06 23 OS, e-mail: Boge.Gulbrandsen@hibu.no).
Vennlig hilsen
Boge Gulbrandsen
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Table B.1 Measures of variables in the theoretical model
Vertical integration (Composite Reliability = 0.94)
1. In the longer term, the principal responsibility for carrying out the maintenance activity will be
executed by our own organization.
2. If the need for maintenance should arise unexpectedly, the activity will next time be carried out
internally in our own organization.
3. If the need for maintenance can be foreseen, the activity will next time be carried out by our own
organization.
4. It is very likely that the activity next time will be carried out by our own staff.
Tacitness
Codifiability (Composite Reliability - 0.64)
1. A useful manual describing how the supplier carries out the maintenance activity can be written by our
power station
2. Extensive documentation describing critical parts ofhow the supplier carried out the activity exists in
our unit
Teachability (Composite Reliability - 0.87)
3. Our personnel can easily learn how to carry out the maintenance activity by talking to skilled
personnel
4. Our personnel can easily learn how to carry out the activity by studying a complete set ofblueprints
S. New personell can easily learn how to accomplish the maintenance activity, if they possess general
technical powerstation practice
System dependence (Composite Reliability - 0.50)
6. It is possible for one person to know everything about how to carrying out the entire activity
7. Workers accomplishing the activity have to be in constant contact with others having different
expertise than themselves
Interfirm trust (Composite Reliability = 0.85)
1. We trusted our supplier to accomplish the work in a 100% honest and truthful way
2. We have full confidence that our supplier will act with our best interests in mind
3. We generally trust our supplier to a great extent
Buyer's closeness to primary competence (Composite Reliability = 0.89)
1. Our unit's knowledge can be compared with the knowledge our supplier's employees possess in
carrying out the activity
2. Our unit's skills are suitable for carrying out the activity, compared with our supplier's skills.
3. Our routines and procedures are suitable to accomplish the activity approximately as well as our
supplier
Buyer's human transaction specific investments (Composite Reliability = 0.77)
1. We have spent significant resources in reorganizing the power production in connection with this
particular co-operation
2. Employees working together with our supplier were given spesialized training
3. During the collaboration we brought into notice significant aspects of our supplier's operations.
4. We have spent significant time to acquire knowledge about our supplier's technical standards
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Table B.2 Measures of control and rival variables.
Vendor's human transaction specific investments
1. Our supplier spent significant resources in reorganizing the production in connection with this
particular co-operation
2. Our supplier gave their employees spesialized training in connection with this particular co-operation
3. During the collaboration the supplier brought into notice significant aspects of our unit's operations.
4. The supplier spent significant time to acquire knowledge about our unit's technical standards
5. The supplier spent resources on training and development of our unit's employees.
Environmental uncertainty
1. Availability of alternative vendors in the market is highly uncertain.
2. Uncertainties in accomplishing the maintenance activity in the market are a real problem
3. The market in whicb we buy the maintenance activity is complex.
4. Supply of accomplishing the maintenance activity in the market is not stable.
5. Prices for accomplishing the maintenance activity are volatile
Annual sales
The measure was available from EnFO's database.
Formalization
1. All aspects regarding quality control of the activity purchased from the supplier were stipulated in
a contract.
2. The daily control relationship was expressed in written agreements.
3. We outlined set procedures for how the supplier sbould follow up agreements and sendings
4. Written contracts managed tbe handling of discontent, complaints and disputes.
Buyer's dependence of the supplier
How dependent is the unit ofthis particular supplier for carrying out the maintenance activity?
Technological economies
In order to accomplish the activity in-bouse, we have to undertake great investments in techology and
production equipments.
Capacity utilization
In order to accomplish the activity in-house, to a great extent we have to employ new personnel.
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Table B.3 Measures of variables representing explanatory mechanisms.
Transaction costs
l. We used too much time controlling the supplies of this supplier
2. It was time-consuming and difficult to get necessary verification of production performance and costs
from this supplier
3. The co-ordination and governing of the relationship with this supplier was very costly
4. Our firm did not manage to utilize the skills and production resources ofthis supplier verywell
5. It was difficult to agree with this supplier about specifications ofproducts and services
6. Negotiations about price and payment terms with this supplier proved time-consuming
Opportunistic behavior
l. Occasionally, our supplier altered information in order to carryout things his own way
2. Sometimes our supplier promised to do things without actually doing them later
3. Sometimes, our supplier altered the facts slightly when negotiations were carried out
4. We could expect the supplier to keep back infurmation in order to protect his own interest
Expected transaction costs if integrating the transaction
l. We will use a lot of time to control and monitor our own employeeswhen they carry out the activity
2. It may prove difficult and time-consuming to make agreement with our employees about specifications
and procedures for performing the activity
3. The co-ordination and governing of the employeeswill be very costly
Expected opportunistic behavior if integrating the transaction
1. We may expect our employees to alter or keep back information about the activity ifthis is to their own
advantages
2. We will expect that our employees will alter procedures in order to get the things they want
3. We will expect our employees to keep back information in order to protect their own interests
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APPENDIX C. The choice of estimation method and fit-indexes
A study should not report a long list of indexes but only the most suitable for the study
addressed (Hoyle & Panter, 1995). As recommended by Tanaka (1993) and Hoyle & Panter
(1995) we provide; (1) an overview and justification of the fit-indexes chosen based on the
characteristics of the study; (2) a definition of each index, and, (3) the critical value of each
index that indicates an acceptable fit. Below, we first rationalize the choice of estimation
method before we give an overview of the different fit indexes available. Finally, we justify the
choice of absolute and incremental fit indexes to be evaluated in the study.
ESTIMA nON METHOD
There seem to be a widely accepted, and growing body ofresearch indicating (Hoyle & Panter,
1995) that the estimation method ofrnaximum likelihood (ML) performs more consistent than
generalized least squares (GLS) and asymptotic distribution-free (ADF) in most situations. Hu
& Bentler (1995) through a review of the studies examining this issue, state: "... all the fit
indexes obtained from ML performed much better than those obtained from GLS and ADF and
should be preferred .. for model selection and evaluation." Thus, ML is used as estimation
method in the study.
MODEL FIT: AN OVERVIEW
At the most general level, it is common to classify fit indexes as absolute and incremental
indexes, respectively. Absolute fit assesses how well the covariances implied by the fixed and
free parameters specified in the model reproduce the observed covariances. The RMSEA and
chi-square tests have a known sampling distribution and can be applied as test statistics. For
absolute fit indexes, higher values imply increasing discrepancy, and, thus, these indexes are
actually measuring "absence-of-fit". Incrementa/fit, by contrast, measures the degree to which
the model in question is superior to an alternative model. The alternative model (i.e. the "null"
or independence model) is usually one that specifies no covariation or correlation among the
observed variables in reproducing the observed covariances. Larger values indicate greater
improvement of the model in question over the alternative, and thus, these indexes measure
"goodness-of- fit".
Absolute tit indexes
The X2 test is a measure of perfect fit (i.e., to which degree the measurement model accounts
for the observed correlations or covariations among the indicants). Optimal fit or exact
reproduction of the sample data is indicated by a value of zero. Since the statistical theory for
T is asymptotic, the problem is that the X2 test is sensitive to sample sizes (i.e., as the sample
sizes increases the chances of rejecting the null-hypotheses also increases). The test is,
however, viewed as the most promising index for which the sampling distribution is known
(Hoyle & Panter, 1995). RMSEA is a statistical test of close fit and, thus, it is concerned about
the phenomenon ofapproximation. RMSEA will be zero ifthere is no discrepancy between the
estimated and the observed covariances. RMSEA adjusts for degrees of freedom as it will
increase in size if additional parameters reduce the discrepancy only slightly (Browne &
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Cudeck, 1993). A value ofless than 0.05 indicates a close fit of the model in relation to the
degrees offreedom(Browne & Cudeck, 1993).
Several other absolute fit indexes (e.g. GFI, AGFI, AlC, CAK. CK, MCI, CN) exist in the
literature. The evaluation of these indexes shows mixed results, with the GLE-based GFI as the
most promising candidate (Hu & Bentler, 1995).
IncreEnentalindexes
Because of a growing dissatisfaction with the X2 goodness-of-fit test (Hoyle, 1995; Hu &
Bentler, 1995), a number of alternate fit indexes of fit have been generated. These descriptive
indexes are not statistics (i.e. the distribution is unknown and there is no definitive critical
value) and they are often intuitively interpreted. Thus, incremental indexes cannot be used to
conduct formal statistical tests ofmodel fit. Instead they are treated as global indexes ofmodel
adequacy and derive from the comparison between the fit of a specified model and the fit of an
independence or null model. The null model is one in which no relations among variables are
specified (i.e., all paths are fixed to zero and only variances are estimated). Accordingly, the
null model is of no interest, and serves only as the statistical baseline of comparison for the
evaluation offit. Normally, the incremental indexes vary between zero and one. 0.90 is widely
accepted as a value such indexes must exceed before a model can be considered adequate
(Hoyle, 1995; Hu & Bentler, 1995). Therefore, accepting values lower than 0.91 should be
particularly justified in a study (Hoyle & Panter, 1995).
Hu & Bentler (1995:83), in reviewing different fit-indexes, distinguish between three different
types or groups ofincremental indexes; type-I, type-2 and type-3 indexes. "Type 1 indexes use
information only from the optimized statistics T used in fitting baseline (TB) and target (TT)
models. T is not necessarily assumed to follow any particular distributional form, although it is
assumed that the fit function, F, is the same for both models. Type-2 and type-3 indexes are
based on an assumed distribution of variables and other standard regularity conditions. A type-
2 index additionally uses information from the expected values of TT under the central X2
distribution. A type-3 index uses type-l information but additionally uses information from the
expected values of TB and/or target TT under the relevant noncentral X2 distribution, When the
assumed distributions are correct, type-2 and type-3 should perform better than type-l indexes
because more information is being used; however, note also that type-2 and type-3 indexes
may use inappropriate information because any particular T may not have the distributional
form assumed".
THE CHOICE OF INDEXES
Due to the low to medium sample size of this study, relying too much on X2-test may cause
Type II errors. However, since the X2-test is the only sharp test of the null hypothesis L = La,
it is strongly recommended that it should be included (cf. Hoyle & Panter, 1995). The higher
probability of Type II errors as well as the lack of information of the degree of fit (i.e., the
dichotomous decision strategy implied by a statistical decision rule) in the X2-test clearly
indicate that additional indexes should be incorporated. According to Browne & Cudeck
(1993) a test of close fit (RMSEA) with a corresponding statistical test is a more realistic test
than the test ofperfect fit. In contrast to the chi square, RMSEA penalizes models tested with
small sample sizes. RMSEA adjusts for degrees of freedom, and should be included as an
additional statistical test (Browne & Cudeck, 1993). Numerous absolute indexes in addition to
X2 and RMSEA exist. Ofthese, GFI seems "to perform better than any other absolute indexes"
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(Hu & Bentler, 1995:91). However, several studies have reported a positive association
between GFI and sample size, and GFI has behaved especially poor under dependency
conditions, Accordingly, the only two absolute indexes included are X2 and RMSEA.
Type-I incremental fit indexes seem to underestimate their asymptotic values and overreject
true models at small sample sizes, i.e., the indexes are positively related to sample size (Hu &
Bentler, 1995:94). Thus, type-I indexes (as e.g. NFl and BL86) should in general, and
especially at low sample size be avoided (Hu & Bentler, 1995; Hoyle & Panter, 1995).
Following this advice we do not report type-I indexes.
By contrast, at least one of each from the type-2 and type-3 indexes should be reported (Hoyle
& Panter, 1995). Among the type-2 indexes, NNFI or IFI perform consistently across ML and
marginal association with sample size is reported (Hoyle & Panter, 1995). However, NNFI
behaves somewhat erratically when the latent variated are (as in this study) dependent (Hoyle
& Panter, 1995). Thus, even though both NNFI and IFI will be reported, priority will be given
to IFI, ceteris paribus. From type-S indexes CIF is preferred (cf. Hu and Bentler, 1995). As
noted by Hu and Bentler (1995), CFI is identical to Fl and RNI when their values fall outside
the O-I range. However, for Fl and RN! overfitting and sampling error can lead to values
greater than I (Hoyle & Panter, 1995). CFI, however, may behave somewhat inconsistently
under dependence conditions at sample sizes of250 or lower (Hoyle & Panter, 1995).
Based on the above discussion the choices of estimation method and indexes of model fit is
shown in table D.l. Note, that when the latent variates are dependent, all types ofincremental
indexes (also the included one) seem to overreject models of sample sizes of 250 or less (Hoyle
& Panter, 1995). Accordingly, as the X2 test is not a conservative test in the study (i.e., "gain"
because of a low sample size), the other chosen indexes surely imply conservative tests (i.e., a
"penalty" with low sample size).
Name











Statistical test of the lack of fit p=O.OS
resulting from overidentifying (Good fit indicated by a p-
restrictions placed on a model. value>O.OS)
Statistical test of the lack of close p(close fit)=O.OS)
fit. An index measuring the (Good fit indicated by aRMSEA
discrepancy per degrees of < O.OS)
freedom
Compares the lack of fit of a
target model to the lack of fit of a
baseline model.
Same interpretation as NNFI.
NNFI= 0.9
(Good fit indicated by a NNFI >
0.9)
IFI = 0.9
(Good fit indicated by a IFI >
0.9)
CFI = 0.9
(Good fit indicated by a CFI >
0.9)
Indexes the relative reduction in
lack of fit as estimated by the
noncentral X2 of a target model
versus a baseline model.
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APPENDIX D. Estimated correlation matrix between product terms






a Standard error in parentheses
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APPENDIX E. Descriptive statistics and factor loadings for control
variables, rival predictors and variables representing explanation
mechanisms




Item I 2.549 1.581 0.834 -0.502 0.74
Item2 2.310 1.542 1.266 0.660 0.57
Item 3 2.549 1.476 0.955 0.143 0.65
Item4 2.106 1.249 1.195 0.773 0.67
Item Sa 1.947 1.148 1.330 1.254
ENV_UNC
Item 1 3.851 1.684 0.064 -0.990 0.65
Item2 3.398 1.623 0.568 -0.517 0.63
Item 3 2.579 1.356 1.022 0.366 0.82
Item4 2.598 1.371 1.044 0.524 0.79
ItemS 4.544 1.482 -0.545 -0.545 0.42
ANN_E 599.711 814.912 3.260 12.315 1.0
Rival
predictors
DEP 3.421 1.886 0.403 -1.077 0.98
T_E 4.754 2.039 -0.853 -0.763 0.98
C_U 4.500 2.114 -0.315 -1.374 0.98
FORM
Item 1 4.754 1.743 -0.585 -0.644 0.73
Item2 4.404 1.899 -0.235 -1.089 0.87
Item 3 4.561 1.960 -0.413 -1.210 0.73




Item 1 4.858 1.817 -0.722 -0.531 0.77
Item 2 4.363 1.808 -0.115 -1.050 0.78
Item 3 4.080 1.734 0.041 -0.947 0.82
Ex._OPP
Item 1 3.080 1.699 0.535 -0.692 0.80
Item2 2.752 1.533 0.640 -0.913 0.83
Item 3 2.248 1.299 1.367 1.785 0.45
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Te
Item 1 2,447 1.482 1.150 0.596 0.81
Item2 2.825 1.620 0.735 -0.523 0.80
Item 3 2.307 1.311 1.234 0.794 0.83
Item4 2,491 1.441 0.949 0.048 0.70
Item 5 2.202 1.415 1.446 1.269 0.77
Item6 2.579 1.545 0.926 0.088 0.75
OPPORT
Item 1 2.919 1.334 0.759 -0.151 0.38
Item 2 2.840 1.470 0.697 -0.670 0.82
Item 3 2.298 1.296 1.287 1.205 0.92
Item4 2.544 1,488 0.791 -0.510 0.79
a Excluded items
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